



# Security Council

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## Progress report of the Secretary-General on Ethiopia and Eritrea

### I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 1320 (2000) of 15 September 2000, and provides an update on the peace process since my report dated 7 July 2004 (S/2004/543). The report also describes the activities of the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), and presents recommendations for adjusting and streamlining its operations. The current mandate of UNMEE expires on 15 September 2004.

### II. Status of the Temporary Security Zone and adjacent areas, and cooperation with the parties

2. The general situation in the Temporary Security Zone and the adjacent areas has remained stable. There have been no major incidents during the period under review, and no significant changes in the disposition and deployment of the armed forces of Ethiopia and Eritrea. A palpable improvement in the cooperation of both parties with UNMEE has also had a positive effect on the overall security environment. At the same time, the concern expressed in the past remains that continued military stability cannot be guaranteed as long as there is no progress in the political process. The continuing mistrust between the parties emanating from the current stalemate carries the risk that a seemingly isolated incident in the border area could bring into jeopardy the security arrangements that have been in place for the past four years. In the meantime, UNMEE has continued, through daily air and ground patrols, to maintain the integrity of the Temporary Security Zone, and to monitor and verify the redeployed positions of the parties' armed forces in the adjacent areas on both sides of the Zone.

3. Relations between the Eritrean authorities and UNMEE have shown signs of a slight improvement since my last report. In particular, there was a decline in restrictions imposed on the Mission's patrols both inside the Temporary Security Zone and in the adjacent areas north of it. I had hoped to be able to report that the Mission's main supply route to its troops in Sector West, the road from Asmara to Barentu via Keren, was once again open to all UNMEE traffic. However, after reopening it on 9 August, the Government informed UNMEE on 30 August that the road would again be closed, effective 1 September.

4. Cooperation between UNMEE and the military authorities on the Ethiopian side has remained satisfactory, and the Ethiopian Armed Forces have continued to honour their commitment not to conduct large-scale training exercises close to the southern boundary of the Temporary Security Zone. Barring a few incidents, the Ethiopian Armed Forces did not impose any restrictions on UNMEE patrols in the adjacent areas south of the Zone.

5. As was the case during previous rainy seasons, incursions into the Temporary Security Zone by Ethiopian herdsmen in Sector Centre have increased in recent weeks. Furthermore, there has been an increase in Eritrean allegations of rustling of livestock by armed Ethiopians inside the Zone. While UNMEE has investigated most of these incidents, their veracity could not be ascertained. In two instances, suspicions of cattle-rustling led Eritrean militia to fire warning shots into the air, which were answered in kind by their Ethiopian counterparts. UNMEE has advised both parties to desist from such actions, which could potentially destabilize the situation in and around the Zone. By and large, both sides have responded in an adequate manner. UNMEE has also regularly looked into incidents of livestock straying across the southern boundary of the Zone, and the parties have cooperated fully in identifying and returning the animals.

6. UNMEE continued to investigate reported or observed defections of military personnel and civilians from both sides across the southern boundary of the Temporary Security Zone. All of the incidents ended peacefully, with the exception of one in Sector East, in which the defection of an Eritrean militiaman caused Eritrean militia to fire warning shots in an attempt to apprehend him. Ethiopian militia responded by firing several warning shots to dissuade the defector's pursuers. UNMEE subsequently lodged a protest with both sides, calling on them to refrain from such actions, as they could jeopardize the fragile peace in the Zone. Both sides have agreed to discuss and resolve this and other issues in the meetings of the Sector Military Coordination Commission.

#### **Freedom of movement**

7. Freedom of movement for UNMEE personnel operating in Eritrea has improved in recent weeks: fewer restrictions have been imposed on the Mission's patrols, and there have been new opportunities to visit the redeployed positions of the Eritrean Defence Forces. Ethiopia has generally allowed UNMEE patrols full freedom of movement. However, the immigration procedures imposed on UNMEE staff entering and exiting Ethiopia and Eritrea at the airports in Addis Ababa and Asmara, respectively, remained in place. I urge both parties to ease those measures, and further appeal to the Government of Eritrea to renounce its insistence on receiving prior notification for non-Mission partners travelling on UNMEE carriers on both domestic and cross-border flights.

