In the matter of an arbitration pursuant to
Article 739 of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement
between the European Union and the European
Atomic Energy Community and the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

PCA Case No. 2024-45

Permanent Court of Arbitration
Peace Palace
The Hague
The Netherlands

Day 1

Tuesday, 28 January 2025

Before:

DR PENELOPE JANE RIDINGS MNZM
PROFESSOR HÉLÈNE RUIZ FABRI
HON JUSTICE MR DAVID UNTERHALTER

\_\_\_\_\_

THE EUROPEAN UNION

Complainant

-v-

THE UNITED KINGDOM

OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND

Respondent

UK-SANDEEL ARBITRATION

\_\_\_\_\_

Transcript produced by Trevor McGowan,
Georgina Vaughn and Lisa Gulland.
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## **APPEARANCES**

## FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION

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MS DANIELA GAUCI, Agent -- member of the European Commission Legal Service

DR BERNHARD HOFSTÖTTER, Agent -- member of the European Commission Legal Service

MS JOSEPHINE NORRIS, Agent -- member of the European Commission Legal Service

DR LAURA PUCCIO, Agent -- member of the European Commission Legal Service

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MR NORMAN GRAHAM, DG MARE, European Commission

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## FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM

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MS CAMILLE BOILEAU, Essex Court Chambers

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DR WEIWEI ZHANG, Baker McKenzie

MR OLIVER BURROWS, UK Government

MR NIALL MACENTEE, UK Government

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MS ZOE COMPSTON, UK Government

MS MAGGIE NG, UK Government

MS CATHERINE WHITE, UK Government

MR MATTHEW NEAT, UK Government

MS RUBY KOOPMAN, UK Government

MR MICHAEL DOWELL, UK Government

MS VICKI CASTRO-SPOKES, UK Government

Trevor McGowan Amended by the parties

MS IMOGEN CESSFORD, UK Government

DR EWEN BELL, UK Government

DR JACOB BENTLEY, UK Government

MR ALLAN GIBB CBE, Scottish Government

MS LAUREN REID, Scottish Government

MS EMMA ROWLAND, FTB Chambers

## FOR THE PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION

DR LEVENT SABANOGULLARI, Registrar and senior legal counsel

MR JOSÉ LUIS ARAGÓN CARDIEL, senior legal counsel

MS ANABEL BLANCO, legal counsel

DR STEFAN SCHÄFERLING, assistant legal counsel

MS ISABELLA KEITH, assistant legal counsel

MS JOANNA SERHAN, case manager

ASSISTANT TO PROFESSOR RUIZ FABRI

PROFESSOR EDOARDO STOPPIONI

\_\_\_\_\_

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09:27 1	Tuesday, 28 January 2025	10:04 1	that the parties do not envisage a requirement to
2	(10.01 am)	2	protect confidential information.
3	THE CHAIRPERSON: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen.	3	May I now ask the Agent for each party to introduce
4	I have the pleasure of opening this hearing of PCA	4	their delegations. First, let me give the floor to the
5	Case 2024-45 in the case UK-Sandeel, European Union	5	European Union.
6	v The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern	6	MR DAWES: Thank you, Madam Chair.
7	Ireland, instituted by the European Union against the	7	Before I introduce the delegation of the European
8	United Kingdom under Article 739 of the Trade and	8	Union, the European Union would like to first express
9	Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and the	9	its gratitude to the Tribunal for taking up this task in
10	European Atomic Energy Community on the one part, and	10	this first dispute under the Trade and Cooperation
11	the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	11	Agreement, or TCA, and the EU would also like to express
12	on the other part. I'll refer to this as the "TCA".	12	its gratitude to the PCA for all its assistance,
13	I'm joined today by my colleagues and fellow members	13	including in the organisation of this hearing.
14	of the Arbitration Tribunal: to my left is Professor	14	My name is Anthony Dawes. And I will let the other
15	Hélène Ruiz Fabri, and to my right is the Honourable	15	agents of the European Union who will address the
16	Justice Mr David Unterhalter. My name is Penelope	16	Tribunal introduce themselves.
17	Ridings.	17	MS NORRIS: Good morning. My name is Josephine Norris,
18	On behalf of the Arbitration Tribunal, I welcome the	18	Agent for the European Union.
19	Agents, counsel and delegations of the European Union	19	DR HOFSTÖTTER: Good morning. My name is
20	and the United Kingdom, and express our gratitude to the	20	Bernhard Hofstötter, Agent for the European Union.
21	parties for their cooperation in the conduct of these	21	DR PUCCIO: Good morning. I am Laura Puccio, Agent for the
22	proceedings.	22	European Union.
23	In accordance with Rule 23 of the Rules of Procedure	23	MS GAUCI: Good morning. I am Daniela Gauci, Agent for the
24	for Dispute Settlement under the TCA and Procedural	24	European Union.
25	Orders Nos. 1 and 2, the Arbitration Tribunal shall sit	25	THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much.
	Page 1		Page 3
		40.07.4	
10:03 1	from today, 20 Ionnam; 2025, until 20 Ionnam; 2025	10.05	
	from today, 28 January 2025, until 30 January 2025.	10:05 1	So now can I give the floor to the United Kingdom to
2	Pursuant to Rule 29 of the Rules of Procedure, the	2	introduce your delegation.
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suit address the Thomas ones of its three claims.  The FU has set out its arguments in its Witten  Submission. It will therefore use this hearing to focus on the cure points of disagreement between the parties, while minimating its broader position as set out in its Witten Submission.  So why are well here today? We are here today be cause the UK's prohibition of all sanded fishing in its waters of the North Sea mulifier ights conferred to use "the EU" pursuant to the "Fisheries" heading of the EU on 31 January 2020. The "Fisheries" heading of the EU on 33 January 2020. The "Fisheries" heading of the EU on 33 January 2020. The "Fisheries" heading of the EU on 34 January 2020. The "Fisheries" heading of the EU on 34 January 2020. The "Fisheries" heading of the EU on 34 January 2020. The "Fisheries" heading of the EU on 34 January 2020. The "Fisheries" heading of the EU on 34 January 2020. The "Fisheries" heading of the EU on 34 January 2020. The "Fisheries" heading of the EU on 34 January 2020. The "Fisheries" heading of the EU on 34 January 2020. The "Fisheries" heading of the EU on 34 January 2020. The "Fisheries" heading of the EU on 34 January 2020. The "Fisheries" heading of the EU on 34 January 2020. The "Fisheries" heading of the EU on 34 January 2020. The "Fisheries" heading of the EU on 34 January 2020. The "Fisheries" heading of the EU and the UK, which have a much longer list of the EU and the UK, which have a much longer the EU and the UK, which have a much longer the EU and the UK, regulating those fisheries relations through a Common Fisheries Policy.  The Fisheries" heading of the TCA establishes a new lead of the EU and the UK and the EU an				
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10:15 1	have impacts, negative impacts, on marine living	10:18 1	" kittiwakes are the key species for which there
2	resources. The EU accepts that rights to access to	2	is substantial concern regarding sandeel fishing"
3	waters to fish may be impaired by fisheries management	3	The Tribunal will find that statement at
4	measures that pursue the legitimate objective of marine	4	Exhibit R-76, which is tab 16 of the core bundle,
5	conservation, provided that such measures respect the	5	page 266.
6	conditions in the TCA.	6	Regarding the second category of sandeel predators,
7	The TCA strikes a careful balance between the	7	marine mammals, again, the scientific advice that the UK
8	conservation of marine living resources and human	8	has identified indicates that:
9	activities, including fishing, and at the heart of this	9	"[While] [s]andeel are also important prey for seals
10	dispute is that the sandeel fishing prohibition	10	and minke whales"
11	disregards that balance.	11	So categories of marine mammals:
12	This brings me on to the scope of the sandeel	12	" these species can forage over a wider area than
13	fishing prohibition.	13	nesting seabirds."
14	The EU's position is a simple one. The scope of the	14	And that the Tribunal will find at tab 4 of its core
15	prohibition, and its nullification of the EU's rights of	15	bundle (C-22), page 89.
16	full access to UK waters of the North Sea to fish	16	In other words, this means that in the event of such
17	sandeel, is the issue. The issue is not, as such, the	17	localised sandeel depletion, marine mammals can prey on
18	imposition or the limitation of those rights in pursuit	18	sandeel outside of the area of the localised depletion.
19	of a legitimate objective.	19	As for the third category of predators so, other
20	The EU accepts that it would have been open for the	20	fish that prey on sandeel again, the scientific
21	UK to restrict the EU's right of full access to UK	21	advice that the UK has identified:
22	waters of the North Sea to fish sandeel, but to the	22	" altered sandeels fishing pressure may have
23	extent that such a restriction or impairment was	23	a limited impact on commercial stocks, such that
24	supported by scientific advice and was proportionate to	24	stocks may be equally likely to experience positive or
25	the needs of specific predators. This is because the	25	negative effects."
23	the needs of specific predators. This is because the	23	negative effects.
	Page 9		Page 11
10:17 1	parties agree that there can be instances of localised	10:20 1	And that the Tribunal will find at tab 15 of its
10:17 1 2	depletion of sandeel in UK waters of the North Sea.	2	core bundle (C-45) at page 230.
2 3	depletion of sandeel in UK waters of the North Sea.  The EU also accepts that scientific advice has	2 3	core bundle (C-45) at page 230. What does this mean? This means that there is
2 3 4	depletion of sandeel in UK waters of the North Sea.  The EU also accepts that scientific advice has identified a link between such localised depletion and	2 3 4	core bundle (C-45) at page 230.  What does this mean? This means that there is essentially no difference for other fish between leaving
2 3 4 5	depletion of sandeel in UK waters of the North Sea.  The EU also accepts that scientific advice has identified a link between such localised depletion and the breeding success of one species of sandeel predators	2 3 4 5	core bundle (C-45) at page 230.  What does this mean? This means that there is essentially no difference for other fish between leaving open or closing the sandeel fishery.
2 3 4 5 6	depletion of sandeel in UK waters of the North Sea.  The EU also accepts that scientific advice has identified a link between such localised depletion and the breeding success of one species of sandeel predators known as black-legged kittiwakes. Why? Because these	2 3 4 5 6	core bundle (C-45) at page 230.  What does this mean? This means that there is essentially no difference for other fish between leaving open or closing the sandeel fishery.  This, the EU submits, is one of the factors that
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10:22 1	terminology set out in that section of the UK's Written	10:25 1	that's section V.A of the UK's Written Submission.
2	Submission.	2	The EU can agree with the following three
3	That was terminology.	3	statements. The first one is paragraph 111: that
4	Now, regarding sandeel in the Greater North Sea,	4	sandeel are industrially fished in the North Sea to
5	which are sections IV.B and IV.C of the UK's Written	5	produce fish oil and fishmeal. The next, paragraph 112:
6	Submission, the EU will list the points on which it is	6	that the fishery in the North Sea is seasonal, taking
7	in agreement, and they start as of paragraph 88. So	7	place between 1 April and 31 July. And finally,
8	I will go through them in order.	8	paragraph 113: that the fishery targets sandeel aged
9	Sandeel are small eel-like fish, paragraph 88.	9	one year or above.
10	Sandeel is an important type of forage fish,	10	So those are the facts with which the EU is in
11	paragraphs 88, 97 and 108 to 110. Sandeel feed on	11	agreement.
12	plankton, and are preyed on in turn by other fish,	12	Given that the EU has a maximum time for its opening
13	marine mammals and seabirds; that's again paragraph 88	13	submissions, I will now pass the floor to my co-Agent to
14	of the UK's Written Submission.	14	address the Tribunal on legal questions regarding the
15	There is also agreement that sandeel is a relatively	15	interpretative approach and the standard of review that
16	short-lived species, again paragraph 88; agreement that	16	the Tribunal should apply when deciding on these claims.
17	sandeel spawn in winter, paragraph 89 of the UK's	17	And the EU is available to answer, at the end of its
18	Written Submission; agreement that sandeel are reliant	18	opening arguments, certain of the factual questions that
19	on the availability of sandy sediments, paragraph 90.	19	the Tribunal sent the parties yesterday.
20	Paragraphs 91 and 92, sandeels have a life-long	20	THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much.
21	attachment to the sand bank in which they initially	21	Ms Norris you have the floor.
22	settle, and that there is a limited exchange between	22	MS NORRIS: Madam Chair, members of the Tribunal, as
23	even close fishing grounds. Paragraph 94, that sandeel	23	announced, the European Union turns now to the legal
24	experience high levels of natural fluctuation.	24	framework applicable to this dispute, and the
25	Paragraph 95, sandeel recruitment is highly sensitive to	25	interpretative approach which it considers this Tribunal
	Page 13		Page 15
10:24 1	environmental variation. Paragraph 96, that sandeel	10:27 1	should follow.
10:24 1 2	environmental variation. Paragraph 96, that sandeel stock sizes can vary significantly from year to year.	10:27 1	should follow.  Now, in these introductory remarks, the European
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2 3	stock sizes can vary significantly from year to year.  Then there's a big jump to paragraphs 117 to 119:	2 3	Now, in these introductory remarks, the European Union will highlight horizontal points in order to
2 3 4	stock sizes can vary significantly from year to year.  Then there's a big jump to paragraphs 117 to 119: the fact that since 2011, the International Council on	2 3 4	Now, in these introductory remarks, the European Union will highlight horizontal points in order to provide the Tribunal with a roadmap through the
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10:29 1	Heading Five of the TCA.	10:31 1	fisheries management, which the parties likewise agree
2	Given this, the European Union takes this	2	may inform the nature, content and ambition of fisheries
3	opportunity to highlight certain points of agreement	3	management measures that a party adopts in accordance
4	between the parties as to the applicable legal standard,	4	with the TCA.
5	and then to turn to areas of disagreement. We will also	5	Importantly, the European Union is not arguing that
6	address the burden of proof, the standard of review, and	6	international law does not recognise a role for the
7	why the sandeel fishing prohibition is challenged by the	7	precautionary approach. This is contemplated by UNCLOS
8	European Union as a single measure.	8	and other international environmental treaties. The
9	So I turn then to the point of agreement, and	9	parties also agree that the precautionary approach to
10	I'm sure the Tribunal will be delighted to learn that	10	fisheries management is identified and accorded a role
11	there are some.	11	in the TCA. The parties further agree that reliance on
12	The first is that protection of the marine	12	the precautionary approach to fisheries management does
13	environment is recognised under the TCA to be	13	not obviate the need to base decisions on the best
14	a legitimate regulatory objective, as is the	14	available scientific advice.
15	conservation of the marine environment. Both the	15	The core difference between the parties' positions
16	United Kingdom and the European Union recognise the role	16	is, therefore, whether the material conditions defined
17	of conservation measures in protecting the marine	17	in Articles 496 and 494 of the TCA for relying on the
18	environment. This is reflected in the TCA, which makes	18	precautionary approach when deciding on fisheries
19	provision for conservation and management decisions for	19	management measures are satisfied in the present
20	fisheries.	20	dispute.
21	Therefore, this dispute does not require the	21	And by way of response to advance question 9(c),
22	Tribunal to rule on the importance of environmental	22	the European Union indicates that it considers the
23	protection and marine conservation as such, either under	23	precautionary approach to be a manifestation of the
24	international law or under the TCA. The European Union	24	precautionary principle, and refers the Tribunal to
25	would like to emphasise that it itself has a high level	25	Article 356 of the TCA, footnote 1.
	Page 17		Page 19
10:30 1	of environmental ambition. Hence, and as has already	10:33 1	The EU will return to these issues in further detail
2	been explained, the European Union takes issue with the	2	under its first claim.
3	UK's characterisation of its objectives in its fisheries		
		3	Having addressed those points of agreement, the
4	policies as focusing on maximising fishing yields.	4	Having addressed those points of agreement, the European Union now turns to highlight some of the
5	policies as focusing on maximising fishing yields. It disagrees with the United Kingdom's suggestion that	4 5	Having addressed those points of agreement, the European Union now turns to highlight some of the critical points of divergence which it considers to be
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10:34		the mere liberalisation of trade between them.	10:38 1	the environment but also how to pursue those objectives,
	2	Like other international agreements to which the	2	the Union disagrees.
	3	Union is party, the TCA establishes rights intended to	3	The Union also disagrees that the recognition of
	4	confer economic and social benefits. Under the TCA,	4	regulatory autonomy comforts the UK's position that it
	5	those rights include access to waters to fish the	5	may ultimately adopt disproportionate and discriminatory
	6	species in Annexes 35 and 36 to the TCA.	6	fisheries management measures without violating
	7	The parties have an obligation not to jeopardise the	7	Article 494(3) TCA, read together with Article 496 TCA.
	8	attainment of any objective of the TCA. This implies	8	The European Union considers that the right to regulate,
	9	that the nullification or any impairment of the rights	9	and the exercise of regulatory autonomy to decide on
	10	and benefits flowing from their commitments under the	10	fisheries management measures, must be construed in the
	11	TCA must respect the balance of rights and obligations	11	light of the UK's commitment to grant full access to UK
	12	under that agreement.	12	waters of the North Sea to fish sandeel as reflected,
	13	How then does this relate to regulatory autonomy?	13	inter alia, in Annex 38 TCA.
	14	The United Kingdom places considerable emphasis on the	14	Since the Tribunal has addressed a question to the
	15	references in the TCA to regulatory autonomy and how,	15	parties on this issue, the European Union will elaborate
	16	since its withdrawal from the Union, it has developed	16	on this under its claim 3.
	17	its own regulatory framework to address marine	17	I turn then to the principles of proportionality and
	18	conservation.	18	non-discrimination. This is clearly a further issue on
	19	The EU recalls that the withdrawal from the Union	19	which the parties diverge, and that divergence concerns
	20	had the effect of ending the European Union's exclusive	20	the function that those principles play under the TCA in
	21	competence in fisheries policy as pertains to the UK.	21	general, and in Heading Five of Part Two in particular.
	22	The TCA is the legal framework governing this dispute.	22	The United Kingdom characterises Article 494(3) as
	23	The EU does not call into question the right of each	23	setting an optional obligation of conduct as regards the
	24	party to the TCA to regulate its own levels of	24	decision-making process only. Consequently, the UK's
	25	protection in the marine environment. This right is	25	position is that the term "having regard to" does not
		Page 21		Page 23
10:36		derived from internationally recognised principles and	10:39 1	entail any obligation to ensure that fisheries
	2	the sovereignty of the United Kingdom as a coastal state	2	management measures that it decides on are proportionate
	3	recognised under international law, of which UNCLOS.	3	and non-discriminatory.
	4	It is also recognised in the TCA.	4	The divergence between the parties on this point
	5	Such recognition cannot, however, be construed as	5	goes beyond the construction of the term "having regard
	6	conferring an unlimited right on either party to	6	to" as it appears in Article 494(3): it goes to the core
	7	derogate from any other provision of the TCA.	7	of the balance between the rights and obligations, as
	8	Regulatory autonomy, as has been explained, must be	8	well as the principle of good faith which informs the
	9	exercised in accordance with the requirements of other	9	
	10	manufacture of the TCA that since summarian to and		interpretation of the TCA as a whole.
	10	provisions of the TCA that give expression to and	10	By its advance question 9(a), the Tribunal has asked
	11	operationalise that right to regulate, and specifically	10 11	By its advance question 9(a), the Tribunal has asked the parties to provide their position as to the
	11 12	operationalise that right to regulate, and specifically to adopt fisheries management measures that have regard	10 11 12	By its advance question 9(a), the Tribunal has asked the parties to provide their position as to the relevance of the term "principles" in the chapeau of
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10:41	1	such as to accord latitude to either party to adopt	10:44 1	Now, in this context, and under the TCA, the
	2	a disproportionate or discriminatory measure, even when	2	measures adopted by a party must be "base[d] on the
	3	pursuing a legitimate regulatory objective such as	3	best available scientific advice". And as the
	4	environmental protection.	4	European Union has explained in its Written Submission,
	5	The United Kingdom asks this Tribunal effectively to	5	this does imply consideration of the qualitative merits
	6	rule that regulatory autonomy, as operationalised in the	6	of a chosen approach to pursuing legitimate objectives.
	7	TCA, offers carte blanche to pay lip-service to these	7	Indeed, the UK appears to agree that this term denotes
	8	core principles under the agreement. The UK goes so far	8	that there should be form of a comparative assessment.
	9	as to say that for the purposes of Article 496(1) TCA,	9	In this respect, to respond to the Tribunal's
	10	it would be permissible for the decision-making process	10	question 8(b), the European Union has never suggested
	11	not to comply with those principles at all; we refer you	11	that the bar is so high that scientific advice must be
	12	to paragraph 330 of their Written Submission.	12	"the best [in] the universe". The European Union has
	13	Now, at this juncture, and to again refer back to	13	set out its understanding of the applicable legal
	14	a question which the panel has asked us in advance, the	14	standard at some length, identifying that it need not be
	15	European Union recalls its position, which it had set	15	the only scientific opinion, but it must of course
	16	out in its Written Submission, that it does not consider	16	respect the criterion of methodological rigour.
	17	there to be any hierarchy between the principles set	17	Moreover, the term "available scientific advice" extends
	18	down in Article 494(3), and hence they must be	18	to advice which could reasonably have been obtained at
	19	considered concurrently. And it refers the panel to	19	the point in time when the measure was being decided on.
	20	paragraphs 257 and 258 of its Written Submission.	20	And the EU will return to these points under its
	21	At the same time, the roles that those principles	21	claim 1.
	22	play must be construed in the light of the terms in	22	Now, the European Union also understands the parties
	23	which they have been formulated. And that is where the	23	to agree that the role of this Tribunal is not to
	24	European Union makes the point that applying is not the	24	conclusively assess the scientific advice or to give its
	25	same as taking into account.	25	own scientific opinion. However, contrary to the
		D 25		D 07
		Page 25		Page 27
10:42	1	I will move on then to the standard of review by		
	1	I will move on their to the standard of feview by	10:45 1	position articulated by the United Kingdom in
	2	•	10:45 1	position articulated by the United Kingdom in paragraph 214 of its Written Submission, the
		the Tribunal. Here there is also some agreement between the parties, notably that it does not extend to ruling		-
	2	the Tribunal. Here there is also some agreement between	2	paragraph 214 of its Written Submission, the
	2 3	the Tribunal. Here there is also some agreement between the parties, notably that it does not extend to ruling	2 3	paragraph 214 of its Written Submission, the European Union does consider that when determining
	2 3 4	the Tribunal. Here there is also some agreement between the parties, notably that it does not extend to ruling on the appropriateness of the level of environmental	2 3 4	paragraph 214 of its Written Submission, the European Union does consider that when determining whether there has been a breach of Articles 496(1) and
	2 3 4 5	the Tribunal. Here there is also some agreement between the parties, notably that it does not extend to ruling on the appropriateness of the level of environmental protection set by either party.	2 3 4 5	paragraph 214 of its Written Submission, the European Union does consider that when determining whether there has been a breach of Articles 496(1) and 496(2) TCA, the Tribunal may assess whether a measure is
	2 3 4 5 6	the Tribunal. Here there is also some agreement between the parties, notably that it does not extend to ruling on the appropriateness of the level of environmental protection set by either party.  On the other hand, the European Union does not agree	2 3 4 5 6	paragraph 214 of its Written Submission, the European Union does consider that when determining whether there has been a breach of Articles 496(1) and 496(2) TCA, the Tribunal may assess whether a measure is based on such scientific advice as required by that
	2 3 4 5 6 7	the Tribunal. Here there is also some agreement between the parties, notably that it does not extend to ruling on the appropriateness of the level of environmental protection set by either party.  On the other hand, the European Union does not agree with the United Kingdom as to the extent to which the	2 3 4 5 6 7	paragraph 214 of its Written Submission, the European Union does consider that when determining whether there has been a breach of Articles 496(1) and 496(2) TCA, the Tribunal may assess whether a measure is based on such scientific advice as required by that provision.
	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	the Tribunal. Here there is also some agreement between the parties, notably that it does not extend to ruling on the appropriateness of the level of environmental protection set by either party.  On the other hand, the European Union does not agree with the United Kingdom as to the extent to which the Tribunal may review the means chosen to pursue that	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	paragraph 214 of its Written Submission, the European Union does consider that when determining whether there has been a breach of Articles 496(1) and 496(2) TCA, the Tribunal may assess whether a measure is based on such scientific advice as required by that provision.  This does therefore imply that the Tribunal should
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11 (Pages 25 to 28)