8. On 18 August, I received a letter from the Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Meles Zenawi, informing me of his Government's decision to allow United Nations aircraft to fly directly between Asmara and Addis Ababa without any deviation. This gesture is very welcome, since the indirect flights have had major operational, security and financial implications for UNMEE since its inception four years ago. In addition to being a real improvement for the Mission's operations, I hope that the direct flights will contribute to building much-needed confidence between the two countries. A team of UNMEE experts met with their Ethiopian counterparts on 31 August to

work out the technical details for the implementation of the direct flights as soon as possible.

#### **Military Coordination Commission**

9. Under the chairmanship of the Force Commander of UNMEE, the twenty-fifth meeting of the Military Coordination Commission was held in Nairobi on 5 July 2004. The meeting, which was conducted in a relatively cordial and constructive atmosphere, reviewed the military situation in and around the Temporary Security Zone, the Sector Military Coordination Commission process, and the impact of possible future adjustments to the Mission's configuration. Progress has been made in meetings of the Military Coordination Commission at the sector level. Until now, UNMEE has been able to hold a total of six sector-level meetings, the most recent of which was held on 24 August in Sector Centre. The Military Coordination Commission is tentatively scheduled to hold its next meeting on 20 September in Nairobi.

#### **Status of the Mission and related issues**

10. As at 30 August, the total strength of the UNMEE military component stood at 3,879, comprising 3,564 troops, 101 headquarters staff officers, and 214 military observers (see annex II).

11. On 23 July, Major General Rajender Singh of India assumed his functions as the new Force Commander of UNMEE. I would like to express my appreciation to Major General Robert Gordon, who had served with distinction as the UNMEE Force Commander since October 2002.

12. Since my last report, there has been a significant decrease in detentions by the Eritrean authorities, on the grounds of national service obligations, of locally recruited United Nations staff. During this period, only one local staff member was detained, and he was released four days later at the Mission's request. While the decrease in detentions is welcome, I call, once again, on the Government of Eritrea to sign the status-of-forces agreement with the United Nations without further delay.

### **III. Review of the Mission's operations**

13. In accordance with Security Council resolution 1531 (2004) of 12 March, I have carried out a review of the effectiveness of UNMEE in order to develop recommendations for the Council's consideration on how the Mission's operations might be adjusted and streamlined. During the review, various options were studied by the Secretariat and UNMEE, and an assessment team from New York visited the Mission area in June. The parties and international partners were consulted during the process.

14. There is no doubt that UNMEE has made a major contribution to the consolidation of the ceasefire between Ethiopia and Eritrea, thus creating a security space for the implementation of the Algiers Agreements and the humanitarian activities in the Temporary Security Zone, which stretches over nearly 1,000 kilometres in an often prohibitive terrain. It is generally agreed that the military component of UNMEE is a vital factor of stability, and that the United Nations should be careful not to leave a security vacuum. At the same time, there is a

realization that, after four years on the ground, the time has come to review and adjust the Mission's configuration, particularly since some areas of the Zone have been militarily stable since the establishment of the Mission.

15. The review process has, to the extent possible, carefully considered the possible implications of any adjustments for the future of the peace process and the results achieved so far. With this in mind, it is believed that any change in the UNMEE force structure should be gradual, take into consideration the security dynamics throughout the Mission area, and not undermine the core monitoring function of UNMEE or the prospect of the Boundary Commission resuming its work. In fact, should the current stalemate in the peace process be broken, leading to demarcation of the border, I would recommend the temporary strengthening of UNMEE in a number of areas, including humanitarian, human rights and legal affairs. In the current circumstances, however, I would recommend to proceed with adjustments to the Mission's presence in two phases.

16. Phase I is already in progress. This phase includes replacing the Slovak military demining contingent, which left the Mission in June, with a modest commercial capacity, resulting in savings of some \$6 million annually. In addition, UNMEE has started adjusting its force headquarters staff, which will be reduced by up to 30 per cent.

17. Phase II would entail the repatriation of the infantry battalion and support elements from Sector East, and the consolidation of the existing three sectors into two sectors. The remaining two infantry battalions would adjust their respective areas of responsibility in order to support and secure the military observers remaining in the current Sector East. The drawdown of troops would be offset to the extent possible by an increase in the flying hours of the existing air assets, thus helping to compensate for the reduction in the Mission's direct monitoring capacity and visibility on the ground. At the completion of Phase II, the military structure would comprise a force headquarters, two infantry battalions, two demining units, other existing support elements and up to 220 military observers. The force reserve, to be determined by the Force Commander, would come from the remaining force structure. This phase would be accompanied by commensurate reductions in the number of civilian staff. The proposed Phase II could commence as soon as approved by the Security Council and, taking into account planned troop rotations, could be completed by the beginning of 2005. The annual savings in troop costs, after adjusting for the increased flying hours, may amount to some \$20 million annually, including the savings for logistic support.