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10:47 1	will also be addressed under claim 1.	10:50 1	with well-established principles, it is for the European
2	So finally in terms of the standard of review, the	2	Union to present a prima facie case that the measure at
3	European Union would simply reflect that evidently the	3	issue violates the UK's commitments under the TCA. And
4	Tribunal may plainly also consider whether the chosen	4	that applies for each of its claims.
5	approach to achieving a level of protection meets other	5	In turn, in accordance with the same
6	requirements under the TCA, namely those pertaining to	6	well-established principles, it is for the UK to support
7	proportionality and non-discrimination.	7	its assertion that its measures could be justified under
8	And that, members of the Tribunal, is an excellent	8	other provisions of the TCA. In that sense, the
9	opportunity to segue precisely to that point: the legal	9	European Union considers that the burden of proof
10	standard relating to proportionality.	10	shifts.
11	The European Union and the United Kingdom have	11	Now, since I've referred to well-established
12	a different understanding not only of the role of	12	principles in support of this proposition, to give one
13	proportionality in delimiting the nature of fisheries	13	example, we could refer the Tribunal to the findings of
14	management measures that a party may adopt, but	14	the Appellate Body in DS33, Wool Shirts and Blouses.
15	they also have differing interpretations of the term	15	Now, although this is authority in the framework of
16	"proportionate".	16	international economic law, in reaching its position,
17	The European Union would like to make it very clear	17	the Appellate Body referred to other sources of law,
18	that its interpretation of "proportionate" is that which	18	including the position which has been expressed by
19	it itself set out in its Written Submission, as opposed	19	the International Court of Justice.
	to the United Kingdom's description of the EU's	20	In that dispute, the Appellate Body said:
20 21	position. And we would therefore emphasise that the	20	" we find it difficult, indeed, to see how any
	•		system of judicial settlement could work if it
22	Tribunal, when following what the European Union's	22	· · · · · ·
23	position is, should look at paragraphs 635 to 641 of the	23	incorporated the proposition that the mere assertion of
24	European Union's submission.	24	a claim might amount to proof. It is, thus, hardly
25	Now, the European Union disagrees with the UK that	25	surprising that various international tribunals,
	Page 29		Page 31
10:48 1	this Tribunal is precluded from considering how that	10:51 1	including the International Court of Justice, have
10:48 1 2	term, which does appear in the legal systems of each of	10:51 1 2	generally and consistently accepted and applied the rule
	term, which does appear in the legal systems of each of the parties, is interpreted under domestic law as one of		generally and consistently accepted and applied the rule that the party who asserts a fact, whether the claimant
2	term, which does appear in the legal systems of each of the parties, is interpreted under domestic law as one of the elements that may provide additional relevant	2	generally and consistently accepted and applied the rule
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10:53 1	a more granular breakdown of where [they say] the burden	10:55 1	It is of course open for a tribunal to frame its
2	of proof falls, and we will do that for each claim as	2	ruling, and any ultimate findings, on how and why it
3	we come to those claims.	3	considered a single measure to be inconsistent or not
4	I turn then to the final point in these introductory	4	inconsistent with obligations under the TCA in the
5	remarks, and that concerns the measure.	5	manner that it considers appropriate. But this is
6	The United Kingdom takes issue with the	6	different to severing parts of a measure at the end of
7	European Union's choice to challenge the sandeel fishing	7	its analysis.
8	prohibition as a single measure. It repeats and	8	Finally, since there is a reference in the panel's
9	emphasises that the management of fishing in Scotland is	9	questions to remedial powers, the European Union would
10	largely a devolved matter.	10	refer to Article 746 of the TCA, entitled "Compliance
11	The European Union has addressed the reasons why	11	measures", and indicates that this reflects that it is
12	it chose to challenge a single measure in its Written	12	for a party found to have acted inconsistently with its
13	Submission. Aside from the evident point that the TCA	13	obligations under the TCA to:
14	is an agreement between the United Kingdom and	14	" take the necessary measures to comply with
15	Northern Ireland on the one hand and the European Union	15	the ruling of the tribunal to bring itself
16	on the other, the EU has relied on other factors which	16	in[to] compliance"
17	warrant treating the provision as a single measure which	17	Members of the Tribunal, unless I can assist you
18	is given effect through different regulatory frameworks.	18	with further questions at this stage, that concludes our
19	Indeed, as the United Kingdom's own explanations show,	19	introductory and framing remarks on the legal standard
20	the regulatory framework in Scotland is partly	20	and interpretative approach. And I would therefore pass
21	overlapping with that which applies in England and	21	the floor to another Agent of the European Union to
22	Wales.	22	address you on claim 1. Thank you.
23	Equally, the European Union would observe that,	23	JUSTICE UNTERHALTER: I wonder if I could just ask you
24	whilst the Tribunal is not bound by either party's	24	one question concerning the question of comparable
25	characterisation, the starting point should be the	25	inconsistency; in other words, whether characterised as
	Page 33		Page 35
10:54 1	in which the European Union of the complete and	10:57 1	a single measure or two measures.
10:54 1	manner in which the European Union, as the complainant, has characterised the measure in its Request and its	10.57 1	If and again, all of this is hypothetical; it's
3	Written Submissions.	3	purely for the purposes of understanding what outcome
4	The panel has asked a question as to the	4	could arise. If there's partial inconsistency let us
5	implications of this for the Tribunal's analytical	5	just say, for argument's sake, that the measure which
6	exercise. The fact that it is challenged as	6	concerns Scottish waters was found to be inconsistent
7	an individual measure means that the Tribunal should	7	the requirement would be to bring a measure that
8	analyse holistically all of the costs and all of the	8	restores consistency.
9	benefits.	9	Would you agree that that doesn't require formal
10	As to the existence of distinguishable parts of the	10	severance, but would have to be a measure that sought to
11	measure, the European Union acknowledges that there is	11	restore inconsistency? Is that your understanding?
12	a different scientific foundation relied upon for the	12	MS NORRIS: Our understanding is indeed that it wouldn't
13	application of the prohibition in English waters of the	13	require formal severance. And the manner in which the
14	North Sea and the application of the prohibition in	14	Tribunal framed its ruling and its findings should
15	Scottish waters of the North Sea. However, the	15	inform the manner in which a party should take the
16	scientific literature review is essentially the same,	16	necessary measures to bring itself into compliance. And
17	and the Ecosim model which will be discussed at some	17	so indeed it could restore itself into a situation of
18	length considers the closure in all UK waters of the	18	compliance.
19	North Sea.	19	JUSTICE UNTERHALTER: Yes. So what, in your understanding,
20	As to advance question 1(c), the European Union	20	really rests on the question as to whether there is
21	considers that although the European Union challenges	21	a single measure or two measures, if there is, as it
22	this measure as a single measure, it is ultimately for	22	were, remedial flexibility concerning how to restore
23	this Tribunal to determine at the outset if it accepts	23	consistency, should the Tribunal ever get to that point
24	this proposition, and the analytical exercise that this	24	in its analysis?
25	Tribunal conducts must follow from this.	25	MS NORRIS: We would argue that that goes to the core of
	Page 34		Page 36
	Page 34		i age 30

10:58 1	the approach to the analytical exercise itself. So the	11:01	principles in it.
2	European Union challenges this measure on various	2	Thank you.
3	grounds: not just on the question of the scientific	3	MS NORRIS: Perhaps just to start by clarifying one aspect
4	basis, but also on the question of its proportionality,	4	of that, what the European Union absolutely does not
5	for example, that being a clear example.	4	disagree with is that individual states and here
6	Now, when conducting the weighing and balancing	6	the two parties can set their own aspiration of
7	exercise, the European Union would say you must look at	7	_
8	the degree of benefits, on the one hand, of this measure	8	
9		ç	
10	a whole. So we would argue that it informs the	10	
11	_	1	-
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21	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	2:	
22		22	
23		23	
24		24	-
25		2:	-
23	costs, on the one nand, and the benefits, [on] the	۷,	icaty.
	Page 37		Page 39
11:00 1	other, on a holistic basis.	11:03 1	And that is where the parties chose and, we would
2	And it says that that is appropriate, for all of the	2	argue, carefully chose to delimit how precisely those
3	reasons we described as to why this is a single measure:	3	considerations need to interact. So when we look at the
4	it is one prohibition which has exactly the same impact.	4	provisions on when you may adopt fisheries management
5	The overall impact of the sandeel fishing prohibition is	5	measures, and the principles to which you must have
6	that no EU vessels have access to any waters of the	6	regard when deciding on those measures, that informs how
7	United Kingdom in the North Sea to fish sandeel, and	7	exactly your regulatory autonomy should be exercised in
8	therefore the analytical exercise should focus on that.	8	a way to ensure respect of the balance of rights and
9	MR JUSTICE UNTERHALTER: Yes, thank you very much.	9	obligations.
10	MS NORRIS: Thank you.	10	Because as the European Union has endeavoured to
11	THE CHAIRPERSON: Ms Norris, I also have a question for you,	11	portray, both in its Written Submission and again this
12	and I would like to refer back to an earlier part of	12	morning, it is not arguing that you can never have
13	your presentation.	13	a fisheries management measure. It is not arguing that
14	You said earlier on, first, that there was a right	14	economic rights always and systematically take
15	of a party to adopt its own level of protection of the	15	
16	of a party to adopt its own level of protection of the	13	precedence over environmental considerations. If that
		16	•
17	marine environment; and then a little later, you talked		•
	marine environment; and then a little later, you talked about regulatory autonomy and the extent to which the	16	were the case, we would be having a very different discussion today. That is absolutely not the
17	marine environment; and then a little later, you talked about regulatory autonomy and the extent to which the TCA constrains regulatory autonomy in respect of	16 17	were the case, we would be having a very different discussion today. That is absolutely not the
17 18	marine environment; and then a little later, you talked about regulatory autonomy and the extent to which the TCA constrains regulatory autonomy in respect of protection of the environment.	16 17 18	were the case, we would be having a very different discussion today. That is absolutely not the European Union's position.  So here it is precisely about the exercise of your
17 18 19	marine environment; and then a little later, you talked about regulatory autonomy and the extent to which the TCA constrains regulatory autonomy in respect of protection of the environment.  So I would like to have a better understanding of	16 17 18 19	were the case, we would be having a very different discussion today. That is absolutely not the European Union's position.  So here it is precisely about the exercise of your
17 18 19 20	marine environment; and then a little later, you talked about regulatory autonomy and the extent to which the TCA constrains regulatory autonomy in respect of protection of the environment.  So I would like to have a better understanding of how you see that interrelationship between the ability	16 17 18 19 20	were the case, we would be having a very different discussion today. That is absolutely not the European Union's position.  So here it is precisely about the exercise of your regulatory autonomy and how you agreed that that should
17 18 19 20 21	marine environment; and then a little later, you talked about regulatory autonomy and the extent to which the TCA constrains regulatory autonomy in respect of protection of the environment.  So I would like to have a better understanding of how you see that interrelationship between the ability or the right to have your own appropriate level of	16 17 18 19 20 21	were the case, we would be having a very different discussion today. That is absolutely not the European Union's position.  So here it is precisely about the exercise of your regulatory autonomy and how you agreed that that should be constrained in order to preserve this balance.
17 18 19 20 21 22	marine environment; and then a little later, you talked about regulatory autonomy and the extent to which the TCA constrains regulatory autonomy in respect of protection of the environment.  So I would like to have a better understanding of how you see that interrelationship between the ability or the right to have your own appropriate level of protection of the marine environment, at the same time	16 17 18 19 20 21 22	were the case, we would be having a very different discussion today. That is absolutely not the European Union's position.  So here it is precisely about the exercise of your regulatory autonomy and how you agreed that that should be constrained in order to preserve this balance.  This is something which, again, we will try to
17 18 19 20 21 22 23	marine environment; and then a little later, you talked about regulatory autonomy and the extent to which the TCA constrains regulatory autonomy in respect of protection of the environment.  So I would like to have a better understanding of how you see that interrelationship between the ability or the right to have your own appropriate level of protection of the marine environment, at the same time as having your regulatory autonomy being constrained by	16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	were the case, we would be having a very different discussion today. That is absolutely not the European Union's position.  So here it is precisely about the exercise of your regulatory autonomy and how you agreed that that should be constrained in order to preserve this balance.  This is something which, again, we will try to elaborate upon in more concrete form when we come to
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	marine environment; and then a little later, you talked about regulatory autonomy and the extent to which the TCA constrains regulatory autonomy in respect of protection of the environment.  So I would like to have a better understanding of how you see that interrelationship between the ability or the right to have your own appropriate level of protection of the marine environment, at the same time as having your regulatory autonomy being constrained by the TCA; and in particular, by Article 494(3) and the	16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	were the case, we would be having a very different discussion today. That is absolutely not the European Union's position.  So here it is precisely about the exercise of your regulatory autonomy and how you agreed that that should be constrained in order to preserve this balance.  This is something which, again, we will try to elaborate upon in more concrete form when we come to the claims.  THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Ms Norris, that would be very
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	marine environment; and then a little later, you talked about regulatory autonomy and the extent to which the TCA constrains regulatory autonomy in respect of protection of the environment.  So I would like to have a better understanding of how you see that interrelationship between the ability or the right to have your own appropriate level of protection of the marine environment, at the same time as having your regulatory autonomy being constrained by	16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	were the case, we would be having a very different discussion today. That is absolutely not the European Union's position.  So here it is precisely about the exercise of your regulatory autonomy and how you agreed that that should be constrained in order to preserve this balance.  This is something which, again, we will try to elaborate upon in more concrete form when we come to the claims.