18. Following the implementation of the two phases described above, further reductions may be justified; the extent and nature of these would depend on the situation on the ground upon the completion of Phase II. While the impact of further reductions in the number of troops could to some extent be offset by an increase in the number of military observers, such a drawdown could reduce the Mission's ability to fully discharge its existing monitoring mandate and respond adequately to all local incidents across the Temporary Security Zone.

#### **IV. Boundary Commission**

19. It is very unfortunate that the Boundary Commission remains unable to proceed with the demarcation of the border, as mandated by the parties in the

Algiers Agreement of December 2000. The Commission has so far maintained a presence in the area, albeit at a limited capacity. However, in its fourteenth report contained in annex I to the present report, the President of the Commission states that, should no progress be made by the end of 2004, the Commission may need to close down its field offices, in order to conserve the remaining funds earmarked for demarcation activities. At the same time, additional funds will be required to complete the demarcation of the whole border when the process resumes.

## **V. Mine action**

20. Landmines and unexploded ordnance continue to claim victims in the Temporary Security Zone and its adjacent areas, hindering the return to normalcy for the population of both countries. From the end of May to the end of August 2004, there were eight incidents involving landmines and unexploded ordnance, in which three people were killed and four injured. UNMEE continued to closely monitor the threat of this scourge throughout its area of operations, destroyed 78 mines and 418 items of unexploded ordnance, and cleared 110,552 m<sup>2</sup> of land and 488 km of road. Meanwhile, the Mission's mine risk education field teams continued to make good progress in providing community-based mine risk education to the people of particularly affected areas in Sectors West and Centre. In total, more than 5,800 people received such education during the reporting period.

21. Arrangements are currently being made to employ a modest commercial asset to replace the Slovak demining contingent, which left the Mission area at the end of June 2004. The memorandum of understanding with the United Nations Office for Project Services is being amended accordingly.

## **VI. Humanitarian developments**

22. Adequate response to persistent humanitarian needs in Ethiopia and Eritrea continued to be of concern to United Nations agencies and implementing partners. In view of this ongoing situation, I have extended the mandate of my Special Envoy for the Humanitarian Crisis in the Horn of Africa, Martti Ahtisaari, for another six months to enable him to continue to work with the two Governments, the donor community, the United Nations country teams and other stakeholders to identify longer-term solutions to the humanitarian challenges.

23. In Ethiopia, needs assessments carried out in July 2004 in crop-growing and pastoral areas of the country revealed that, owing to poor and erratic rainfall, food availability has deteriorated significantly in several parts of the country. As a result, the total population requiring humanitarian assistance until the end of 2004 has increased to 7.8 million. Contributions towards the 500,000 tons of food aid required until the end of the year have resulted in a net shortfall of 100,000 tons. As the effect of the drought continues, substantial new needs are expected to emerge for which donor support will be crucial. Funding for non-food assistance stands at only 56 per cent of requirements for 2004. Funding this gap requires the additional amount of \$7 million for new malaria drugs, because of the recent change in the malaria drug regime. Humanitarian agencies continue to express serious concern about the funding imbalance in favour of food, stressing that more urgent attention

is required for meeting critical non-food needs, particularly in the health and nutrition, water and sanitation and agriculture sectors.

24. In Eritrea, there has been an improvement in food aid pledges since the last report. Of the total unmet food requirement of 433,000 tons, approximately 52 per cent has been contributed. The impact of the drought persists, however, and Eritrea's capacity to cope has further declined, particularly since more than 70 per cent of the population live below the poverty line and need humanitarian assistance. Some 425,000 children under 14 continue to be affected by drought conditions and the lingering effects of war. The malnutrition rate stands at more than 10 per cent in four of the country's six administrative regions, many children under five suffering acute malnutrition. Under-5 mortality has increased to 1.5 per cent, comparable to 1 per 10,000 per day.

25. The poor seasonal rains have led to acute water shortages in many parts of Eritrea, adversely affecting access to clean water. In addition, only 39 per cent of the seeds needed for planting were available, translating into loss of production opportunities for the season. The scarcity of the seasonal rains and its impact on food security and potable water point to another year of food shortages and emergency humanitarian assistance. The situation of internally displaced persons and expellees in camps worsened with the rainy season, and humanitarian agencies and the Government have expressed the need for donor support in the resettlement of approximately 25,000 people. The continuing inability of this population to resettle, coupled with the failure to resume cross-border economic activities, has left many people exposed to serious humanitarian and economic constraints.

#### **Quick-impact projects**

26. UNMEE continued to implement quick-impact projects in the Temporary Security Zone and in the areas adjacent to it, using voluntary contributions received through the Trust Fund for the Support of the Peace Process in Ethiopia and Eritrea. Of a total of 123 projects, 97 projects have now been completed since April 2001. Most of the projects have been implemented in the sector of water/sanitation (51 per cent), followed by education (46 per cent) and health (23 per cent). The Government of Norway has recently pledged a contribution of \$250,000 to the Trust Fund. I urge donors to continue to lend support to these projects by making additional contributions to the Trust Fund. In view of the importance of these activities, consideration could be given to including, partially, allocations for this purpose in the UNMEE budget, as is done in some other United Nations operations in Africa.

#### **HIV/AIDS activities**

27. UNMEE continued its HIV/AIDS capacity-building activities through weekly HIV/AIDS awareness programmes, training of trainers and the promotion of voluntary confidential counselling and testing in the workplace. Three training-of-trainers courses were conducted jointly with the United Nations country teams, the Africa AIDS Initiative, People Living with HIV/AIDS, and other non-governmental organizations as well as the youth. In addition, UNMEE was represented at a two-day heads of agency seminar organized by UNAIDS. Jointly with UNAIDS in Eritrea, the Mission conducted the first refresher training for HIV/AIDS learning facilitators. The course ran for six days and included participants from UNMEE, the United Nations country teams, non-governmental organizations and hotels.

28. With technical support from UNAIDS, UNMEE conducted in July 2004 its first self-assessment framework for HIV/AIDS competencies, with a view to assessing strengths and weaknesses and devising strategies for bridging the gaps. The Mission's HIV/AIDS Task Force further held monthly meetings, which focused on the monitoring and evaluation of cascade training linked to developed workplace plans.

## **VII. Human rights**

29. UNMEE continued to follow up with local civilian and security officials reports of individuals of the "other" nationality arrested or reported missing on either side of the Temporary Security Zone, and maintained regular contact with their families. The Mission was recently granted access to visit an Eritrean held at Badme police station and followed up on the case. It would be beneficial for UNMEE to have similar access to Ethiopians detained by the Eritrean authorities inside the Zone. The ongoing illegal and arbitrary detention of individuals arrested within the Zone, and of those civilians who voluntarily cross into it, continues to be worrisome.

30. UNMEE recently observed an increase in allegations of abductions of Eritrean nationals by Ethiopian Armed Forces personnel in various locations in Sector Centre. The increase apparently coincided with the rotation of the armed forces and the deployment in May 2004 of a new division in the area. Following investigations of the allegations and constructive meetings with the division commander, the Mission received assurances that its concerns would be addressed in the future. While working relations with partners remained sound in both countries, relations with some local officials continue to be problematic, particularly with regard to information-sharing and access to persons and locations that fall within the Mission's mandate.

31. UNMEE continues to monitor the situation of the most vulnerable groups, paying special attention to the welfare of minors who cross the Temporary Security Zone. At the end of July 2004, 46 Eritrean unaccompanied minors were being housed at Indabaguna (Ethiopia) in Sector West, under the protection of UNHCR. UNMEE is working closely with ICRC and UNHCR with a view to addressing the issue of those minors who have asked to return to Eritrea. The relocation of the camp for Eritrean refugees and asylum-seekers from Wa'al N'hibi to Shimelba, a site located about 50 km from the southern boundary of the Zone, was completed in June 2004. Long-standing residents of the former camp welcomed the relocation and the improved facilities at the new site. An estimated 1,000 residents chose not to be resettled at Shimelba, however, and their whereabouts are not known. Eritreans resident in Ethiopia reported growing confidence in the new directives issued by the Government of Ethiopia in January 2004, aimed at improving their legal status. I encourage both parties to extend residency and citizenship rights to all residents having the "other" national origin, in accordance with each country's national legislation.

32. UNMEE continued to conduct human rights promotional activities for law enforcement officials and women's associations in Ethiopia, where it is receiving a growing number of requests for human rights training in general, including for

prison officials. I am contemplating a modest expansion of the human rights office of UNMEE in order to meet the additional requirements and an evolving context.