*			
11:04 1	helpful.	11:07 1	on the EU's first claim.
2	So I invite your next speaker, thank you.	2	The EU will first walk the Tribunal through the
3	MS NORRIS: Thank you.	3	legal standard with regard to the notion of the "best
4	DR HOFSTÖTTER: Madam Chair, distinguished members of	4	available scientific advice". It will then apply this
5	the Tribunal, the EU will now start by addressing the	5	legal standard to the facts of the case.
6	Tribunal on the first claim.	6	In a second step, the EU will return to the legal
7	The EU's first claim is that the sandeel fishing	7	standard concerning the notion of "based on". This will
8	prohibition is inconsistent with the UK's obligation	8	be followed by the application of the legal standard
9	under Articles 496(1) and 496(2) of the TCA, read	9	concerning "based on" to the facts of the case.
10	together with Article 494(3)(c) of the TCA, because that	10	The EU will now start by addressing the Tribunal on
11	prohibition is not based on the best available	11	the legal standard regarding the "best available
12	scientific advice. This claim is addressed in the EU's	12	scientific advice".
13	Written Submission commencing at page 127.	13	When it comes to the interpretation of the notion of
14	This claim will require the Tribunal to consider	14	"best available scientific advice", the parties agree
15	scientific facts and information. But before we come to	15	about the principal role of ICES in the framework of
16	these facts, the EU notes that there are differences	16	Article 494(3)(c), which, however, does not preclude
17	between the parties about the interpretation of the	17	reliance on other scientific advice. I refer you to the
18	legal standards. The EU will therefore start by	18	UK's Written Submissions, paragraph 202.
19	explaining the elements of the legal standards on which	19	The parties agree further that the term
20	the Tribunal will need to adjudicate.	20	"principally", as it appears in Article 494(3)(c) TCA,
21	The parties agree that Heading Five of the TCA	21	recognises the weight to be accorded to advice coming or
22	obliges them to base fisheries management measures	22	emanating from ICES, a world-leading marine research
23	applicable to the waters on the best available	23	organisation. There is no issue between the parties as
24	scientific advice.	24	regards any exclusion of national scientific bodies from
25	Article 494(3)(c) TCA establishes that the parties	25	providing scientific advice, provided that such advice
	Page 41		Page 43
11:05 1	shall have regard to the principle of:	11:08 1	meets the attributes of the "best available scientific
11:05 1 2	shall have regard to the principle of: " basing conservation or management decisions for	11:08 1 2	meets the attributes of the "best available scientific advice", and I will come back to these attributes very
2	" basing conservation or management decisions for	2	advice", and I will come back to these attributes very
2 3	" basing conservation or management decisions for fisheries on the best available scientific advice,	2 3	advice", and I will come back to these attributes very shortly.
2 3 4	" basing conservation or management decisions for fisheries on the best available scientific advice, principally that provided by [ICES]"	2 3 4	advice", and I will come back to these attributes very shortly.  Contrary to what the UK seems to imply in
2 3 4 5	" basing conservation or management decisions for fisheries on the best available scientific advice, principally that provided by [ICES]"  This obligation is mirrored in Article 496(1) TCA,	2 3 4 5	advice", and I will come back to these attributes very shortly.  Contrary to what the UK seems to imply in paragraph 213 of its Written Submission, the EU has
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8	" basing conservation or management decisions for fisheries on the best available scientific advice, principally that provided by [ICES]"  This obligation is mirrored in Article 496(1) TCA, which provides that:  "Each Party shall decide on any measures applicable to its waters in pursuit of the objectives set out in Article 494(1) and (2), and having regard to the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	advice", and I will come back to these attributes very shortly.  Contrary to what the UK seems to imply in paragraph 213 of its Written Submission, the EU has never argued that national scientific bodies as such do not have the authority to provide the best available scientific advice. Moreover, the EU has never contested
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	" basing conservation or management decisions for fisheries on the best available scientific advice, principally that provided by [ICES]"  This obligation is mirrored in Article 496(1) TCA, which provides that:  "Each Party shall decide on any measures applicable to its waters in pursuit of the objectives set out in Article 494(1) and (2), and having regard to the principles referred to in Article 494(3)."  This obligation is further mirrored in Article 496(2) of the TCA, which provides that:  "A Party shall base the measures referred to in paragraph 1 [of 496] on the best available scientific advice."  It is not in dispute between the parties that Article 494(3)(c) and Article 496 TCA provide for an obligation for parties to base their fisheries management measures on the best available scientific advice. The Tribunal will have to determine whether the sandeel fishing prohibition is based on the best available scientific advice. This will require that the Tribunal determines the meaning of the notions of (1) "best available scientific advice", and (2) "based on",	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	advice", and I will come back to these attributes very shortly.  Contrary to what the UK seems to imply in paragraph 213 of its Written Submission, the EU has never argued that national scientific bodies as such do not have the authority to provide the best available scientific advice. Moreover, the EU has never contested the authority of any body that provided scientific advice to the UK in the present case. This is therefore a false debate.  The parties agree that beyond the principal role of ICES, the TCA does not prescribe from what scientific body scientific advice must come. Consequently, there is no need for the Tribunal to address this issue in the present case, since there is no dispute between the parties.  In its Written Submission, the EU attempted to give a complete interpretation of the term "best available scientific advice". We appreciate that the application of the legal standard regarding the "best available scientific advice" will not require the Tribunal to look into all of the issues covered by the interpretation set out in the EU's Written Submission. However, there are

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11:10 1	scientific advice" that are material to resolve the	11:13 1	The "best available scientific advice" should
2	dispute, and which the Tribunal will therefore have to	2	integrate available scientific information. To the
3	interpret and apply.	3	extent that it does not, and is in that sense
4	In this regard, the EU notes that the parties	4	incomplete, it cannot meet the attributes of the "best
5	disagree on the following three key questions:	5	available scientific advice".
6	(1) Which meaning is to be accorded to the term	6	The EU does not argue that the UK did not comply
7	"available" in relation to scientific advice?	7	with the first of these obligations, namely to request
8	(2) What attributes of quality does scientific	8	scientific advice. It is indisputable that the UK has
9	advice have to have in order to qualify as the "best	9	requested scientific advice prior to the sandeel fishing
10	available scientific advice"?	10	prohibition. What the EU is arguing, however, is that
11	(3) Under what circumstances are the parties allowed	11	the Natural England scientific report, Exhibit C-0045,
12	to rely on the precautionary approach?	12	exhibits various flaws in the context of what the UK is
13	I will start with the first question, and take the	13	trying to test, including caveats. These flaws and
14	remainder in turn.	14	caveats could and should have been addressed on the
15	So the first question is: which meaning is to be	15	basis of reasonably available data and science, but
16	accorded to the term "available" in relation to	16	a choice was made not to address those flaws and
17	scientific advice?  Lyould like to start by recalling that "bast" in	17	caveats.  My colleague will detail these flows leter this
18 19	I would like to start by recalling that "best" in "best available scientific advice" is a superlative:	18 19	My colleague will detail these flaws later this morning, when applying the legal standard to the facts
20		20	of the case.
20 21	it sets a high threshold. The necessary consequence of "best" is that the advice relied on by a party to adopt	20	Moving on to the requirement of basing measures on
22	a fisheries management measure is comprehensive,	22	the most recent available scientific advice, on which
23	in the sense that it relies on all available scientific	23	the EU has elaborated in its Written Submission, the EU
24	information or data objectively available or objectively	24	argues that where there is relevant data, including more
25	obtainable by that party.	25	recent data, that data being the more recent data
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	Page 45		Page 47
11:11 1	In this context, the EU notes the UK's reference to	11:14 1	has to be taken into account.
2	the Virginia Commentary on Article 119(1)(a) of	2	The EU accepts that "recent" doesn't always mean
3	UNCLOS that is Exhibit R-0136 in this regard	3	"best". But in fisheries management, as a general
4	according to which:	4	proposition, the most comprehensive available data needs
5	" 'available' evidence indicates that	5	to be taken into account in order to achieve the
6	measures should be based on whatever evidence is at hand	6	objectives of the TCA, including the objective of
7	or reasonably obtainable."	7	exploiting shared stocks at rates intended to maintain
8	This statement from the Virginia Commentary is borne	8	and progressively restore populations of harvested
9	out by Articles 12(1) and 12(3) of the FAO Code for	9	species. To the extent that there is more recent data,
10	Responsible Fisheries, which is relevant context for the	10	a party should therefore rely on that more recent data.
11	interpretation of the TCA. You will find the FAO Code	11	As said, the EU's concerns as regards the scientific
12	in Exhibit CLA-0033, and it's also in the core bundle of	12	advice that the UK has identified as the base for the
13	documents.	13	sandeel fishing prohibition relates to certain flaws and
14	This is the basis for the EU's submission that the	14	unaddressed caveats in the Natural England scientific
15 16	parties must make reasonable efforts to obtain the best	15 16	report. They do not relate to an assertion that more recent data could have been taken or should have been
17	available scientific advice. And this is also in reply to your question 8(a) of yesterday afternoon.	16	taken into account.
17	The obligation for parties to make reasonable	17	This being said, I will now move to the second
19	efforts is twofold. It consists, first, of the	19	question which I introduced at the start of my
20	obligation to request scientific advice from	20	presentation. The second question is: what attributes
20	a scientific body, to the extent that that advice is not	20	of quality does scientific advice have to have in order
22	already available; and second, the obligation to make	22	to qualify as "the best available scientific advice"?
23	sure that the scientific body requested to provide the	23	This question is about whether the scientific advice
24	scientific advice bases its report on reasonably	24	that the UK has identified as the base for the sandeel
25	obtainable data.	25	fishing prohibition has the attribute of quality of
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11:16 1	being the "best available scientific advice".	11:19 1	New Zealand intervening, claimed that Japan was not
2	The EU argues that the "best available scientific	2	undertaking scientific research, but rather commercial
3	advice" must be derived from rigorous scientific	3	harvesting, contrary to the moratorium under the 1946
4	methods. This is essentially for the following reasons.	4	International Convention on the Regulation of Whaling.
5	As already discussed earlier, Article 494(3)(c) of	5	Japan, on the other hand, argued that its whaling
6	the TCA qualifies the term "best available scientific	6	programme was undertaken for purposes of scientific
7	advice" by referring that such advice is	7	research. The ICJ found that Japan's whaling programme
8	"principally" "principally" that provided by ICES.	8	is not for the purposes of scientific research.
9	The parties agree that this does not rule out the best	9	Article VIII, paragraph 1 of the 1946 Whaling
10	available scientific advice from scientific bodies other	10	Convention that the court was called upon to interpret
11	than ICES. However, the emphasise on ICES in	11	provides in relevant part that:
12	Article 494(3)(c) implies that such advice from other	12	" any Contracting Government may grant to any of
13	parties should be based on compelling and authoritative	13	its nationals a special permit authorizing that national
13	scientific evidence such that it can be considered to	14	to kill, take and treat whales for purposes of
15	have an equivalent authoritative status: equivalent to	15	scientific research"
16	the advice provided by ICES.	16	
17	The notion that scientific advice should adhere to		So the notion which the ICJ interprets in the Whaling case was "for the purposes of scientific
		17	
18	rigorous scientific methods and standards is therefore	18	research". But the notion to be interpreted by this
19	a reasonable attribute of the "best available scientific	19	Tribunal is "best available scientific advice".
20	advice" to read into Article 494(3)(c) TCA, given that	20	In the Whaling case, the ICJ held that activities
21	the parties recognise the principal role of ICES.	21	must not satisfy the criteria for "scientific research"
22	Conversely, it would be inconsistent with that	22	put forward by Australia. Among these criteria were
23	principal role if the parties were entitled to rely on	23	appropriate methods and peer review. At the same time,
24	advice not adhering to rigorous scientific methods and	24	the ICJ did not consider it necessary to devise
25	standards. To the extent that a party relies on advice	25	alternative criteria or a general definition of
	Page 49		Page 51
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11:17 1	other than coming from ICES, it has therefore to show	11:20 1	"scientific research".
11:17 1 2	other than coming from ICES, it has therefore to show that such advice has certain attributes, to the extent	11:20 1	"scientific research".  At the same time, in paragraph 58 of the Whaling
	_		At the same time, in paragraph 58 of the Whaling judgment, the ICJ found that:
2	that such advice has certain attributes, to the extent that it is supported by data obtained by using rigorous scientific methods.	2	At the same time, in paragraph 58 of the Whaling judgment, the ICJ found that: " programmes for purposes of scientific research
2 3	that such advice has certain attributes, to the extent that it is supported by data obtained by using rigorous	2 3	At the same time, in paragraph 58 of the Whaling judgment, the ICJ found that:
2 3 4	that such advice has certain attributes, to the extent that it is supported by data obtained by using rigorous scientific methods.	2 3 4	At the same time, in paragraph 58 of the Whaling judgment, the ICJ found that: " programmes for purposes of scientific research
2 3 4 5	that such advice has certain attributes, to the extent that it is supported by data obtained by using rigorous scientific methods.  "Best available scientific advice" therefore does	2 3 4 5	At the same time, in paragraph 58 of the Whaling judgment, the ICJ found that:  " programmes for purposes of scientific research should foster scientific knowledge"
2 3 4 5 6	that such advice has certain attributes, to the extent that it is supported by data obtained by using rigorous scientific methods.  "Best available scientific advice" therefore does not have to be the best of the universe it has already been said as long as it uses rigorous scientific methods, and is thus reputable and legitimate	2 3 4 5 6	At the same time, in paragraph 58 of the Whaling judgment, the ICJ found that:  " programmes for purposes of scientific research should foster scientific knowledge"  It is on the basis of paragraph 86 of the Whaling
2 3 4 5 6 7	that such advice has certain attributes, to the extent that it is supported by data obtained by using rigorous scientific methods.  "Best available scientific advice" therefore does not have to be the best of the universe it has already been said as long as it uses rigorous scientific methods, and is thus reputable and legitimate science. This is also in reply to your question 8(b).	2 3 4 5 6 7	At the same time, in paragraph 58 of the Whaling judgment, the ICJ found that:  " programmes for purposes of scientific research should foster scientific knowledge"  It is on the basis of paragraph 86 of the Whaling judgment alone this is the paragraph about science
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	that such advice has certain attributes, to the extent that it is supported by data obtained by using rigorous scientific methods.  "Best available scientific advice" therefore does not have to be the best of the universe it has already been said as long as it uses rigorous scientific methods, and is thus reputable and legitimate	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	At the same time, in paragraph 58 of the Whaling judgment, the ICJ found that:  " programmes for purposes of scientific research should foster scientific knowledge"  It is on the basis of paragraph 86 of the Whaling judgment alone this is the paragraph about science not requiring specific methods or peer review it is
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11:22 1	that Article 494(3)(c) TCA should be interpreted as	11:25 1	is the case here, then that model has to be prepared on
2	setting a standard for science for a post-factual age,	2	the basis of methodological rigour.
3	without there being any requirements with regard to the	3	The EU does not dispute that there may be parametric
4	quality of the best available scientific advice. The EU	4	uncertainties in any model. It is also not arguing that
5	submits that this cannot be the result of	5	the model must be perfect, or free from such
6	an interpretation in good faith of Article 494(3)(c).	6	uncertainties, in order to qualify as the "best
7	The EU's position is further corroborated by	7	available scientific advice". However, if there are
8	a reference to the international law of the sea,	8	obvious deficiencies in a model which could have been
9	providing for the same stringent standard as the TCA and	9	avoided by reasonably available scientific information,
10	WTO law.	10	any failure to use that information deprives the data
11	As far as WTO law is concerned, the UK takes	11	derived from applying the model of its quality of the
12	an ambiguous position, and does not seem to entirely	12	"best available scientific advice".
13	exclude the relevance of the WTO jurisprudence on	13	Now, what advice is there that meets this attribute
14	scientific and methodological rigour, identified by the	14	of quality attaching to the "best available scientific
15	EU as relevant context in further interpretation; and	15	advice"? The EU argues that the North Sea Ecopath with
16	this in the EU's Written Submissions, paragraph 415.	16	Ecosim model or short, "Ecosim model" as updated
17	In fact, the UK itself seems to apply this standard	17	by Natural England, Cefas and JNCC, and the simulations
18	when it submits, for instance, in paragraph 252 of the	18	based on that model, do not have the necessary
19	UK's Written Submissions, that the Natural England	19	scientific and methodological rigour to be considered
		20	reputable science. It can therefore not be considered
20	report was "methodical, thorough and objective".		to constitute the "best available scientific advice".
21	At the same time, the UK argues that the standard	21	
22	simply serves to distinguish between reputable and	22	On the other hand, the EU does not challenge the
23	legitimate, and disreputable and thus illegitimate	23	scientific and methodological rigour of the remainder of
24	science. But it shouldn't be in dispute that "best	24	the pieces of scientific advice identified by the UK in
25	available scientific advice" must be reputable and	25	support of the sandeel fishing prohibition. These are
	Page 53		Page 55
11:23 1	legitimate science, and must thus have scientific and	11:26 1	
	regrammate serence, and must thus have serentifie and	11.20 1	notably the ICES Technical Service, the remainder of
2	methodological rigour.	2	the Natural England scientific report and the Scottish
2 3			-
	methodological rigour.	2	the Natural England scientific report and the Scottish
3	methodological rigour.  As regards the law of the sea, the UK is incorrect	2 3	the Natural England scientific report and the Scottish scientific literature review.
3 4	methodological rigour.  As regards the law of the sea, the UK is incorrect when it seeks to discard the relevance of the fact that,	2 3 4	the Natural England scientific report and the Scottish scientific literature review.  I will now move on to the third question. And the
3 4 5	methodological rigour.  As regards the law of the sea, the UK is incorrect when it seeks to discard the relevance of the fact that, in the context of fisheries, organised methods of	2 3 4 5	the Natural England scientific report and the Scottish scientific literature review.  I will now move on to the third question. And the third question is: under what circumstances are the
3 4 5 6	methodological rigour.  As regards the law of the sea, the UK is incorrect when it seeks to discard the relevance of the fact that, in the context of fisheries, organised methods of science typically rely on large amounts of data, and the	2 3 4 5 6	the Natural England scientific report and the Scottish scientific literature review.  I will now move on to the third question. And the third question is: under what circumstances are the parties allowed to rely on the precautionary approach?
3 4 5 6 7	methodological rigour.  As regards the law of the sea, the UK is incorrect when it seeks to discard the relevance of the fact that, in the context of fisheries, organised methods of science typically rely on large amounts of data, and the ability to create and apply models, so as to arrive at	2 3 4 5 6 7	the Natural England scientific report and the Scottish scientific literature review.  I will now move on to the third question. And the third question is: under what circumstances are the parties allowed to rely on the precautionary approach?  According to Article 495
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18 (Pages 53 to 56)

11.00 1		11.01.1	the state of the s
11:28 1	qualitative, the methodological rigour which science has	11:31 1	what are the substantive scientific norms that ICES
2	to have.	2	adheres to in the quality of the work it produces that
3	JUSTICE UNTERHALTER: Yes. But I'm assuming that	3	you, I think, are contending must be sufficiently
4	the agreement to reference principally ICES was because	4	replicated in another institution that might be used for advice?
5	of the confidence that the parties had in ICES as	5	
6	a repository of science and scientific advice. That's	6 7	And you ultimately say that's methodological rigour.  But I'm just wondering how one derives methodological
7	why it's specifically identified. Would that be fair?  MS NORRIS: To respond to that question specifically,	8	rigour from the mere reference to ICES as
8	the role of ICES in that provision is indeed reflecting	9	an institution. How do you go from ICES to
10	an understanding between the parties that effectively	10	methodological rigour?
10	it could be presumed, if science came from that	11	MR DAWES: I think one characteristic is the way in which
12	institutional body, that it had the relevant attributes,	12	the ICES advice is peer-reviewed. So the way the advice
13	as it were. That's not to say that other bodies	13	is produced, the way it is then also reviewed within
14	couldn't have the same, but that would be something that	14	ICES before it is published. So to go back to the
15	had to be demonstrated.	15	notions you were referring to, so then the manner in
16	So in that sense, yes, there is an institutional	16	which the output of ICES is produced.
17	recognition built into the TCA. Of course	17	So I would say there are multiple characteristics,
18	JUSTICE UNTERHALTER: Assuming I'm so sorry. Please.	18	including the ones we've discussed. But I would say
19	MS NORRIS: I was simply going to add that of course, in	19	when you put those together, they explain the reference
20	this particular dispute, the European Union is not	20	to "principally [by ICES]" in the TCA.
21	challenging the institutional attributes of the sources	21	JUSTICE UNTERHALTER: Then, final question: just taking peer
22	of the other	22	review as an example, does ICES always give advice on
23	JUSTICE UNTERHALTER: Yes, I think that my follow-up	23	the basis of peer review, or does it sometimes do so?
24	question is, though: to the extent that this is	24	Are you saying it's a necessary attribute, or simply one
25	a reference to an institutional guarantee of the quality	25	of the factors to be considered?
	a reference to an institutional guarantee of the quanty		
	Page 57		Page 59
11:29 1	of advice, how does one then know whether another	11:32 1	MR DAWES: I don't think we say it's a necessary attribute
11:29 1	of advice, how does one then know whether another	11:32 1	MR DAWES: I don't think we say it's a necessary attribute,
2	institution that is used is, as it were, matching what	2	in the sense that scientific advice can constitute the
2 3	institution that is used is, as it were, matching what you call the "rigour" that would be of application by	2 3	in the sense that scientific advice can constitute the best available science if it is not peer-reviewed. But
2 3 4	institution that is used is, as it were, matching what you call the "rigour" that would be of application by ICES?	2 3 4	in the sense that scientific advice can constitute the best available science if it is not peer-reviewed. But I would say peer review is one of the characteristics
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2 3 4 5 6	institution that is used is, as it were, matching what you call the "rigour" that would be of application by ICES?  In other words, what is there about ICES that adheres to certain identifiable norms of science that	2 3 4 5 6	in the sense that scientific advice can constitute the best available science if it is not peer-reviewed. But I would say peer review is one of the characteristics that gives the ICES advice the presumption, if one can call it that, that it [is].
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Page 62 Page 64	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	Now, the EU's proposition is that the [Natural]  England report used, among other things, a model which had flaws and unaddressed caveats, even though there was available science to address those caveats.  How should the Tribunal look at this issue? This is how I understand your question. I think the Tribunal would need to look at the evidence which the European Union has presented; and in particular, it would need to look if credible evidence has [been] presented that there was available science that could have addressed the caveats and the problems identified in full transparency in the Natural England scientific report.  The EU will present a list of those elements. It has also drawn attention to those elements, it has elaborated on them in its Written Submission. And the Tribunal's task would be to assess whether indeed there was available science to address these gaps.  That would be my answer to your question.  Madam Chair, with your indulgence, may I come back to the question which Judge Unterhalter asked before the break concerning the quality and the methodological rigour, and why there is any connection being made	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	The second element is "Quality assurance[s]". So there are quality checks in place which make sure that the science that emanates from ICES has actually been thoroughly assessed, checked, double-checked, and therefore is indeed reputable, reliable science, with all the methodological rigour which such science requires.  And the third element, which links back to the second element, is "Transparency": transparency in the sense that the science is open to researchers in a very large area; I could say it is open, yes, to scientists globally. And transparency contributes to the qualitative outcome.  Now, of course we are not submitting that a national body would necessarily have to have the same system of transparency involving a full international network at the same level as ICES does. But it is these three quality elements which ensure that science that emanates from national scientific bodies is in line, is in accordance with the requirements of scientific rigour, and can therefore be considered the best available scientific advice.  That would be the answer of the European Union.
		Page 62		Page 64