### **VIII. Public information**

33. UNMEE public information activities have continued through radio programmes, weekly press briefings and the monthly newsletter. The number of visitors to the two Outreach Centres in Ethiopia continued to increase, and plans are under way to open a third centre at Adigrat.

### **IX. Financial aspects**

34. The General Assembly, by its resolution 58/302 of 18 June 2004 appropriated the amount of \$198.3 million, equivalent to \$16.5 million per month, for the maintenance of UNMEE for the financial period from 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2005. Should the Security Council decide to extend the mandate of UNMEE beyond 15 September 2004, the cost of maintaining the Mission would be limited to the amount approved by the General Assembly. As at 31 July 2004, unpaid assessed contributions to the special account for UNMEE amounted to \$50.6 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations as at that date amounted to \$2.4 billion.

### **X. Observations**

35. While the situation between Eritrea and Ethiopia remains far from ideal, there have been some positive developments in areas relating to UNMEE operations. On the Eritrean side, UNMEE has experienced a decline in restrictions on its freedom of movement; a cessation of anti-UNMEE statements by officials; and a significant decrease in the number of detentions of locally recruited United Nations staff. As regards Ethiopia, the main positive development during the reporting period is its decision to allow UNMEE to fly directly between Asmara and Addis Ababa. These steps appear to indicate that the two parties appreciate the need to cooperate with the Mission, in order for it to be fully effective. If so, such measures should be followed by additional improvements in cooperation. My Special Representative and the Mission as a whole are always prepared to assist the parties to consolidate peace in the region.

36. I remain concerned about the overall status of the peace process or, more specifically, the absence of prospects for breaking the continuing stalemate regarding the demarcation of the border between the two countries. During my visit to Eritrea and Ethiopia at the beginning of July, I met with the two leaders in their respective capitals. Unfortunately, despite my strong encouragement, neither side offered any new ideas on how the peace process could be advanced, and restated their positions. There is reason to believe that the longer the impasse persists, without any consequences for either party, the less likely either of them will be to show flexibility or radically modify its position. In addition, the longer the political deadlock continues, the greater the risk of an incident which could have serious consequences. While both parties stress that they have no desire to unleash an armed



conflict, they reportedly continue to arm themselves and state that they would not hesitate to react if provoked.

37. The key to breaking the current stalemate is the implementation of the Boundary Commission's final and binding decision of 13 April 2002. The main challenge to its implementation remains Ethiopia's opposition to significant parts of the decision. I therefore call on the Government of Ethiopia to reconsider its position, taking into account its wider and longer-term implications. In addition to the immediate consequences for peace and stability in the region, the delay in the implementation of a central component of the Algiers Agreement of December 2000 could also set an unfortunate precedent for the future resolution of similar disputes.

38. For its part, Eritrea still insists that dialogue is not possible before the completion of the demarcation process, and has so far refused to meet with my Special Envoy, Lloyd Axworthy. In his letters addressed to me, the President of Eritrea continues to express his perception of my good offices initiative as an accommodation of Ethiopia's rejection of the Boundary Commission decision, and his reluctance to work with my Special Envoy. By now, it should be clear that progress will not be made merely by restating and maintaining positions which are well known. It is time that the more cooperative spirit demonstrated by the two parties towards UNMEE in recent weeks be applied to the broader political process, in order to move it forward.

39. Ethiopia's position on the Boundary Commission decision and Eritrea's position on my Special Envoy continue to hinder any progress in my initiative to help expedite the implementation of the Algiers Agreement. I appeal to Ethiopia to allow demarcation to proceed expeditiously in accordance with the Commission's decision, and to both parties to adopt a more constructive approach towards the efforts of my Special Envoy with a view to moving the peace process forward. The United Nations and the wider international community, which remain committed to assisting the parties, can only serve as facilitators in that regard. I, therefore, call on the parties to face this fact squarely and to realize that the opportunity cost of postponing peace grows immensely with time. Both Governments need peace and stability to focus on the serious humanitarian and development challenges facing their countries.

40. As regards UNMEE, the peacekeeping operation was established as a temporary measure, to create conditions conducive to a permanent settlement. These conditions have generally been present on the ground for quite some time. However, the political will to move decisively to implement the Algiers Agreement is still lacking. It would therefore be important for the international community, in particular the members of the Security Council and the witnesses of the Algiers Agreements, to intensify their efforts to help Eritrea and Ethiopia to conclude this peace process without further hesitation. In the meantime, I recommend that the mandate of UNMEE be extended for a further six months, until 15 March 2005, and that the Security Council authorize the implementation of the proposed adjustments contained in section III of the present report.