11:57 1	THE CHAIRPERSON: Yes, Dr Hofstötter, can I ask a follow-up	11:59 1	approach is a lack of adequate scientific information.
2	question in that regard.	2	I refer to the United Kingdom's Written Submission,
3	So the ICES Technical Service, it's made quite clear	3	paragraph 221.
4	in its products that it is not "advice" as such. It is,	4	The EU doesn't call into question that the
5	however, considered in the EU's opening statements to be	5	precautionary approach, which is a manifestation of
6	the best available scientific advice. So to what extent	6	the precautionary principle, is potentially relevant in
7	does the ICES Technical Service meet these three	7	relation to fisheries management measures. This is
8	qualities that you mentioned that the ICES advice does?	8	already suggested by Article 495 and the definition of
9	Not necessarily now, but something for you to think	9	the "precautionary approach" contained in that article.
10	about, especially when you come later.	10	However, the EU argues that the UK is invoking the
11	DR HOFSTÖTTER: I can answer right now your question.	11	precautionary approach in circumstances where invoking
12	First of all, there is agreement between the	12	that approach is not called for.
13	European Union and the United Kingdom that the	13	The precautionary principle certainly is
14	ICES Technical Service is part of the best available	14	a well-established principle of public international
15	scientific advice in this case.	15	law, going back to Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration.
16	And the second point is that if you look at	16	And in Case No. 21, the International Tribunal for the
17	Annex C-54 at page 1, you will see that the ICES	17	Law of the Sea held that the precautionary approach has
18	Technical Service follows the exact same standards as	18	been incorporated into a growing number of international
19	ICES. So therefore we do not see any problem arising	19	treaties and other instruments, many of which reflect
20	from the fact that the Technical Service, and not ICES	20	the formulation of exactly Principle 15 of the
21	as such, issues the scientific advice.	21	Rio Declaration.
22	THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much for that.	22	In Case No. 31 (C-21), the Advisory Opinion on
23	Please go ahead with your precautionary approach	23	Climate Change, ITLOS held, against the background of
24	arguments. Thank you.	24	Article 194(1) of UNCLOS, on the prevention of marine
25	DR HOFSTÖTTER: Thank you.	25	pollution, that:
	7		
	Page 65		Page 67
11.50 1	I will now come healt to the third question which	12:01 1	"While the precautionary approach is not explicitly
11:58 1	I will now come back to the third question which	12:01 1	"While the precautionary approach is not explicitly
2	I introduced before the break, and that third question	2	referred to in the Convention"
2 3	I introduced before the break, and that third question is: under what circumstances are the parties allowed to	2 3	referred to in the Convention"  The "Convention" being UNCLOS:
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	I introduced before the break, and that third question is: under what circumstances are the parties allowed to rely on the precautionary approach?  Now, it is not in dispute that, according to Article 495(1)(b) of the TCA:  " 'precautionary approach' means an approach according to which the absence of adequate scientific information does not justify postponing or failing to take management measures to conserve target species, associated or dependent species and non-target species and the environment"  The precautionary approach is also referred to in Article 356 of the TCA; also this is in full agreement between the parties. There, one can read that:  "The parties acknowledge that, in accordance with the precautionary approach, where there are reasonable grounds for concern that there are potential threats of serious or irreversible damage to the environment or human health, the lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for preventing a Party from adopting appropriate measures to prevent such damage."  Both parties agree that one of the material	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	referred to in the Convention"  The "Convention" being UNCLOS:  " such approach is implicit in the very notion of pollution of the marine environment, which encompasses potential deleterious effects."  Paragraph 213. ITLOS then continued and developed further on the relevance of the precautionary approach in international law.  Similar things can be said about the Convention on Biological Diversity, and references to the precautionary approach are also being made in the FAO Code of Conduct.  Nothing of this is controversial, none of this is in dispute. But the central question is whether the UK could rely in casu on an absence of adequate scientific information in adopting the sandeel fishing prohibition, and thus whether the first material condition for applying the principle or the approach has been met.  The precautionary approach presupposes an objective absence of adequate scientific information. Therefore, its application presupposes that there is no best available scientific advice on which to base a measure. In fact, the UK fully recognises that the precautionary

12:02		fisheries management measures on the best available	12:05 1	should and could have addressed those flaws, and I will
	2	scientific advice.	2	show how.
	3	As my colleague will show in a minute, there was	3	Essentially, the five flaws identified consider
	4	reasonably obtainable data to fill the flaws and caveats	4	parametrisation. Parametrisation is how and what
	5	identified in the Natural England scientific report. In	5	information was fed into the model in order to answer
	6	light of this fact, there can be no doubt that there was	6	the research question.
	7	obtainable data in the present case. Since the absence	7	Now, the first one that I will look at is the
	8	of adequate scientific information is an objective	8	assumption made regarding the level of catches, referred
	9	standard, the inescapable conclusion is that there was	9	[to] in point 484 of the EU submission. This is
	10	no absence of adequate scientific information in the	10	important, as I will show, because overestimating the
	11	present case, and thus the first material condition for	11	proportion of fishing catches inevitably leads to
	12	the application of the precautionary approach is not	12	overestimation of results in the benefits.
	13	met.	13	Second, there is the issue of aggregation of
	14	I would like to conclude by saying that, against	14	functional groups, in particular seabirds and sandeels,
	15	this legal background which I just sketched out, the	15	which are referred [to] in point 486 and point 488 of
	16	parties can therefore not rely upon an absence of	16	the EU's submission. This essentially leads to not
	17	adequate scientific information and invoke the	17	properly identifying who is eating what and how, which
	18	precautionary approach unless they have made reasonable	18	also will lead to incorrect results on the actual
	19	efforts, as discussed before, to obtain relevant	19	benefits of the closure.
	20	scientific advice or to analyse available research data.	20	Third is not accounting for the special distribution
	21	If there could and should have been such scientific	21	of the predators, and how this overlaps with the fishing
	22	advice, the precautionary approach is simply not	22	grounds, and this is point 489 of the EU's submission.
	23	applicable. And this is exactly the case here.	23	This is fundamental: to assess where the other predators
	24	My co-Agent is now going to apply the legal standard	24	are, and how these overlap the fishery grounds, and
	25	which I just sketched out to the first limb of the EU's	25	therefore whether there is a benefit from a closure of
		Page 69		Page 71
12:04		first claim.	12:07 1	the fishing on those predators.
	2	DR PUCCIO: As my colleague just mentioned, the first limb	2	Last, the EU made a point on the idea of fixed
	3	of the EU's first claim is that scientific advice that	3	fishing pressure for time limits, and this was in point
	4	the UK identifies as the basis for its full closure	4	485. For time limits, the EU will not address this in
	5	measure cannot be considered as "best available	5	the pleading but refers to its submission in the case.
	6	scientific advice" within the meaning of Article 496(2)	6	I can answer questions if necessary.
	7	of the TCA and Article 493(3)(c) of the TCA.	7	So on the first point, on the point raised in
	8	As mentioned in point 491 of the EU's submission,	8	point 484 of the EU's submission regarding the average
	9	the scientific advice on which such a full closure	9	reduction of catches, accounting for 58%, what is this
	10	measure is actually based is only the Ecosim model	10	average reduction of catches?
	11	contained in the Natural England scientific report.	11	This measure is important. Why? Because the model
	12	This is because it's the only one that assesses this	12	of the UK is assuming that fishing mortality will be
	13	full closure and its impact.  The LIK unders of the Foosim model in this case.	13	reduced by the measure only insofar as you reduce
	14 15	The UK update of the Ecosim model in this case	14 15	fishery, because you are closing the fishery, and
	15 16	lacked the necessary methodological rigour to be considered "best available scientific advice", and this	15 16	therefore the reduction of the fishery catches
	17	because of five flaws that the EU has identified in the	16 17	corresponds to the reduction that the model expects in
		way this model was parametrised by the UK, leading to	17 18	fishing mortality. And therefore what the model will do is that it will look at how that expected reduction in
		way uns moder was parametrised by the UK, leading to		is that it will fook at now that expected reduction in
	18 19	overestimation of the result. I have the dounting tack	10	fishing mortality impacts the higmass of the other
	19	overestimation of the result. I have the daunting task	19 20	fishing mortality impacts the biomass of the other
	19 20	to walk through these flaws and to show why those are so	20	predators. So that variable is a key variable.
	19 20 21	to walk through these flaws and to show why those are so important as to put in doubt this methodological rigour.	20 21	predators. So that variable is a key variable.  Now, before the UK's submission, the EU had no idea
	19 20 21 22	to walk through these flaws and to show why those are so important as to put in doubt this methodological rigour.  Now, the UK recognises itself those flaws in the	20 21 22	predators. So that variable is a key variable.  Now, before the UK's submission, the EU had no idea of how the UK reached this average of 58% reduction in
	19 20 21 22 23	to walk through these flaws and to show why those are so important as to put in doubt this methodological rigour.  Now, the UK recognises itself those flaws in the Natural England scientific report, as well as in its	20 21 22 23	predators. So that variable is a key variable.  Now, before the UK's submission, the EU had no idea of how the UK reached this average of 58% reduction in catches, and therefore reduction in fishing mortality.
	19 20 21 22 23 24	to walk through these flaws and to show why those are so important as to put in doubt this methodological rigour.  Now, the UK recognises itself those flaws in the Natural England scientific report, as well as in its submission, but argues that it could not have addressed	20 21 22 23 24	predators. So that variable is a key variable.  Now, before the UK's submission, the EU had no idea of how the UK reached this average of 58% reduction in catches, and therefore reduction in fishing mortality.  The UK's submission presented in table 2 how they
	19 20 21 22 23	to walk through these flaws and to show why those are so important as to put in doubt this methodological rigour.  Now, the UK recognises itself those flaws in the Natural England scientific report, as well as in its	20 21 22 23	predators. So that variable is a key variable.  Now, before the UK's submission, the EU had no idea of how the UK reached this average of 58% reduction in catches, and therefore reduction in fishing mortality.
	19 20 21 22 23 24	to walk through these flaws and to show why those are so important as to put in doubt this methodological rigour.  Now, the UK recognises itself those flaws in the Natural England scientific report, as well as in its submission, but argues that it could not have addressed	20 21 22 23 24	predators. So that variable is a key variable.  Now, before the UK's submission, the EU had no idea of how the UK reached this average of 58% reduction in catches, and therefore reduction in fishing mortality.  The UK's submission presented in table 2 how they

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12:09 1	(Slide 1) So essentially what we are looking at is	12:14 1	as we will see, the other flaws that we are analysing
2	they have analysed so from the total catches that	2	will show that actually even those lower proportions
3	they refer [to] here, they have looked at what is the	3	that are here, those results on the biomass for the
4	proportion of the UK catches for every year into these	4	other predators, might actually be also overestimated.
5	total catches, and got an average, and then they did	5	The second flaw is the issue of aggregation. So in
6	compute the average over a different time period.	6	order to feed the information into the model, you need
7	(Slide 2) Now, the problem here is that those total	7	to define functional groups, and those functional groups
8	catches mentioned here are underestimated. They are not	8	essentially define which predator will eat which prey.
9	the full amount of the catches. The full amount of the	9	(Slide 4) Here we see the functional group as
10	catches, as derived from the ICES official numbers, is	10	defined by the UK, and we see that sandeels are
11	the one here (indicating), which is much bigger than the	11	considered as one functional group.
12	one expected here in 2020 from the UK. This number	12	Now, in the scientific literature that the UK also
13	comes from Exhibit C-0011. That gives you the total	13	cites and one can see it, for example, in section 4
14	catches for all seven areas, and it's clearly a much	14	of the Scottish scientific report (C-50) those
15	larger number.	15	predators don't eat necessarily the same sandeel that is
16	This number, also you can see it from table 1 of	16	actually fished. So fishing will be interested in adult
17	the UK's submission that shows the total catches in	17	sandeels, whereas some seabirds predominantly eat
18	three areas. So they are not all the areas; here it is	18	juvenile sandeels that are not affected by fishing.
19	areas 1, 3 and 4. And if you compute the total of only	19	Because they are not affected by fishing, normally they
20	these three areas, you get a total catch that is much	20	should have no impact from the ceasing of the fishery,
21	bigger than the total catch calculated by the UK.	21	because they are not in competition with the fisheries.
22	What is the problem with that? Well, if the	22	So the fact that they have not divided that sandeel
23	proportion of the UK catches is calculated on	23	category into two falsely represents the interaction
24	an underestimated total catch, then obviously the	24	between predators and prey in the ecosystem, and leads
25	proportion of these UK catches in this total will appear	25	to an overestimation, because here the model assumes
	Page 73		Page 75
12:11 1	bigger, and therefore the percentage reduction that they	12:16 1	that there is a competition between the seabirds and the
2	expect is bigger. If you use the right number, i.e. the	2	fishery, which is not justified in accordance with the
3	total catches foreseen by the ICES for all areas, then	3	scientific literature.
4	the actual percentage of the UK catches falls from 58%	4	Also another issue on the aggregation is that
5	to 39% over the area, 2011 to 2020.	5	seabirds are all considered as one category. Again,
6	(Slide 3) So why this number is important? If,	6	scientific literature shows that there are variations in
7	using the right numbers of the total catches, we have in	7	terms of how they depend on sandeel, because they have
8	reality an average of 39%, then what we are interested	8	different characteristics in diving and capacity of
9	in is not the average result, the results for the	9	reaching the sandeels, in foraging range and in diets.
10	average landing proportion that the UK suggests so	10	And this is clear also from the Scottish scientific
11	the middle column, which represented the effect on the	11	report in section 4. So clearly the UK was aware of
12	biomass assuming a 58% average but in reality, the	12	these differences in how they interact with sandeels,
13	changes in the biomass will be more those of the lower	13	but they didn't represent it in the model.
14	landing proportion of the confidence interval, because	14	The third flaw, and probably the most important one,
15	the UK says, "I am looking at a confidential interval	15	is the flaw concerning the spatial element and not
1.6			
16	with the lower bound being 38% of reduction of catches",	16	accounting for it. The UK recognises that this is
17	with the lower bound being 38% of reduction of catches", and that corresponds to the 39% average that you would	17	a flaw in the Natural England report, like also the one
17 18	and that corresponds to the 39% average that you would get if you put the right total numbers.	17 18	a flaw in the Natural England report, like also the one of not separating juvenile from young sandeels.
17 18 19	and that corresponds to the 39% average that you would get if you put the right total numbers.  Now, there is still an effect, you would say, even	17 18 19	a flaw in the Natural England report, like also the one of not separating juvenile from young sandeels.  Just to mention one more thing on the aggregation,
17 18 19 20	and that corresponds to the 39% average that you would get if you put the right total numbers.  Now, there is still an effect, you would say, even if you look at the lower level. So why is this still	17 18 19 20	a flaw in the Natural England report, like also the one of not separating juvenile from young sandeels.  Just to mention one more thing on the aggregation, the UK says that they could not do the disaggregation.
17 18 19 20 21	and that corresponds to the 39% average that you would get if you put the right total numbers.  Now, there is still an effect, you would say, even if you look at the lower level. So why is this still important?	17 18 19 20 21	a flaw in the Natural England report, like also the one of not separating juvenile from young sandeels.  Just to mention one more thing on the aggregation, the UK says that they could not do the disaggregation.  Actually they have done so in previous studies: for
17 18 19 20 21 22	and that corresponds to the 39% average that you would get if you put the right total numbers.  Now, there is still an effect, you would say, even if you look at the lower level. So why is this still important?  Well, this is, first of all, a methodological error,	17 18 19 20 21 22	a flaw in the Natural England report, like also the one of not separating juvenile from young sandeels.  Just to mention one more thing on the aggregation, the UK says that they could not do the disaggregation.  Actually they have done so in previous studies: for example, the 2015 ICES model, which is Exhibit R-0108;
17 18 19 20 21 22 23	and that corresponds to the 39% average that you would get if you put the right total numbers.  Now, there is still an effect, you would say, even if you look at the lower level. So why is this still important?  Well, this is, first of all, a methodological error, to have mistaken the calculation of the total catches,	17 18 19 20 21	a flaw in the Natural England report, like also the one of not separating juvenile from young sandeels.  Just to mention one more thing on the aggregation, the UK says that they could not do the disaggregation.  Actually they have done so in previous studies: for example, the 2015 ICES model, which is Exhibit R-0108; and also Exhibit R-0128, which shows that the seabirds
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	and that corresponds to the 39% average that you would get if you put the right total numbers.  Now, there is still an effect, you would say, even if you look at the lower level. So why is this still important?  Well, this is, first of all, a methodological error, to have mistaken the calculation of the total catches, and therefore mistaken one of the key variables for	17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	a flaw in the Natural England report, like also the one of not separating juvenile from young sandeels.  Just to mention one more thing on the aggregation, the UK says that they could not do the disaggregation.  Actually they have done so in previous studies: for example, the 2015 ICES model, which is Exhibit R-0108; and also Exhibit R-0128, which shows that the seabirds were disaggregated when it was necessary. So they could
17 18 19 20 21 22 23	and that corresponds to the 39% average that you would get if you put the right total numbers.  Now, there is still an effect, you would say, even if you look at the lower level. So why is this still important?  Well, this is, first of all, a methodological error, to have mistaken the calculation of the total catches,	17 18 19 20 21 22 23	a flaw in the Natural England report, like also the one of not separating juvenile from young sandeels.  Just to mention one more thing on the aggregation, the UK says that they could not do the disaggregation.  Actually they have done so in previous studies: for example, the 2015 ICES model, which is Exhibit R-0108; and also Exhibit R-0128, which shows that the seabirds
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	and that corresponds to the 39% average that you would get if you put the right total numbers.  Now, there is still an effect, you would say, even if you look at the lower level. So why is this still important?  Well, this is, first of all, a methodological error, to have mistaken the calculation of the total catches, and therefore mistaken one of the key variables for having sound results at the end of the estimation. But	17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	a flaw in the Natural England report, like also the one of not separating juvenile from young sandeels.  Just to mention one more thing on the aggregation, the UK says that they could not do the disaggregation.  Actually they have done so in previous studies: for example, the 2015 ICES model, which is Exhibit R-0108; and also Exhibit R-0128, which shows that the seabirds were disaggregated when it was necessary. So they could have done it.
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	and that corresponds to the 39% average that you would get if you put the right total numbers.  Now, there is still an effect, you would say, even if you look at the lower level. So why is this still important?  Well, this is, first of all, a methodological error, to have mistaken the calculation of the total catches, and therefore mistaken one of the key variables for	17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	a flaw in the Natural England report, like also the one of not separating juvenile from young sandeels.  Just to mention one more thing on the aggregation, the UK says that they could not do the disaggregation.  Actually they have done so in previous studies: for example, the 2015 ICES model, which is Exhibit R-0108; and also Exhibit R-0128, which shows that the seabirds were disaggregated when it was necessary. So they could

12:18 1	So, on the spatial, why is spatial so important?	12:23 1	map (C-50, figure 12) showing the fishery location, and
2	The issue is that the model currently presupposes	2	we see also the closure that already existed. The
3	a uniform distribution of those predators over the area	3	fishery locations are using the Jensen reference for
4	where fishing is actually occurring, and this assumption	4	which we used the maps in the previous slides. And here
5	is actually flawed.	5	(C-50, figure 29), you have the densities of the
6	So in our submission, we proposed, in footnote 60,	6	kittiwake locations.
7	to overlap two maps from the literature, the Waggitt	7	(Slide 11) And we put those together, and you can
8	et al map and the Jensen et al map, and I will show	8	see how they play out.
9	[what] this shows, because that would show that actually	9	And what does it mean concretely for the result of
10	there is very little overlap of concentration of some of	10	this? From this map, we can see it clearly: it means
11	those predators in particular, seabirds, but not	11	that the benefit that right now is assumed to be
12	only and the fishery grounds.	12	uniform, because we are assuming that those animals are
13	(Slide 5) The UK in its submission (page 129), in	13	uniformly distributed in the area where fishing occurs,
14	reply to this, proposes this map, for example, for the	14	well, that benefit from the closure will not be uniform.
15	black-legged kittiwake, to show that the foraging range	15	For example, here (indicating), if we locate
16	of those animals covers in reality the whole fishing	16	ourselves in the area where the previous closure was,
17	area. But again, this map is not showing the density,	17	if they had put the spatial element, here there is no
18	it's not showing the concentration. It only shows	18	fishery, because it's already closed. So the measure
19	a possibility of the foraging range, without	19	per se would not have yielded further benefits.
20	distinguishing between whether there is actually only	20	Now, if I am moving further away, in this area there
20	one bird or a huge concentration of birds.	21	are fisheries and there is some concentration of birds,
22	(Slide 6) Let's take the kittiwake example using the	22	so here I will have a result of some benefits. I would
23		23	
	maps mentioned in footnote 60. We have here first the		have a higher benefit here, where the concentration is
24	map from Jensen et al (C-23, figure 1) showing the	24	bigger. But then if I move further away, in the area
25	sandeel banks, so where fishery occurs; and here (C-39,	25	where it's white, I don't have any more overlap between
	Page 77		Page 79
12:21 1	figure 4), the density distribution of the kittiwakes,	12:25 1	the bird and the fisheries. So fisheries in that area
2	represented as one animal per kilometre.	2	shouldn't have any impacts on the birds.
2 3	represented as one animal per kilometre.  Now, the January figure is not important to us,	2 3	shouldn't have any impacts on the birds.  So this is to say that because of the absence of
2 3 4	represented as one animal per kilometre.  Now, the January figure is not important to us, because in January sandeels are spawning, and kittiwakes	2 3 4	shouldn't have any impacts on the birds.  So this is to say that because of the absence of these special elements, the results cannot give the
2 3 4 5	represented as one animal per kilometre.  Now, the January figure is not important to us, because in January sandeels are spawning, and kittiwakes are actually not therefore eating them; and also there	2 3 4 5	shouldn't have any impacts on the birds.  So this is to say that because of the absence of these special elements, the results cannot give the right and cannot assess the right benefit derived from
2 3 4 5 6	represented as one animal per kilometre.  Now, the January figure is not important to us, because in January sandeels are spawning, and kittiwakes are actually not therefore eating them; and also there is no fishery, it's not the fishery season.	2 3 4 5 6	shouldn't have any impacts on the birds.  So this is to say that because of the absence of these special elements, the results cannot give the right and cannot assess the right benefit derived from a closure in the different areas.
2 3 4 5 6 7	represented as one animal per kilometre.  Now, the January figure is not important to us, because in January sandeels are spawning, and kittiwakes are actually not therefore eating them; and also there is no fishery, it's not the fishery season.  So July would apply to the fishery season. As we	2 3 4 5 6 7	shouldn't have any impacts on the birds.  So this is to say that because of the absence of these special elements, the results cannot give the right and cannot assess the right benefit derived from a closure in the different areas.  The UK says: well, it's not only about seabirds. So
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	represented as one animal per kilometre.  Now, the January figure is not important to us, because in January sandeels are spawning, and kittiwakes are actually not therefore eating them; and also there is no fishery, it's not the fishery season.  So July would apply to the fishery season. As we see, the concentration is mainly on the coast. The	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	shouldn't have any impacts on the birds.  So this is to say that because of the absence of these special elements, the results cannot give the right and cannot assess the right benefit derived from a closure in the different areas.  The UK says: well, it's not only about seabirds. So even if we account that there is a difference in
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	represented as one animal per kilometre.  Now, the January figure is not important to us, because in January sandeels are spawning, and kittiwakes are actually not therefore eating them; and also there is no fishery, it's not the fishery season.  So July would apply to the fishery season. As we see, the concentration is mainly on the coast. The green already represents less. So orange represents one	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	shouldn't have any impacts on the birds.  So this is to say that because of the absence of these special elements, the results cannot give the right and cannot assess the right benefit derived from a closure in the different areas.  The UK says: well, it's not only about seabirds. So even if we account that there is a difference in distribution of the seabirds, why should we care about
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	represented as one animal per kilometre.  Now, the January figure is not important to us, because in January sandeels are spawning, and kittiwakes are actually not therefore eating them; and also there is no fishery, it's not the fishery season.  So July would apply to the fishery season.  So July would apply to the fishery season. As we see, the concentration is mainly on the coast. The green already represents less. So orange represents one kittiwake per kilometre, so green is even lower. So it's a very low overlap.  (Slides 7-8) One can do the same exercise with the second picture provided by the UK on gannet (UK Written Submission, page 128), and the result is even worse, in the sense that here, as we can see from the Waggitt map, gannets are actually more concentrated in areas where fishery does not occur. The only one that I would see is here (indicating).  (Slide 9) Now, one can do the same, looking at the same elements, for all the other seabirds that the UK mentions in point 297 of its submission. And the result is the same: distribution is important, because there is sometimes very low overlap, or it's localised.  (Slide 10) To do that, we can also use two maps from the Scottish scientific report. So again, we have this	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	shouldn't have any impacts on the birds.  So this is to say that because of the absence of these special elements, the results cannot give the right and cannot assess the right benefit derived from a closure in the different areas.  The UK says: well, it's not only about seabirds. So even if we account that there is a difference in distribution of the seabirds, why should we care about special elements?  First of all, if the UK had introduced special elements which they could, because there is an Ecosim model using the special elements they would have still accounted for the other predators in the area, because the Ecosim considers all the predators involved. So they would have had the data also for that.  (Slide 12) Second, there are some mammals that are also very much localised. And here we put some figures from the exhibits that show exactly that some of these animals are, again, very specifically localised, and not necessarily overlapping with the fishery grounds. This is particularly clear with the harbour seals, but also with the others.  So to conclude, those flaws are overestimating these benefits. They are inconsistent with the literature
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	represented as one animal per kilometre.  Now, the January figure is not important to us, because in January sandeels are spawning, and kittiwakes are actually not therefore eating them; and also there is no fishery, it's not the fishery season.  So July would apply to the fishery season.  So July would apply to the fishery season. As we see, the concentration is mainly on the coast. The green already represents less. So orange represents one kittiwake per kilometre, so green is even lower. So it's a very low overlap.  (Slides 7-8) One can do the same exercise with the second picture provided by the UK on gannet (UK Written Submission, page 128), and the result is even worse, in the sense that here, as we can see from the Waggitt map, gannets are actually more concentrated in areas where fishery does not occur. The only one that I would see is here (indicating).  (Slide 9) Now, one can do the same, looking at the same elements, for all the other seabirds that the UK mentions in point 297 of its submission. And the result is the same: distribution is important, because there is sometimes very low overlap, or it's localised.  (Slide 10) To do that, we can also use two maps from	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	shouldn't have any impacts on the birds.  So this is to say that because of the absence of these special elements, the results cannot give the right and cannot assess the right benefit derived from a closure in the different areas.  The UK says: well, it's not only about seabirds. So even if we account that there is a difference in distribution of the seabirds, why should we care about special elements?  First of all, if the UK had introduced special elements which they could, because there is an Ecosim model using the special elements they would have still accounted for the other predators in the area, because the Ecosim considers all the predators involved. So they would have had the data also for that.  (Slide 12) Second, there are some mammals that are also very much localised. And here we put some figures from the exhibits that show exactly that some of these animals are, again, very specifically localised, and not necessarily overlapping with the fishery grounds. This is particularly clear with the harbour seals, but also with the others.  So to conclude, those flaws are overestimating these

that the UK steel's cating, and should have taken into 2 account when constructing and applying the Econium model 3 for its own research question. And moreover, the UK 4 could have addressed those thou that the UK itself 5 mentions in the [Natural Fregland] report. 6 The UK meastion that by doing this, by changing the 9 model, it had already lost that ICFS key run. Bio. 10 Moreover, the ICES key run was given for this 2015 11 ICFS study that I mentioned previously, and that already 12 divided back into at least two catagories, depending on 13 their diving capacity, and the Uk now changed the model. 14 to have only one category. 15 So, in reality, they would have in any case not this 16 ICES key an. And this ICFS key mut, they can still 17 apply for it in any case with a new model. So it is not 18 a sufficient reason not to have addressed those flows. 19 And I would stophers. If you have any 20 questions. 21 USTICE UNTERHALTER: I wonder if I could sak you thise 22 in order to show that there has been a faither to 23 conform with the standard of the "lesst savailable 24 scientific advise", does it suffice to show that there 25 are methodological flows of the kind that you've  Pige 81  1229 1 indicated, or does one have to show that there 26 in the first that the standard of the "lesst savailable 27 indicated, or does one have to show that if those flows 28 land been corrected, the measure that was taken would not 39 have been supported?  1229 1 indicated, or does one have to show that if those flows 20 glassions, and the first savailable 30 scientific advise; does it suffice to show that it sheing 31 land the first savailable scientific advise; and the scientific advis				
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12:34 1	•	12:38 1	first?
2	, , , ,	2	DR PUCCIO: Yes.
3	•	3	THE CHAIRPERSON: Yes, good.
4	$\epsilon$	4	So then on figure 12, my understanding is the black
5	, ,	5	line at the very side, on the right-hand side, is the
6	question I think there are two moments here that need	6	edge of the UK EEZ; and then the hatched areas, the
7	to be separated.	7	purple hatched area is the sandeel prohibition from
8	The first one is to understand whether this piece of	8	2000, and again the sandeel area 4 is in purple.
9	advice can be considered as "best available scientific	9	DR PUCCIO: Yes.
10	advice". And those flaws show that it cannot, because,	10	THE CHAIRPERSON: So when we then go to the next slide (11),
11	as I said, [there is] material that came from	11	there's a little bit of additional information.
12	information that the UK had available and could address	12	You have the full EEZ of the United Kingdom on the
13	them.	13	right-hand side, that solid black line. Is that
14	And therefore they are not a mere decision to	14	correct, that that is the line of the EEZ of the
15		15	United Kingdom?
16		16	DR PUCCIO: Yes.
17		17	THE CHAIRPERSON: I see nods from your colleagues.
18		18	DR PUCCIO: Yes.
19	* * * - *	19	THE CHAIRPERSON: And in comparison to the pink on this
20	•	20	slide and the pink on the previous slide, there's not as
	-	20	much pink, can I say. The pink identifies the foraging
21	* *		
22	-	22	range of the black-legged kittiwake.
23	•	23	So am I correct that we should read this slide,
24	3	24	this overlay slide, as a representation of the two
25	with another advice or not. So those are two different	25	individual slides, rather than looking at that one slide
	Page 85		Page 87
12:36 1	questions.	12:40 1	by itself? Because it doesn't include as much pink, can
2	But these flaws, in our view, already justify the	2	I say.
3	consideration that this particular piece of advice could		
4		3	DR PUCCIO: Yes, it's so light that there you couldn't see
_	not be considered as "best available scientific advice",	4	it that much. But indeed, within this slide there is
5	not be considered as "best available scientific advice", and therefore the UK could not base itself on this		
5		4	it that much. But indeed, within this slide there is
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12:41 1	maybe not got right.	12:45 1	measures to be based on the "best available scientific
2	And then where does the border between Scotland and	2	advice", and I have interpreted the notion of the "best
3	England lie on this kind of map?	3	available scientific advice". I will now turn to the
4	DR PUCCIO: So you would have below area 4, so here	4	interpretation of the notion of "based on".
5	(indicating), this area here should be 1r. And up here,	5	The EU argues that the parties must establish
6	there should be 7r somewhere. And next to area 4 there,	6	a rational or objective relationship
7	here there should be area 3r; and up here, 5r; and down	7	JUSTICE UNTERHALTER: I'm so sorry to interrupt, if I may.
8	there, 2r. Yes, more or less. You can basically	8	But since you're going on to another topic, could I just
9	compare it with figure 9 in the UK's submission so as to	9	be clear on the question around transparency, unless
10	see it more clearly.	10	you're coming to that in due course. You have mentioned
11	THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much for that. So I will	11	it already, the failure to adhere to proper norms of
12	go back and make sure that I have a very good	12	transparency as part of what "best available scientific
13	understanding of the map, of the various management	13	advice" means.
14	areas overlaid on this kind of map. So thank you very	14	$\varepsilon$
15	much.	15	because I am really now discussing the standard of
16		16	"based on". But if you would like me to go back
17	for the Scottish, but it gives already the idea, and	17	to it
18	the same idea applies for the whole of the UK.	18	JUSTICE UNTERHALTER: It's just one question which arose
19	THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much. So that concludes	19	immediately, but you can of course answer entirely when
20	my question.	20	it suits you.
21	Professor Ruiz Fabri.	21	But as I had understood, the flaws that are being
22	PROFESSOR RUIZ FABRI: Yes, one quick question to follow	22	identified in the model are flaws that the UK had
23	[Justice] Unterhalter's questions about the best	23	acknowledged in the modelling exercise, by and large;
24	available scientific advice.	24	these are features of the model that they identified.
25	If I understand well, your contention is that this	25	That would suggest that the model was transparent;
	Page 89		Page 91
12:43 1	modal cannot be best available scientific advice because	12:46 1	it may or may not be flawed as you say, but there was
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27 (Pages 89 to 92)

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12:54 1	reputable science for lack of scientific rigour. It is	12:57 1	feeding range of chick-rearing seabirds.
2	as unreliable as regards the biomass responses of	2	However, there is no rational objective relationship
3	sandeel predators. Correcting the caveats and errors in	3	between the scientific advice invoked by the UK as the
4	the English scientific report moreover indicates that	4	base of the sandeel prohibition and a spatial
5	most simulated biomass increases of a closure of all UK	5	prohibition on sandeel fishing in UK waters of the
6	waters of the North Sea for the sandeel fishery would	6	North Sea that goes beyond the feeding range of
7	likely be smaller.	7	chick-rearing seabirds, for which sandeel comprise
8	But if the English scientific report is unreliable	8	a substantial proportion of the diet. Nor does the
9	with regard to simulated biomass increases of certain	9	scientific advice indicate that such spatially broader
10	sandeel predators, and the ICES Technical Service	10	prohibition would further benefit the breeding success
11	indicates that risk-averse advice could result in	11	of these seabirds.
12	localised depletions, without any spatial element having	12	In view of unreliable biomass responses to the
13	been considered in the English scientific report, where	13	sandeel fishing prohibition presented in the Natural
14	is then the rational objective relationship between the	14	England report, the UK's proposition that an increase in
15	scientific advice that the UK has identified as the base	15	sandeel abundance as a result of closure of all UK
16	for the sandeel fishing prohibition and the closure of	16	waters of the North Sea for the fishery could offer some
17	all UK waters of the North Sea for the sandeel fishery?	17	resilience at times of adverse natural conditions is
18	The EU submits that there is no such relationship.	18	untenable.
19	Therefore, the sandeel fishing prohibition is not based	19	The UK argues that the sandeel fishing prohibition
20	on the best available scientific advice, even when	20	was not solely or primarily intended to benefit
20	assuming that the Natural England scientific report	20	seabirds. But we cannot lose sight of the fact that,
22	constituted the best available scientific advice, which	22	according to the Natural England report, seabirds are by
23	is not the case, for the reasons given.	23	far the potential primary beneficiaries of the measure,
23		23	with their biomass simulated to increase by 4-8% in
25	A few considerations on this point.  First, sandeel abundance is mainly driven by natural	25	
23	First, sandeer abundance is mainly driven by natural	23	around ten years; referring to the Natural England
	Page 97		Page 99
			(0.15)
12:55 1	mortality rather than the impact of the North Sea	12:59 1	report (C-45), page i.
2	sandeel fishery. This is noted in the Scottish	2	These figures are unreliable as a result of
2 3	sandeel fishery. This is noted in the Scottish scientific literature review, Exhibit C-50, and is not	2 3	These figures are unreliable as a result of parametric flaws in the context of what the UK is trying
2 3 4	sandeel fishery. This is noted in the Scottish scientific literature review, Exhibit C-50, and is not contested by the EU.	2 3 4	These figures are unreliable as a result of parametric flaws in the context of what the UK is trying to test, as discussed by my co-Agent earlier. But it is
2 3 4 5	sandeel fishery. This is noted in the Scottish scientific literature review, Exhibit C-50, and is not contested by the EU.  Localised depletions of sandeel primarily affect	2 3 4 5	These figures are unreliable as a result of parametric flaws in the context of what the UK is trying to test, as discussed by my co-Agent earlier. But it is also unreliable because it groups together all seabirds,
2 3 4 5 6	sandeel fishery. This is noted in the Scottish scientific literature review, Exhibit C-50, and is not contested by the EU.  Localised depletions of sandeel primarily affect predators with a limited foraging range, given their	2 3 4 5 6	These figures are unreliable as a result of parametric flaws in the context of what the UK is trying to test, as discussed by my co-Agent earlier. But it is also unreliable because it groups together all seabirds, regardless of their spatial distribution, their forage
2 3 4 5 6 7	sandeel fishery. This is noted in the Scottish scientific literature review, Exhibit C-50, and is not contested by the EU.  Localised depletions of sandeel primarily affect predators with a limited foraging range, given their limited inability to migrate to other areas where there	2 3 4 5 6 7	These figures are unreliable as a result of parametric flaws in the context of what the UK is trying to test, as discussed by my co-Agent earlier. But it is also unreliable because it groups together all seabirds, regardless of their spatial distribution, their forage range or capacities, or their diet flexibility.
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		12.04 1	d (1 d 20 d 4 777
13:00 1	provided in the Scottish scientific report, according to	13:04 1	the flaws and caveats identified by the UK.
2	which:	2	Unless the Tribunal has further questions, this
3	" a typical foraging range would not regularly	3	concludes the EU's submissions on the first claim.  THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much, Dr Hofstötter.
4 5	include foraging outside of the existing closed area"	5	I have a first question, which goes backwards a bit,
6	This is Exhibit C-50, page 51.	6	and you can answer it either now or later. It refers
7	In addition, the new maps presented by the UK are	7	back to when you were discussing the interpretation of
8	also contradicted by the UK's submissions concerning the	8	"based on" best available scientific evidence. You
9	risk of local sandeel depletion. If the forage ranges	9	said, on the one hand, that the obligation to base
10	of seabirds were as large as the new maps claim, these	10	a measure on the best available scientific advice can't
11	seabirds would be entirely insensitive to local	11	be relegated to one of a number of factors; and you also
12	depletion.	12	said, after quoting the ITLOS Climate Change Advisory
13	The United Kingdom's scientific evidence shows small	13	Opinion, that a measure does not have to conform to the
14	simulated biomass increases for species other than	14	best available scientific evidence.
15	seabirds. But even those small simulated biomass	15	So it seems to be quite a nuanced position that the
16	increases or especially those small biomass	16	EU is subscribing to. And I wonder, therefore, how you
17	increases are not reputable science, as a result of	17	take into account where you have a number of factors,
18	the parametric flaws in the context of what the UK is	18	are you suggesting, therefore, that, of a number of
19	trying to test.	19	factors, it is the best available scientific evidence or
20	All of this shows that there is no rational or	20	advice that should be given some degree of preference?
21	objective relationship between the scientific advice	21	Or what are the implications of these two statements?
22	that the UK has identified as the base for the sandeel	22	Thank you.
23	fishing prohibition and this particular measure.	23	DR HOFSTÖTTER: Thank you. The EU would prefer to come back
24	The EU finally observes that the United Kingdom also	24	to your question later. Thank you.
25	refers to the precautionary approach in an attempt to	25	THE CHAIRPERSON: I think Justice Unterhalter also has
	Page 101		Page 103
13:02 1	justify the sandeel fishing prohibition. I have already	13:05 1	a question.
2	addressed the Tribunal on the issue of the precautionary		
			IUSTICE UNTERHALTER: It's actually a follow-up question I
3		2 3	JUSTICE UNTERHALTER: It's actually a follow-up question, more or less in the same vein. And again, come back to
3 4	approach earlier this morning. I will therefore limit	3	more or less in the same vein. And again, come back to
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4 5	approach earlier this morning. I will therefore limit myself to the following very brief remarks.  As has been shown by my co-Agent, the UK has chosen	3 4 5	more or less in the same vein. And again, come back to it if you wish.  I understood your argument to be that a measure may
4 5 6	approach earlier this morning. I will therefore limit myself to the following very brief remarks.  As has been shown by my co-Agent, the UK has chosen to parametrise the Ecosim model, on which the results of	3 4 5 6	more or less in the same vein. And again, come back to it if you wish.  I understood your argument to be that a measure may be justified for a number of reasons, one of which is
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you don't have enough information.  25 available scientific advice. That's very clear: it's				
Page 106 Page 108	23	you don't have chough information.	2.5	available scientific advice. That's very clear, it's
		Page 106		Page 108