41. In conclusion, I would like to express my gratitude to my Special Representative and to the civilian and military personnel serving in UNMEE for their commitment and hard work. I would further like to thank all the Mission's partners, including the United Nations country teams and other humanitarian agencies, individual Member States, the African Union and other international

organizations for the support they lend to the peace process. I also wish to acknowledge the work and determination of my Special Envoy, and the important support of all others involved in this process, including the troop-contributing countries.

## Annex I

### **Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission: fourteenth report on the work of the Commission**

1. This is the fourteenth report of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission, covering the period from 4 June to 20 August 2004.
2. As indicated in its thirteenth report, the Commission has, regrettably, and for reasons beyond its control, been unable to make progress with its demarcation activities. The Commission is unaware of any developments during the period currently under review that would cause it to revise its conclusion that, until the positions of either or both of the parties are modified, there is nothing more that the Commission can do.
3. As noted in its thirteenth report, the Commission, in keeping with its undertaking to continue its work, if the parties cooperate fully in the manner foreseen in the Algiers Agreement, is maintaining its presence in the area, but has reduced its activity to the minimum compatible with its being able to resume it, if and when the parties make it possible for the Commission to do so. The Commission is still maintaining its field offices in both capitals, but with reduced staff, but, having regard to the financial implications of delays in the demarcation process, it cannot maintain a presence in the area indefinitely. The Commission reiterates its hope that the parties will cooperate “fully and promptly” with the Commission, as set out in paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 1531 (2004), and thus enable it to resume its mission. Should no progress be made by the end of 2004, the Commission may see no alternative but to close its field offices and to release its remaining staff hired for those offices, in order to conserve the remaining amount in the Trust Fund for use in future demarcation activities.
4. The Special Consultant provided progress reports to the parties through the Secretary on 9 July and 5 August 2004, both stating: “as the Parties have not made it possible for the Commission to resume its activity, no progress was made in [June] [July] and there is nothing to report”. Unless and until there is some marked change in the situation, there is no point in continuing with these progress reports and they will, accordingly, be suspended forthwith.
5. Under article 4 (17) of the Algiers Agreement, the parties are required to bear the expenses of the Commission in equal shares, and accordingly deposits have been required from them at regular intervals. Eritrea has paid its latest deposit, while Ethiopia, despite repeated reminders, including that in paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 1531 (2004), still has not. The Commission therefore remains unable to make payment on certain accrued expenses and has no funds in hand to finance any renewed activity.

(Signed) Sir Elihu **Lauterpacht**  
President of the Commission

20 August 2004

## Annex II

**United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea: contributions as  
at 11 June 2004**

<i>Country</i>	<i>Military observers</i>	<i>Troops</i>	<i>Staff</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>National support elements</i>
Algeria	8			8	
Australia			2	2	
Austria	2		1	3	
Bangladesh	7	168	4	179	
Benin			0	0	
Bosnia and Herzegovina	9			9	
Bulgaria	5		2	7	
China	7			7	
Croatia	7			7	
Czech Republic	2			2	
Denmark	4			4	
Finland	7	169	11	187	
France			1	1	
Gambia	4		2	6	
Ghana	11		6	17	
Germany	2			2	
Greece	3			3	
India	9	1523	21	1553	
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	3			3	
Italy		51	1	52	8
Jordan	6	951	14	971	
Kenya	12	669	12	693	
Malaysia	7		4	11	
Namibia	5		1	6	
Nepal	4			4	
Nigeria	6		2	8	
Norway	5			5	
Paraguay	3			3	
Peru	3			3	
Poland	6			6	
Romania	7			7	
Russian Federation	5			5	
Spain	3		2	5	
South Africa	5		3	8	
Sweden	5			5	
Switzerland	4			4	

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<i>Country</i>	<i>Military observers</i>	<i>Troops</i>	<i>Staff</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>National support elements</i>
Tunisia	2		3	5	
Ukraine	7			7	
United Republic of Tanzania	8		3	11	
Uruguay	5	33	3	41	
United States of America	6			6	
Zambia	10		3	13	
<b>Total</b>	<b>214</b>	<b>3 564</b>	<b>101</b>	<b>3 879</b>	<b>8</b>

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