31 (Pages 105 to 108)

13:14 1 2 3 4 5	stated in Article 496. The point being that that is the starting point. And that shouldn't really be a controversial position. Science-based decision-making is widely recognised, and I don't think that the UK contests that one should start from available science.	13:17 1 2 3 4 5	(1.17 pm) (Adjourned until 2.15 pm) (2.15 pm) THE CHAIRPERSON: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. I would like to now invite the European Union to
6 7	The question really comes to: what happens if there is a gap? And here, the European Union is saying: well,	6 7	continue your submissions. Thank you, Ms Norris.  MS NORRIS: Madam Chair, members of the Tribunal, we will
8	it depends why there is a gap, if I may simplify the	8	continue, in fact, to move towards our submissions on
9	position.	9	claim 2. However, to come back to the question that you
10	If there is a gap because the parties could have and	10	posed, Madam Chair, before lunch on the relationship
11	should have gone out and used reasonably available	11	between the expressions "conform to" and "based on", and
12	scientific information to complete the picture, and	12	you identified that this is a nuanced position.
13	therefore could have ended up with what would constitute	13	The words "conform to" appear actually in the
14	*	14	United Kingdom's Written Statement at paragraph 220.
15	Union would say: that is not a situation in which the	15 16	They made the argument, which in fact the European Union
16 17	precautionary principle should be relied upon to come up with a different conclusion; or, worse, to simply not	17	would agree with, that "based on" is not the same as "conform to". So I imagine that in fact what the
18	even try to address those parametric uncertainties.	18	Tribunal is seeking to ascertain is what lies in between
19	And that goes back to the question of whether those	19	the shades of the two.
20	parametric uncertainties could and should have been	20	The European Union would say that the structure of
21	addressed. And again, the European Union acknowledges	21	the TCA is intended to acknowledge precisely that there
22	that there is a little bit of a nuance here, because	22	should be science-based decision-making to the extent
23	clearly it's difficult to say that there would ever be	23	possible, and hence Article 496(2) refers to the fact
24	a perfect model; the question is an objective one. And	24	that measures should be based on best available
25	you have been taken through the reasons why, on the	25	scientific advice. That is not, however, at the expense
	Page 109		Page 111
13:15 1	facts of this dispute, the European Union says that the	14:17 1	of consideration of the principles in 494(3), and that
2	precise flaws that were enumerated, it wasn't sufficient	2	is clear from 496(1), we would say.
3	to just identify them, but something could and should	3	That's important because the European Union
4	have been done to plug them.	4	acknowledges that there may be situations, as we've
5	So then what about the precautionary approach? The	5	already alluded to, where there is a gap, and so there
6	principle of the relevance of the precautionary approach	6	is no best available scientific advice, and then
7	is not disputed. The European Union accepts that within	7	logically a principle such as the precautionary approach
8	the TCA, a role, or a potential role, is envisaged. And	8	would be necessary.
9	that applies where the gap is, as it were, not due to	9	We also say that flows from the ordinary meaning of
10 11	an unwillingness or a positive decision not to use other scientific information reasonably available to plug the	10 11	the terms. We wouldn't really disagree with anything that the United Kingdom has said concerning the fact
12	gap, but such information simply didn't exist or doesn't	12	
13	meet the standards required.	13	
14	So in that sense, where there is a lacuna, then of	14	
15	course the precautionary principle has a very important	15	there is best available scientific advice, it implies
16	role to play in filling a space. And that is how the	16	
17	European Union would articulate the two. On the facts	17	a foundation, in other words.
18	of this dispute, we say we are in the first scenario,	18	The other point that I wanted to come back to,
19	and therefore the material condition for applying the	19	simply because the European Union had said that it would
20	precautionary approach simply didn't arise.	20	do so, is the question of the burden of proof under
21	THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much to the Agents of the	21	claim 1.
22	European Union.	22	-
23	We will now take a lunch break, and we will return	23	the European Union to establish a prima facie case that
24	at 2.15, if that is okay.	24	a measure is not based on the best available scientific
25	Thank you very much. Have a nice lunch. Thank you.	25	advice. To the extent that the Tribunal is satisfied
	Page 110		Page 112

32 (Pages 109 to 112)

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14:18 1	that it has established a presumption or has a prima	14:21 1	And for this claim, the European Union has the
2	facie case that there may be issues with that advice,	2	burden to establish a prima facie case that the UK acted
3	then the United Kingdom obviously has to show that there	3	inconsistently with its obligation to decide on and
4	is no merit to the points that the European Union was	4	apply proportionate and non-discriminatory fisheries
5	made, and in that sense there is a shifting of the	5	management measures. The EU accepts that it also has
6	burden of proof. But we would accept that it is for the	6	the burden of proof to establish a prima facie case that
7	European Union in the first instance to establish that	7	a proportionate alternative measure was reasonably
8	prima facie case.	8	available to the UK.
9	If I may then move on to the second claim advanced	9	Of course, to the extent that the United Kingdom
10	by the European Union in this dispute, and that is that	10	contends that its measure is proportionate and
11	in adopting the sandeel fishing prohibition, the United	11	non-discriminatory, it has the burden of rebutting the
12	Kingdom acted inconsistently with its obligations under	12	EU's case and, notably, of showing why it could not have
13	Article 496(1) and (2), read together with	13	adopted the alternative measure identified by the
14	Article [494(3)](f) of the TCA.	14	European Union.
15	In sum, the European Union considers that whilst	15	Now, in approaching the legal standard, we felt
16	496(1) undeniably provides a basis for the parties to	16	it might be useful to articulate the different positions
17	decide on fisheries management measures, including	17	between the parties around five questions which we
18	measures aimed at marine conservation, their regulatory	18	consider the Tribunal will need to resolve to settle the
19	autonomy in deciding on those measures is constrained,	19	dispute between the parties, which is of course not to
20	and it is constrained by the requirement to have regard	20	prejudge or preempt any other questions that the
21	to the principles in Article 493(3) of the TCA.	21	Tribunal may have.
22	The principle that is the focus of this particular	22	The first of those is: on the basis of the term
23	claim is the one that is numerated in [494(3)](f), which	23	"have regard to", when and to what extent must the
24	is formulated as:	24	principles in Article 494(3) be taken into account?
25	" applying proportionate and non-discriminatory	25	The second question is: is there an obligation to
	Page 113		Page 115
	· ·		, and the second
14:19 1	measures for the conservation of marine living resources	14:22 1	ensure that a measure decided on and applied for the
14:19 1 2	whilst preserving the regulatory autonomy of the	14:22 1 2	ensure that a measure decided on and applied for the purposes of the conservation of marine living resources
			purposes of the conservation of marine living resources and the management of fisheries resources is
2 3 4	whilst preserving the regulatory autonomy of the Parties"  In other words, as the European Union was at pains	2	purposes of the conservation of marine living resources and the management of fisheries resources is proportionate and non-discriminatory?
2 3	whilst preserving the regulatory autonomy of the Parties"  In other words, as the European Union was at pains to emphasise in its opening this morning, this claim is	2 3	purposes of the conservation of marine living resources and the management of fisheries resources is
2 3 4	whilst preserving the regulatory autonomy of the Parties"  In other words, as the European Union was at pains to emphasise in its opening this morning, this claim is not about the importance of environmental protection as	2 3 4 5 6	purposes of the conservation of marine living resources and the management of fisheries resources is proportionate and non-discriminatory?  The third issue we will look at is: what are the stages in a proportionality assessment?
2 3 4 5 6 7	whilst preserving the regulatory autonomy of the Parties"  In other words, as the European Union was at pains to emphasise in its opening this morning, this claim is not about the importance of environmental protection as such, and nor is it about posing a binary opposition	2 3 4 5 6 7	purposes of the conservation of marine living resources and the management of fisheries resources is proportionate and non-discriminatory?  The third issue we will look at is: what are the stages in a proportionality assessment?  Fourth, we will turn to the relationship between
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14:24 1	determination of the fisheries management measure that	14:26 1	that the UK advances in this respect. It accepts that
2	will actually be decided on and ultimately applied.	2	"regulatory autonomy" has some meaning, it has a meaning
3	The UK argues quite forcefully that, hence, this is	3	under international law, and that meaning is confirmed
4	purely an obligation of conduct and not an obligation of	4	in the TCA itself. But the difference comes to whether
5	result; which means, on the UK's analysis, that it does	5	it can simply override everything else.
6	not have to actually comply with those principles, in	6	And that is the point where the European Union
7	the sense that the output of the decision-making process	7	really parts company with the UK, because it says: no,
8	is not constrained by the condition that, in substantive	8	this is an issue that many tribunals have been
9	terms, the measure it decides on is not disproportionate	9	confronted with in the past, this idea that you can have
10	or not discriminatory. And that's very clear from	10	a broad margin of regulatory autonomy to set a level of
11	paragraph 330 of the United Kingdom's Written Statement.	11	environmental protection and to pursue a high level of
12	And that interpretation really turns on the meaning	12	environmental ambition. This is something the
13	that is to be ascribed both to "have regard to", as it	13	European Union does itself, and prays in aid of, that
14	appears in 496(1), and the meaning of the term "while	14	right of regulatory autonomy.
15	preserving the regulatory autonomy of the Parties", in	15	But that doesn't have primacy in the absolute sense.
16	494(3)(f), read together.	16	Where you have an agreement that sets out rights and
17	The European Union does have a fundamentally	17	obligations for both parties, it is not because you have
18	different interpretation of the relationship between	18	regulatory autonomy that you can simply ignore
19	regulatory autonomy to decide on fisheries management	19	everything else.
20	measures and the constraints on that autonomy reflected	20	And here we have a relatively extreme proposition,
21	in the other provisions of Heading Five.	21	we would say: that in a trade and cooperation agreement,
22	As to the term "having regard to", the	22	a measure could be adopted, even if it's completely
23	European Union's position is that this requires active	23	discriminatory and accepted to be such by the UK, simply
24	consideration of those principles. And our position is	24	because it can invoke regulatory autonomy. That is
25	that this term, in its context, read in that context,	25	a proposition the European Union fundamentally disagrees
	Page 117		Page 119
14.25 1	was intended to create a link between the right the	14.28 1	with And that same logic applies to the question of
14:25 1	was intended to create a link between the right the	14:28 1	with. And that same logic applies to the question of
2	parties undeniably have to decide on a fisheries	2	proportionality.
2 3	parties undeniably have to decide on a fisheries management measure in their waters and the principles in	2 3	proportionality.  So if I now turn to the next point, which is
2 3 4	parties undeniably have to decide on a fisheries management measure in their waters and the principles in 494(3). The real difference between the parties is the	2 3 4	proportionality.  So if I now turn to the next point, which is Article 496(1) of the TCA, that says in terms:
2 3 4 5	parties undeniably have to decide on a fisheries management measure in their waters and the principles in 494(3). The real difference between the parties is the extent to which those principles must inform the outcome	2 3 4 5	proportionality.  So if I now turn to the next point, which is Article 496(1) of the TCA, that says in terms: "Each Party shall decide on any measures"
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14:30	1	hypothetical situation, the UK's position were correct,	14:33 1	bit about this distinction between process and outcome.
14.50	2	this would effectively mean that any measure for the	2	If the point of the process is to achieve a reasoned
	3	conservation of marine living resources and the	3	outcome, then maybe these things are not quite as
	4	management of fisheries resources which leads to	4	separate as the parties suppose.
	5	an impairment of the economic rights granted under	5	But my real question is: if you have had regard to
	6	Heading Five and Annex 38 could always be justified,	6	the principles in considering the reasons, but you've
	7	even if discriminatory, even if disproportionate,	7	also looked at other reasons, and there's a reasoned
	8	because in their logic this regulatory autonomy takes	8	basis for coming to the decision which hasn't
	9	primacy over all other considerations. And that would	9	disregarded either of the principles that are at issue
	10	include the other principles in 494(3) as well. In	10	here, does that suffice, or is something still more
	11	other words, their position is that it is only the	11	required by way of the characteristics of the decision
	12	decision-making process itself that is in any way	12	that then result?
	13	constrained.	13	MS NORRIS: I'll try and break that question down, and
	14	Now, the European Union says that this would	14	we may revert to that question in more detail.
	15	actually jeopardise the objectives of the TCA, and	15	JUSTICE UNTERHALTER: Yes, please, because it had various
	16	Heading Five in particular, and it is an interpretation	16	parts.
	17	that runs counter to the implementation in good faith of	17	MS NORRIS: But to give you an immediate response, it seems
	18	the agreement. In short, Heading Five makes very	18	to me that this turns a little bit on what we understand
	19	detailed arrangements for the negotiation of TACs for	19	by the precise wording of 496(1), which says:
	20	shared stocks.	20	"Each Party shall decide on"
	21	It is illogical and I repeat: illogical that	21	In fact, here I would tentatively argue that it is
	22	regulatory autonomy should be understood to override,	22	the UK that draws the broad distinction between the
	23	without constraint, the outcome of those negotiations	23	decision-making process and the outcome, and it is the
	24	and those agreements. It would make all of the	24	European Union that says in fact you cannot divorce
	25	agreements on TACs, and the right of full access to	25	the two; they don't operate in splendid isolation.
		7. 404		D 400
		Page 121		Page 123
14:31	1	waters to fish those TACs, essentially an empty vessel.	14:34 1	And if you read Article 496(1) purposively, in
14:31	1 2	waters to fish those TACs, essentially an empty vessel.  I move then to the second question, which relates to	14:34 1 2	And if you read Article 496(1) purposively, in the full context, in line with its reference back to
14:31				
14:31	2	I move then to the second question, which relates to	2	the full context, in line with its reference back to
14:31	2 3	I move then to the second question, which relates to whether there is an obligation for a measure applied for	2 3	the full context, in line with its reference back to principles, then precisely it is that which is
14:31	2 3 4	I move then to the second question, which relates to whether there is an obligation for a measure applied for the purposes of the conservation of marine living	2 3 4	the full context, in line with its reference back to principles, then precisely it is that which is artificial: to suggest that you could simply consider,
14:31	2 3 4 5 6 7	I move then to the second question, which relates to whether there is an obligation for a measure applied for the purposes of the conservation of marine living resources and the management of fisheries resources to actually be proportionate and non-discriminatory. This is very closely linked	2 3 4 5	the full context, in line with its reference back to principles, then precisely it is that which is artificial: to suggest that you could simply consider, have regard to during the decision-making process, and
14:31	2 3 4 5 6 7	I move then to the second question, which relates to whether there is an obligation for a measure applied for the purposes of the conservation of marine living resources and the management of fisheries resources to actually be proportionate and non-discriminatory. This is very closely linked JUSTICE UNTERHALTER: I'm sorry to interrupt, but I wonder,	2 3 4 5 6	the full context, in line with its reference back to principles, then precisely it is that which is artificial: to suggest that you could simply consider, have regard to during the decision-making process, and still arrive at an end result where you had
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35 (Pages 121 to 124)

3 JUSTICE UNTERHALTER: Perhaps in due course you could 4 consider this question as to whether, if you have paid 5 regard to the principles and the reasons that compel 6 a decision in one form, but nevertheless have regard to 7 other reasons that may attenuate those principles, is 8 that a permissible process for nevertheless giving rise 9 to a decision that conforms or not? 9 that a permissible process for nevertheless giving rise 10 MS NORRIS: I would again respond on a preliminary basis. 11 Here the principle that is being opposed is the one 12 of regulatory autonomy. And just to reaffirm the 13 European Union's position, we would not accept that 14 regulatory autonomy as such could override all of the 15 other principles in 494(3). Regulatory autonomy is not 16 some magic carte blanche that allows you to disregard 16 some magic carte blanche that allows you to disregard 17 everything else. 18 So here, in this dispute, those are the principles 19 that are in opposition, in a sense: it's regulatory 20 autonomy and the width of discretion, the margin of 21 discretion that the UK says that confers, versus the 22 extent to which the principles should inform the 23 decision-making process, and therefore what to have 24 regard to and how much weight should be applied. 25 JUSTICE UNTERHALTER: Yes, thank you.  Page 125  14:37 MS NORRIS: Perhaps then if I may now move on to the second 4 Question, which, as I already alluded to, is quite 5 decision-making process, and therefore what to have 6 proportionality, we would say, in Article 494(3)(f) is 7 precisely to limit the manner in which a party could 8 permissibly their regulatory autonomy, and hence to 9 provide a legal standard against which the justification 10 for any impairment to the rights of access to waters to 11 fish, as granted under Heading Five and Annex 38, could 11 then be assessed.	d in other provisions, notably  ton does not disagree that that ance attached to the nature we already addressed that boundational, we would say, nation, which clearly has rever, contrary to the United Union does not interpret this
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Page 126 Page 12	separate the two. bear to be aligned that the dies that there should be g of the costs and benefits of refer to the UK's Written 352. gree that delimiting this entails two questions: what y. And that appears at t's Written Submission. Turopean Union considers that the Tribunal must undertake is the light of the facts giving the the UK complied with that

14:41	1	conservation. Article 496 identifies specific	14:44 1	the least protective measure in order to show it is
	2	objectives which fisheries management measures may	2	proportionate. However, if a measure goes beyond what
	3	pursue, and this is among them. So the European Union	3	is necessary, in the sense that it is more restrictive
	4	has never contested the legitimacy or importance of that	4	than would be necessary to achieve the legitimate aim,
	5	as a regulatory objective.	5	then it will not be proportionate. So in that sense,
	6	As to the role of that objective in the weighing and	6	yes, the European [Union] argues that there is
	7	balancing exercise, Article 494(3)(f) refers to:	7	an additional element in the proportionality standard.
	8	" applying proportionate and non-discriminatory	8	So we would argue that the weighing and balancing in
	9	measures for the conservation of marine living	9	the framework of proportionality requires a holistic
	10	resources"	10	assessment both of the benefits of a policy, which can
	11	Therefore, the legitimacy and importance of that	11	be assessed by reference to the degree of contribution
	12	objective is acknowledged within the role of the	12	to an objective, and the costs, which is typically
	13	proportionality itself, but it certainly doesn't	13	assessed by reference to the degree of impairment to
	14	displace the whole of the rest of the weighing and	14	economic and social rights. Where there is
	15	balancing exercise. It is one of a series of factors,	15	a nullification of the rights, the benefits must be
	16	we would say, that must be considered.	16	commensurate with that level of impairment.
	17	The third point on which the parties absolutely	17	What does this mean exactly? That's actually what
	18	agree is that the term "proportionality" establishes	18	I wrote on my page, but I think that is an excellent
	19	a different legal standard to that of "necessity", which	19	question for the European Union now to address.
	20	is the language, of course, that applies in the	20	The European Union considers that the obligation is
	21	GATT 1994 and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to	21	to look at the differential. You could have a situation
	22	Trade, which also provide a legal framework for the	22	where the costs and the benefits are at a very similar
	23	balancing of economic and environmental objectives in	23	level: this would not raise a proportionality issue.
	24	certain contexts, including between states or WTO	24	You could have a situation where an increase in the
	25	members.	25	benefits above that baseline would only lead to a small
		Page 129		Page 131
		1 age 127		1 age 131
14:42	1	So the principal difference between the parties	14:46 1	increase in costs, in the sense of the impairment of the
	2	concerns how the degree of the impairment of rights	2	rights: that may also still be proportionate. In other
	3	associated with a measure is a factor to be weighed in	3	words, there doesn't have to be absolute equality
	4	the balance. And this is also a factor which is	4	between the two.
	5	relevant to the EU's third claim, but I will address it	5	The issue arises when an increase in the benefits
	6	here.	6	here, we would say, from partial closure to the full
	7	The other point, of course, is that how that factor	7	closure is matched by a significant increase in
	8	is weighed has implications when one considers the	8	costs, meaning that the two become very far apart on the
	9	relevance of the availability of other measures.	9	scale: we've moved from here to here (indicating).
	10	There have been this is essentially my fourth	10	Now, there is no disagreement between the parties
	11	question extensive discussions in the parties'	11	that when conducting this assessment, both quantitative
	12	Written Statements on the relationship between	12	and qualitative factors are relevant. When looking at
	13	proportionality and necessity.	13	the benefits, the scientific basis or foundation for
	14	So the European Union would say, first, that	14	a measure is a factor the Tribunal should plainly
	15	the difference between a necessity standard and	15	consider; however, it is not dispositive. And that is
	16	a proportionality standard is precisely that a measure	16	why the European Union argues that even were this
	17	which fully contributes to a stated and legitimate	17	Tribunal to determine that the measure at issue in this
	18	regulatory objective could pass the necessity test, as	18	dispute is based on the best available scientific
	19	has been applied under the GATT 1994, and still fail	19	advice, it does not follow a fortiori that the same
	20	a proportionality standard. That is a difference	20	measure is proportionate.
	21	between the two, because it is not because a measure is	21	I turn now to the final question that I signalled
	22	necessary under the standard applied under the GATT that	22	that we felt would be useful to address by way of legal
	23	it is also a proportionate measure.	23	standard: that concerns the relevance of the
	24 25	And second, it has never been argued by the EU that	24 25	availability of other measures. And for the purposes of
,	25	proportionality means that a party must always adopt	25	proportionality
		Page 130		Page 132

14.47	1	HICTICE INTEDITAL TED. Could Live to decrease I am decreased	14.51 1	and an anti-Cartina and an arrangement and an arrangement
14:47		JUSTICE UNTERHALTER: Could I just ask you: I understand	14:51 1	actual quantification, perhaps you can't weigh them in
	2	that ultimately your proportionality analysis is	2	exactly the same way, but one can nonetheless form
	3	a weighing-up, a holistic weighing-up of cost and	3	a view as to the degree of impairment.
	4	benefits, and there is an acknowledgement that that is	4	Here we have an absolute prohibition on fishing.
	5	both qualitative and quantitative. Sometimes in this	5	So it's fairly clear that on the spectrum, we are at the
	6	approach there is a problem of commensurability, as it	6	far end of the spectrum in terms of impairment, so one
	7	were: how do you weigh up what might seem to be	7	would expect there to be a very high level of benefit in
	8	a relatively small potential yield of biomass against	8	that sense. Now, how you quantify that scientifically
	9	the exclusion of people's livelihoods, or an element of	9	may be a different way to how you would quantify
	10	their livelihoods, in respect of vessels that fish	10	economic cost.
	11	sandeel?	11	JUSTICE UNTERHALTER: Yes, thank you.
	12	On a sort of pure quantitative basis, you might say:	12	THE CHAIRPERSON: Ms Norris, can I ask a question.
	13	well, it's something small versus something much bigger,	13	Because you just said that:
	14	and therefore the cost/benefit analysis doesn't work	14	,
	15	out. But sometimes in this sort of approach, one has	15	the availability of another proportionate measure can
	16	a difference of the what you're trying to weigh is	16	provide a useful baseline in that assessment [of
	17	hard to weigh in the same scale in order to reach	17	proportionality]."
	18	other than at extremes, it's sometimes hard to weigh in	18	* *
	19	what I'm calling the same scale, because you're weighing	19	
	20	up different things, different kinds of rights that	20	into account the availability of another sort of more
	21	don't all cash out in the same currency, if I could use	21	proportionate, if I can say, measure? Is that
	22	that metaphor.	22	a requirement, as part of the proportionality
	23	I'm just wondering how you think about that problem.	23	assessment, to do that? Or is it just a useful
	24	MS NORRIS: I think the European Union is alive to	24	mechanism in order to undertake a proper weighing and
	25	the difficulties that that presents on a practical	25	balancing of the various costs and benefits of
		Page 133		Page 135
		•		•
14:49		level. And this is something that another Agent for the	14:52 1	a measure?
	2	European Union will be addressing when it comes to	2	MS NORRIS: I think it's very difficult to give
	3	applying this legal standard to the precise measure at	3	a one-size-fits-all answer. I think what we would say
	4	issue, so without going into that particular premise.	4	is that where you're contemplating a measure that
	5	I think that this is actually exactly why the	5	you know is evidently going to nullify economic rights
	6	European Union would say that looking at the		
		European Union would say that looking at the	6	granted under this agreement because you are
	7	availability of another proportionate measure can	7	granted under this agreement because you are contemplating a full prohibition, then one would have
	8	availability of another proportionate measure can provide a useful baseline in that assessment. Because	7 8	granted under this agreement because you are contemplating a full prohibition, then one would have an obligation to consider, given the obvious extreme
	8 9	availability of another proportionate measure can provide a useful baseline in that assessment. Because as we've said, we don't argue that commensurability must	7 8 9	granted under this agreement because you are contemplating a full prohibition, then one would have an obligation to consider, given the obvious extreme impairment of economic and social rights, whether that
	8 9 10	availability of another proportionate measure can provide a useful baseline in that assessment. Because as we've said, we don't argue that commensurability must mean "equal to". So in a sense, what you are looking	7 8 9 10	granted under this agreement because you are contemplating a full prohibition, then one would have an obligation to consider, given the obvious extreme impairment of economic and social rights, whether that could be achieved in another way.
	8 9 10 11	availability of another proportionate measure can provide a useful baseline in that assessment. Because as we've said, we don't argue that commensurability must mean "equal to". So in a sense, what you are looking at, as we've said, is the delta between the two.	7 8 9 10 11	granted under this agreement because you are contemplating a full prohibition, then one would have an obligation to consider, given the obvious extreme impairment of economic and social rights, whether that could be achieved in another way.  Now, in terms of how the alternative measure plays
	8 9 10 11 12	availability of another proportionate measure can provide a useful baseline in that assessment. Because as we've said, we don't argue that commensurability must mean "equal to". So in a sense, what you are looking at, as we've said, is the delta between the two.  And here we have put forward the proposition that	7 8 9 10 11	granted under this agreement because you are contemplating a full prohibition, then one would have an obligation to consider, given the obvious extreme impairment of economic and social rights, whether that could be achieved in another way.  Now, in terms of how the alternative measure plays out in an analysis, that is also a useful device that
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	8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	availability of another proportionate measure can provide a useful baseline in that assessment. Because as we've said, we don't argue that commensurability must mean "equal to". So in a sense, what you are looking at, as we've said, is the delta between the two.  And here we have put forward the proposition that there is a reasonably available alternative measure that would be proportionate. And when you look at that measure, we would say than if you take that as a baseline, the additional benefits in terms of the	7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	granted under this agreement because you are contemplating a full prohibition, then one would have an obligation to consider, given the obvious extreme impairment of economic and social rights, whether that could be achieved in another way.  Now, in terms of how the alternative measure plays out in an analysis, that is also a useful device that has been used extensively in the framework of necessity tests in front of the WTO precisely because it became a mechanism through which to assess this question of: is there a less restrictive measure available? And in
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38 (Pages 133 to 136)

14:53 1	we find ourselves.	14:56 1	the difference in costs.
2	THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much.	2	This also has implications for the burden of proof.
3	MS NORRIS: I think that perhaps if I may move to without	3	Since the European Union says that it has established
4	wishing to cut short any further question the Tribunal	4	a prima facie case that a partial closure would have
5	may have had the two final points really on this.	5	been a proportionate means for the UK to pursue its
6	The first is that the UK points to the absence of	6	regulatory objective, it says that the UK needs to
7	a clearly defined proportionality standard under	7	engage with that position. And instead it has
8	international economic law and international	8	reformulated the legal standard to avoid this analytical
9	environmental law.	9	step.
10	Now, the European Union is not suggesting that there	10	Now, this is an important point of difference
11	is a proportionality standard that one can simply lift	11	between the parties because, as I said, the European
12	from either international economic law or international	12	Union's position is that that is a useful, and in fact
13	environmental law. However and this must be	13	necessary, part of the analytic process.
14	stressed proportionality is a core principle in the	14	So those would conclude my remarks on
15	European Union's legal order; and, as the European Union	15	proportionality.
16	set out in its Written Submission, it is also	16	I could briefly address the Tribunal on
17	a principle in the United Kingdom's legal order.	17	discrimination, just simply because the parties do not
18	We are in the framework of an agreement which uses	18	agree on the legal standard as applicable to
19	that term, rather than the term "necessity". This	19	discrimination either. And to avoid repetition, I would
20	Tribunal will have to ascribe meaning to that term. And	20	try and respond, by reference to the Tribunal's advance
21	it is for that reason that the European Union says:	21	question 16, by highlighting the following propositions.
22	applying the principles of customary international law,	22	The first is that the EU has addressed what it
23	what is the relevant context that this Tribunal can look	23	considers would be permissible differential treatment in
24	at? And that must and does include in this specific	24	its Written Submission. And the European Union
25	case, because of the specificity linked to this term,	25	considers that this refers to a difference in treatment
	Page 137		Page 139
14:55 1	the way that proportionality has been understood by both	14:58 1	that stems exclusively from a legitimate regulatory
2	parties in their legal orders.	2	objective, and that would be permissible differential
3	That's not to say that it is determinative, and that	3	treatment. The European Union does not argue that
4	is why the European Union also tried to draw elements	4	a differential treatment in itself is enough to
5	from other standards to show that its test is one which	5	establish discrimination.
6	reflects a proper interpretation of that term.	6	As to the relevance of the sandeel as a shared
7	Now, the second issue just to come back to refers to	7	stock, what this actually means is that it was in both
8	your advance question 13. And here it's really to	8	parties' waters at the time of conclusion of the TCA,
9	repeat something I have alluded to already: the	9	and still is. We would suggest that, given the agreed
10	European Union's position that, unlike in the framework	10	shares in Annex 35, any measure addressing sandeel would
11	of a necessity analysis, a proportionate alternative	11	have a differential impact on the EU.
12	measure is not required to make an equivalent	12	As a matter of principle, again without belabouring
12	contribution to the regulatory objective much	12	
13	contribution to the regulatory objective pursued.	13 14	the point, the EU does not accept the proposition that
14	In fact, therefore, to respond to the question, the	14	the point, the EU does not accept the proposition that Heading Five can be interpreted to mean that regulatory
14 15	In fact, therefore, to respond to the question, the Tribunal is neither required to consider whether the	14 15	the point, the EU does not accept the proposition that Heading Five can be interpreted to mean that regulatory autonomy and the right to regulate, as described in
14 15 16	In fact, therefore, to respond to the question, the Tribunal is neither required to consider whether the least restrictive measure would be likely to achieve	14 15 16	the point, the EU does not accept the proposition that Heading Five can be interpreted to mean that regulatory autonomy and the right to regulate, as described in Recital 7 of the preamble, allows a party to simply
14 15 16 17	In fact, therefore, to respond to the question, the Tribunal is neither required to consider whether the least restrictive measure would be likely to achieve substantially the same result or to consider whether	14 15 16 17	the point, the EU does not accept the proposition that Heading Five can be interpreted to mean that regulatory autonomy and the right to regulate, as described in Recital 7 of the preamble, allows a party to simply adopt a discriminatory fisheries management measure.
14 15 16 17 18	In fact, therefore, to respond to the question, the Tribunal is neither required to consider whether the least restrictive measure would be likely to achieve substantially the same result or to consider whether a less restrictive measure would be likely to achieve	14 15 16 17 18	the point, the EU does not accept the proposition that Heading Five can be interpreted to mean that regulatory autonomy and the right to regulate, as described in Recital 7 of the preamble, allows a party to simply adopt a discriminatory fisheries management measure.  Nor does the European Union agree that the concept
14 15 16 17 18	In fact, therefore, to respond to the question, the Tribunal is neither required to consider whether the least restrictive measure would be likely to achieve substantially the same result or to consider whether a less restrictive measure would be likely to achieve substantially the same result. The Tribunal is required	14 15 16 17 18 19	the point, the EU does not accept the proposition that Heading Five can be interpreted to mean that regulatory autonomy and the right to regulate, as described in Recital 7 of the preamble, allows a party to simply adopt a discriminatory fisheries management measure.  Nor does the European Union agree that the concept of non-discrimination, as referred to in Heading Five,
14 15 16 17 18 19 20	In fact, therefore, to respond to the question, the Tribunal is neither required to consider whether the least restrictive measure would be likely to achieve substantially the same result or to consider whether a less restrictive measure would be likely to achieve substantially the same result. The Tribunal is required to consider whether there is a proportionate measure	14 15 16 17 18 19 20	the point, the EU does not accept the proposition that Heading Five can be interpreted to mean that regulatory autonomy and the right to regulate, as described in Recital 7 of the preamble, allows a party to simply adopt a discriminatory fisheries management measure.  Nor does the European Union agree that the concept of non-discrimination, as referred to in Heading Five, can be interpreted in splendid isolation from the
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14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	In fact, therefore, to respond to the question, the Tribunal is neither required to consider whether the least restrictive measure would be likely to achieve substantially the same result or to consider whether a less restrictive measure would be likely to achieve substantially the same result. The Tribunal is required to consider whether there is a proportionate measure which would have better reflected the balance of rights and obligations between the parties. And to do that, the Tribunal should look at the degree of the additional benefit gained when comparing the total prohibition with	14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	the point, the EU does not accept the proposition that Heading Five can be interpreted to mean that regulatory autonomy and the right to regulate, as described in Recital 7 of the preamble, allows a party to simply adopt a discriminatory fisheries management measure.  Nor does the European Union agree that the concept of non-discrimination, as referred to in Heading Five, can be interpreted in splendid isolation from the meaning accorded to that term elsewhere in the TCA, or the meaning accorded to that term under international law, including international economic law.  So in terms of the legal standard, those are the

1				
14:59	1	THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much, Ms Norris.	15:03 1	Those documents essentially indicate that the
	2	Thank you. I invite the European Union Agent	2	prohibition on sandeel fishing in all UK waters of the
	3	Mr Dawes: I believe you have the floor now.	3	North Sea can bring about benefits to the extent that
	4	MR DAWES: Thank you, Madam Chair.	4	there is a localised depletion of sandeel, and that the
	5	The EU will now address the Tribunal on the	5	relevant predators that are dependent on sandeel cannot
	6	application of the legal standard to the facts of this	6	forage by that, I mean feed themselves on sandeel
	7	dispute, and this I should give the Tribunal advance	7	outside of any such locally depleted area. In such
	8	warning will require the EU to take the Tribunal	8	circumstances, a prohibition on sandeel fishing in those
	9	through a number of documents in the core bundle.	9	waters can bring about benefits because it removes any
	10	But maybe I will start on a happier note. The	10	competition between the fishery and the predators in
	11	parties can agree that the measure is apt to contribute	11	a locally depleted area.
	12	to the objective identified by the UK. By that, the EU	12	Those documents also essentially indicate that to
	13	means that by prohibiting all sandeel fishing in UK	13	the extent there is either no localised depletion or
	14	waters of the North Sea, there is a contribution to	14	that predators can forage outside of any locally
	15	the stated objective of marine conservation.	15	depleted area, a prohibition on sandeel fishing cannot
	16	By contrast, the parties disagree on the following	16	bring about additional benefits.
	17	four points, all of which will require factual	17	The EU will now take the Tribunal to the relevant
	18	determination by this Tribunal.	18	passages of the three documents, and the EU will do so
	19	The first point of disagreement is on whether the UK	19	in relation to each of the points that I just made, so
	20	has properly assessed the benefits of the sandeel	20	starting with the fact that there may be instances of
	21	fishing prohibition.	21	localised sandeel depletion.
	22	The second point on which the parties disagree is on	22	If the EU could ask the Tribunal to turn to tab 4,
	23	whether the United Kingdom has properly assessed the	23	which is Exhibit C-22, the ICES Technical Service
	24	economic and social impacts of the measure.	24	report, and it's page 89 of the core bundle. If the
	25	The third point of disagreement is on whether the	25	Tribunal sees just above the bold there is a bold
		Page 141		Page 143
15:01	1	United Kingdom has properly weighed the benefits of the	15:05 1	"Sandeel" in the middle of the page, and it's the
15:01	1 2	United Kingdom has properly weighed the benefits of the measure and its economic and social impacts.	15:05 1 2	"Sandeel" in the middle of the page, and it's the sentence just before that bold heading. It says:
15:01		United Kingdom has properly weighed the benefits of the measure and its economic and social impacts.  And the fourth point of factual disagreement is on		"Sandeel" in the middle of the page, and it's the sentence just before that bold heading. It says: " for some predators, it is the local
15:01	2	measure and its economic and social impacts.	2	sentence just before that bold heading. It says:
15:01	2	measure and its economic and social impacts.  And the fourth point of factual disagreement is on	2 3	sentence just before that bold heading. It says: " for some predators, it is the local
15:01	2 3 4	measure and its economic and social impacts.  And the fourth point of factual disagreement is on whether the United Kingdom could have decided on	2 3 4	sentence just before that bold heading. It says: " for some predators, it is the local concentration of prey that matters, at a scale below any
15:01	2 3 4 5	measure and its economic and social impacts.  And the fourth point of factual disagreement is on whether the United Kingdom could have decided on alternative proportionate measures.	2 3 4 5	sentence just before that bold heading. It says:  " for some predators, it is the local concentration of prey that matters, at a scale below any feasible stock assessment."
15:01	2 3 4 5 6	measure and its economic and social impacts.  And the fourth point of factual disagreement is on whether the United Kingdom could have decided on alternative proportionate measures.  The EU will start with the benefits of the measure.	2 3 4 5 6	sentence just before that bold heading. It says:  " for some predators, it is the local concentration of prey that matters, at a scale below any feasible stock assessment."  What does that mean? It means, in other words, while the stock assessments are done at a higher level, a broader level, there may be localised instances where
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15:06 1	sandbanks and the patchiness of available suitable	15:10 1	razorbill and puffin) and so are less affected by
2	habitat indicates that the local conditions affecting	2	a decrease in absolute abundance of sandeel"
3	adult mortality (fishing pressure, food availability and	3	And if you could then just turn to the next page in
4	predator abundance) can lead to significant variation in	4	the same document, so page 411, the third paragraph on
5	sandeel age and length composition over a relatively	5	that page, which begins "Prey availability". And again,
6	fine spatial scale."	6	it says:
7	And then there's a reference:	7	"Prey availability, rather than abundance or
8	"Local depletion of sandeel aggregations is	8	biomass, plays a key role in the breeding success of
9	therefore unlikely to be compensated by"	9	some seabirds. Prey need to be within foraging distance
10	So, again, a reference to the fact that what is	10	of seabird colonies, they need to be within the water
11	relevant is the local depletion.	11	column, and they need to be within dive depth (which
12	That was on the local depletions of sandeel. So	12	varies considerably among seabird species).
13	turning now to the ability of the different predators to	13	Similarly"
14	forage outside of any locally depleted area.	14	And this is the point on which the EU addressed
15	As the European Union has already indicated, there	15	the Tribunal this morning:
16	are three main I'll call them "categories" of	16	" prey of the right age or size class must be
17	predators, if one can call them like that: seabirds,	17	available at the right time of the year for provisioning
18	marine mammals and other fish. The European Union will	18	to chicks."
19	take each of these in turn.	19	So that's the reference to the breeding season.
20	So if we can start with the ability of seabirds to	20	Before moving on to the marine mammals, the EU would
21	forage outside of any locally depleted area.	21	take this opportunity to react to a point made by the
22	The European Union would ask the Tribunal to turn	22	United Kingdom in its Written Submission regarding
23	back and this may happen several times to tab 4 of	23	the protection of seabirds outside of the breeding
24	the core bundle (C-22), which is the ICES Technical	24	season, and even for kittiwakes.
25	Service report, and to page 8 of that document. It's in	25	There, if the Tribunal could just turn back to
	Page 145		Page 147
	1 ago 143		1 ago 147
15:08 1	the middle of the page, the third paragraph under the	15:11 1	page 409 of the document in which you are, and it's the
2	heading "Ecosystem aspects", and the last sentence of	2	paragraph that begins "While". So page 409 of the core
3	that paragraph. It's the paragraph that begins:	3	bundle. It says:
4	"Spatial distributions of forage stocks"	4	" seabirds are not constrained to feeding around
5	And the last sentence there says:	5	their colonies or provisioning offspring during the
6	"Seabirds are the most sensitive predators to	6	non-breeding period"
7	changes in sandeel abundance, with terns and kittiwakes	7	So essentially that means they are able to travel
8	the most sensitive among seabirds."	8	further because they do not need to travel back as often
9	Now, if the Tribunal could again jump forward in the	9	to their nests.
10	bundle to tab 23 (C-50), so back to the Scottish	10	So that was on the ability of seabirds to forage
11	scientific report, and to page 54 of the internal	11	outside of any locally depleted area.
12	numbering, which is page 410 of the core bundle.	12	We can now move on to the ability of marine mammals
13	So as I said, in the ICES Technical Service there	13	to forage outside of any locally depleted area. Again,
14 15	was a reference to terns and to kittiwakes. In the	14 15	if the Tribunal could jump back to the ICES Technical
15 16	Scottish scientific report, it's the second paragraph on	15 16	Service report (C-22), so tab 4, and page 89 in the core bundle.
16	page 410. There is a description of two scientific studies, which:	16	There, under the bold heading "Sandeel", "Overview",
17	" did not deduct any increase in breeding success	18	it is said that:
18	following the Wee Bankie sandeel closure for any other	18	"Sandeel are also important prey"
20	species than kittiwakes."	20	It's the fifth line.
20 21	And then:	20	"Sandeel are also important prey for seals and minke
21 22	"[One of these studies] concluded this was because	21 22	whales"
22 23	some species feed close inshore in unfished areas"	23	So these are marine mammals.
23	And there, there's a reference to "(terns, shag)":	23	" however, these species can forage over a wider
25	" or can dive in the water column (guillemot,	25	area than nesting birds."
23	of can are in the water commit (guinemot,	23	unit negating of doi:
	Page 146		Page 148

15.12	1 And then it was on to small sally some day the	15.17 1	There exain at the top of the page under "Denefits
15:13	1 And then it goes on to specifically consider the	15:17 1 2	There again, at the top of the page under "Benefits of a sandeel closure on predatory fish", there are
	2 situation of minke whales, where it says that they are		statements that:
	<ul><li>3 "in particular able to forage over large distances".</li><li>4 And it says that they are:</li></ul>	4	"Predatory fish"
	· · ·	5	•
	5 " unlikely to be seriously affected by local		Sorry.
	depletion of a particular prey, while seals are likely		HE CHAIRPERSON: Could you just point us to the exact
	7 intermediate between wide-ranging Minkes and locally		page number, please, and tab?
	8 dependent seabirds."		IR DAWES: Pardon me. My apologies, Madam Chair. Page 391
	9 The reference to "locally dependent seabirds".	9	of tab 24.
	So that was the ability of marine mammals to forage		HE CHAIRPERSON: I think you mean tab 23.
	outside of any locally depleted area.		IR DAWES: Do I mean tab I do mean tab 23.
	Finally on this point, regarding the ability of		My apologies. Tab 23, indeed.
	other birds, I would like to take the Tribunal to	13	The page number is correct: 391. So there, under
	14 [C-]45, which is the English scientific report or the	14	section 3.1.1:
	Natural England report that has been discussed at length	15	"Predatory fish are often generalist feeders, where
	this morning. But the good news is we will not discuss		the diet typically consists of no more than 20% of any
	this aspect of the English scientific report again.	17	species, as predators switch between prey species based
	18 It's tab 15 of the core bundle and page 13 of the	18	on availability"
	document, so page 212 in the bundle.	19	And then:
	There it's under the heading "Marine fish" in bold.	20	"The importance of sandeel is more variable for
	21 So there it says:	21	predatory fish than for seabirds and mammals"
	22 "The diet 'flexibility' and ability of predatory	22	So based on those factual elements, that's the basis
	commercial fish to substitute diet shortfalls with other	23	on which the EU says that the UK has not properly
	24 prey species suggests that they are less crucially	24	assessed the benefits of the measure, based on the
	dependent on local sandeel abundance than, for example,	25	scientific advice that the UK identified for the basis
	D 110		D 464
	Page 149		Page 151
15:15		15:18 1	of the measure.
15:15	2 So essentially that means that in the event of	2 Л	USTICE UNTERHALTER: Can I just ask: among the references
15:15	2 So essentially that means that in the event of 3 a local depletion of sandeel, the other fish are able to	2 Л 3	USTICE UNTERHALTER: Can I just ask: among the references you gave us was the dependence that seabirds have; well,
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	So essentially that means that in the event of a local depletion of sandeel, the other fish are able to replace sandeel with other fish. So that's why they, in a way, are not affected by any localised depletion. And then THE CHAIRPERSON: Excuse me, Mr Dawes, can I just ask a question there. Because it says here they're "less crucially dependent on local sandeel abundance".  MR DAWES: Yes. THE CHAIRPERSON: But does that also mean that they may be they're less crucially dependent, but they may be dependent?  MR DAWES: I mean, there I think one would have to look also at the area in which what is meant by "local sandeel abundance". Yes, it means that to the extent that there is a local depletion, at least in principle, they are more able than the seabirds to replace sandeel with other fish. So they were less dependent on sandeel in the first place, yes. THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Please continue. MR DAWES: And then maybe, Madam Chair, if one goes then forward to the Scottish scientific report, because there, there is also a similar statement. So it's	2 JU 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 M 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 JU 24 24	JSTICE UNTERHALTER: Can I just ask: among the references you gave us was the dependence that seabirds have; well, their ability to feed outside depleted areas. There seemed to be some qualification around the breeding season, where there was a greater dependency on localisation. Does that make a difference to your analysis or not?  IR DAWES: I think the EU's position is: one of the constraints on the foraging range of these nesting seabirds is the fact that during their breeding season, because of where the seabird colonies are, the adults must, when they feed, not only go out and eat sandeel for themselves, but they must also bring back sandeel or other fish to their young, who are in the nests on the coast.  So to that extent, yes, there is a difference during the breeding season because and that was shown also by some of the slides you were shown this morning the foraging ranges are smaller during the breeding season than maybe they are when the adults are not required to bring back the sandeel in order to feed their young.  JSTICE UNTERHALTER: Does that make a difference to the dependence of various species on localised depleted

42 (Pages 149 to 152)

15:20 1 rather critical to the perpetuation and flourishing of 2 the species. So the fact that outside the breeding 2 on. But to the extent that there	
2 the species. So the fact that outside the breeding 2 on. But to the extent that there	why they cannot be relied
3 season they have less dependence would still seem to 3 biomass increases, they are base	•
4 require careful consideration as to what dependency 4 generated based on that model,	
5 exists during the breeding season. 5 submissions on that point.	•
6 MR DAWES: But I think to that point, the position would be 6 So that was the claim in para	graph 391 about
7 that to the extent there is a localised depletion, then 7 the likely biomass increases.	& ·1
8 those seabirds are even more able to travel longer 8 But importantly is the next page	aragraph, 392, where
9 distances; if sandeel is an important part of their 9 the European Union understand	
10 diet, they are able to travel even further. And 10 which it does not seem to have	
11 therefore any dependency in the localised area is 11 it says that:	,
12 reduced because the seabirds are able to go even further 12 " the [United Kingdom] wa	s entitled to place
13 than during the breeding season, and to obtain sandeel 13 significant weight on the grav	•
14 in a wider range of areas, geographically. 14 to be addressed"	·
15 JUSTICE UNTERHALTER: Thank you. 15 Because:	
16 MR DAWES: Before moving on, the European Union would also 16 " at the time of the adoption	n of the measures,
17 like to respond to the UK's summaries of the benefits of 17 there was a real and pressing ne	
18 the measure in the United Kingdom's Written Submission, 18 measures to protect sandeel abu	
19 because these also overstate the benefits, but in 19 resilience"	
20 a manner different to the scientific advice. So these 20 So that's paragraph 392.3 of t	the United Kingdom's
21 are paragraphs 391 to 395 of the United Kingdom's 21 Written Submission.	
22 Written Submission, and I'll take the paragraphs in 22 In support of that statement r	egarding "a real and
23 order. (Pause) 23 pressing need to [act]", it refers	
24 For now you can put away your bundle, but I cannot 24 subparagraphs, 392.1 and 392.2	2. And I think it's
25 promise that you will not have to get it out again soon. 25 necessary for the Tribunal to lo	ok more closely at those
Page 153 Page 155	
1 age 133	
15:22 1 It will be back! 15:25 1 two subparagraphs, and the arguments of the arguments of the subparagraphs are two subparagraphs.	ments and the evidence
2 At the end of paragraph 391, there is a statement: 2 identified by the UK regarding the	he "real and pressing
3 "By increasing the availability of sandeel as food 3 need".	
4 for their predators, a closure of sandeel waters was 4 So if the Tribunal could turn b	back to 392.1,
5 likely to increase the biomass of those predators" 5 essentially, when one looks at the	
6 And it's not to reopen the debate that we have 6 sentence summarises the points by	<del>-</del>
7 already had, but if one looks at footnote 767 of the 7 is a risk of sandeel stock collapse	
8 UK's Written Submission, which is the support for that 8 levels of fishing". That's the last	sentence of
9 statement, there are references to two of the documents 9 paragraph 392.1.	
10 in the core bundle. So it's the Scottish scientific 10 But simply, this is not the case	
11 report (C-50), which is tab 23, and not 24; and also to 11 North Sea sandeel fishery and the	e way it is currently
10 1 7 11 1 10 10 10 10 10	
12 the English scientific report (C-45). 12 managed. As the European Unic	on explained this morning,
13 I don't propose to take the Tribunal to those now, 13 it is an agreed fact that since 201	on explained this morning,  1 the management
13 I don't propose to take the Tribunal to those now, 13 it is an agreed fact that since 201 14 but if the Tribunal looks at those references so it's 14 strategy for sandeel is designed to	on explained this morning,  1 the management o avoid the risk of
13 I don't propose to take the Tribunal to those now, 14 but if the Tribunal looks at those references so it's 15 page 13 of Exhibit C-50 and pages 7 and 10 of 18 it is an agreed fact that since 201 19 strategy for sandeel is designed to sandeel stock collapse by aiming	on explained this morning,  1 the management o avoid the risk of to ensure, essentially,
13 I don't propose to take the Tribunal to those now, 14 but if the Tribunal looks at those references so it's 15 page 13 of Exhibit C-50 and pages 7 and 10 of 16 Exhibit C-45 there is nothing in those particular 18 it is an agreed fact that since 201 19 strategy for sandeel is designed to the sandeel stock collapse by aiming that a sufficient proportion of the	on explained this morning,  1 the management o avoid the risk of g to ensure, essentially, e sandeel population
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13 I don't propose to take the Tribunal to those now, 14 but if the Tribunal looks at those references so it's 15 page 13 of Exhibit C-50 and pages 7 and 10 of 16 Exhibit C-45 there is nothing in those particular 17 pages of those documents to support this statement about 18 the likelihood. 13 it is an agreed fact that since 201 14 strategy for sandeel is designed to sandeel stock collapse by aiming 16 that a sufficient proportion of the escapes fishing pressure, and tha 18 fishery can be continued in a sus	on explained this morning,  1 the management o avoid the risk of g to ensure, essentially, e sandeel population t ensures that the tainable manner. And
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15:27 1	Submission.	15:30 1	is indicating that nevertheless, even with the
2	Now, with a bit of detective work because that	2	precautionary framework adopted by ICES, it's possible
3	covers paragraphs 87 to 110, and 111 to 129 there are	3	that the resulting biomasses may be too low.
4	two actually two relevant paragraphs in sections IV and	4	So I'm not quite sure where, in either footnote 162
5	V where the United Kingdom discusses this risk of	5	or 163 which again refers to the "English Scientific
6	sandeel stock collapse even with limited fishing, and	6	Report", the "Scottish Scientific Report" and
7	those are paragraphs 96 and 115 of the United Kingdom's	7	a "De Minimis [Report]" where the reference to the
8		8	2004 study comes in.
9	1	9	I must admit, I did not look at paragraph 96, which
10		10	you also referred us to. But it would be helpful if you
11		11	explained that.
12	•	12	113
13	•	13	
14		14	
15	•	15	• •
16		16	ŭ ·
17		17	
18		18	1 0 1
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21	•	21	
22	2 ,	22	•
23		23	
24		24	
25	mortality in years where indeed the stock size might be	25	It's essentially the same point that is made in
	Page 157		Page 159
15:29 1	lower in a particular sandeel management area.	15:32 1	paragraph 115.
2	If the Tribunal requires the reference to the fixed	2	"The fact that sandeel experience high levels of
2 3	If the Tribunal requires the reference to the fixed fishing pressure in the study from 2004, it's at page 3	2 3	"The fact that sandeel experience high levels of natural fluctuation means that even without the
2 3 4	If the Tribunal requires the reference to the fixed fishing pressure in the study from 2004, it's at page 3 of Exhibit R-0027. And there are references to three	2 3 4	"The fact that sandeel experience high levels of natural fluctuation means that even without the additional pressure of fishing, sandeel abundance can
2 3 4 5	If the Tribunal requires the reference to the fixed fishing pressure in the study from 2004, it's at page 3 of Exhibit R-0027. And there are references to three variables that are used for fishing pressure, and those	2 3 4 5	"The fact that sandeel experience high levels of natural fluctuation means that even without the additional pressure of fishing, sandeel abundance can vary from year to year."
2 3 4 5 6	If the Tribunal requires the reference to the fixed fishing pressure in the study from 2004, it's at page 3 of Exhibit R-0027. And there are references to three variables that are used for fishing pressure, and those are all variables which are based on a fixed fishing	2 3 4 5 6	"The fact that sandeel experience high levels of natural fluctuation means that even without the additional pressure of fishing, sandeel abundance can vary from year to year."  That is not contested. But then, and it's the key
2 3 4 5 6 7	If the Tribunal requires the reference to the fixed fishing pressure in the study from 2004, it's at page 3 of Exhibit R-0027. And there are references to three variables that are used for fishing pressure, and those are all variables which are based on a fixed fishing mortality.	2 3 4 5 6 7	"The fact that sandeel experience high levels of natural fluctuation means that even without the additional pressure of fishing, sandeel abundance can vary from year to year."  That is not contested. But then, and it's the key sentence:
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	If the Tribunal requires the reference to the fixed fishing pressure in the study from 2004, it's at page 3 of Exhibit R-0027. And there are references to three variables that are used for fishing pressure, and those are all variables which are based on a fixed fishing mortality.  So one of the two arguments on which the United	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	"The fact that sandeel experience high levels of natural fluctuation means that even without the additional pressure of fishing, sandeel abundance can vary from year to year."  That is not contested. But then, and it's the key sentence:  "A modelling study has found that even with a low
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	If the Tribunal requires the reference to the fixed fishing pressure in the study from 2004, it's at page 3 of Exhibit R-0027. And there are references to three variables that are used for fishing pressure, and those are all variables which are based on a fixed fishing mortality.  So one of the two arguments on which the United Kingdom relies for the "real and pressing need" is the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	"The fact that sandeel experience high levels of natural fluctuation means that even without the additional pressure of fishing, sandeel abundance can vary from year to year."  That is not contested. But then, and it's the key sentence:  "A modelling study has found that even with a low level of fishing pressure, there remains a risk that
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	If the Tribunal requires the reference to the fixed fishing pressure in the study from 2004, it's at page 3 of Exhibit R-0027. And there are references to three variables that are used for fishing pressure, and those are all variables which are based on a fixed fishing mortality.  So one of the two arguments on which the United Kingdom relies for the "real and pressing need" is the risk of stock collapse, which simply, under the current	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	"The fact that sandeel experience high levels of natural fluctuation means that even without the additional pressure of fishing, sandeel abundance can vary from year to year."  That is not contested. But then, and it's the key sentence:  "A modelling study has found that even with a low level of fishing pressure, there remains a risk that sandeel populations will 'crash'."
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	If the Tribunal requires the reference to the fixed fishing pressure in the study from 2004, it's at page 3 of Exhibit R-0027. And there are references to three variables that are used for fishing pressure, and those are all variables which are based on a fixed fishing mortality.  So one of the two arguments on which the United Kingdom relies for the "real and pressing need" is the risk of stock collapse, which simply, under the current management strategy, that risk is taken into account in	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	"The fact that sandeel experience high levels of natural fluctuation means that even without the additional pressure of fishing, sandeel abundance can vary from year to year."  That is not contested. But then, and it's the key sentence:  "A modelling study has found that even with a low level of fishing pressure, there remains a risk that sandeel populations will 'crash'."  And if one looks at footnote 103, there you will see
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15:33 1	the United Kingdom's Written Submission to the next	15:36 1	biomass of commercially valuable fish and tourism
2	subparagraph, so 392.2. And here, in a way, it will not	2	opportunities".
3	be necessary to refer to any documents, but what is	3	Very briefly on that.
4	important is to unpack this paragraph. Because it makes	4	On the increased biomass of commercially viable
5	several statements with which the European Union agrees,	5	fish, the European Union would again ask the Tribunal to
6	but when one tries to put them together, they don't	6	turn back to the Scottish scientific report, which is at
7	actually support the proposition the UK is making about	7	tab 23 (C-50), and to page 391. So it's the sentence
8	the real and urgent need to act.	8	after the ones we've already considered, where it says:
9	So if I could just take the Tribunal through,	9	"Some fish species such as whiting, haddock, cod,
10	I think there are four statements.	10	plaice have shown higher body condition indices or
11	The first statement is essentially that there is	11	growth in years of high sandeel abundances"
12	a general decline in seabird populations. And that is	12	And the simple point there is: whilst there may be
13	unfortunate, but it's not an element that is disputed by	13	indications of higher body masses in those years, that
14	anyone.	14	does not mean that in years where there is less sandeel
15	The second statement, which again is not disputed,	15	abundance, that there is necessarily an impact on
16	is that avian flu also has an impact on certain seabird	16	the biomass of those fish.
17	populations. And I think the reference is in particular	17	Then finally, regarding tourism, the
18	to 2022, when there was this impact.	18	European Union's simple point is that this was not
19	Then the third statement, which again is not in	19	something which the United Kingdom itself purported to
20	dispute: declines in sandeel abundance can impact	20	have taken into account during its decision-making
21	breeding success of certain seabirds, most notably	21	process. This is something that the United Kingdom
22	kittiwakes. Again, there is nothing disputed there.	22	and one can see that in paragraph 395 there is
23	And the fourth and final statement, which is of	23	a reference to responses that the United Kingdom
24	a general nature and with which the EU can agree, is	24	received to consultations. But when one looks at the
25	that:	25	various consultation documents and the various
	Page 161		Page 163
	1 110		1 100
15:35 1	" spatial sandeel fishing closures may build	15:38 1	ministerial submissions that were made, there is no
2	and hind marilian and as revall as having resident apparent		
2	seabird resilience as well as having wider ecosystem	2	reference actually to tourism being taken into account.
3	benefits."	3	So unless the Tribunal has questions at this
3 4	benefits."  As a general proposition, the EU can agree that	3 4	So unless the Tribunal has questions at this juncture, I will turn to the second point of
3 4 5	benefits."  As a general proposition, the EU can agree that spatial closures may have these effects.	3 4 5	So unless the Tribunal has questions at this juncture, I will turn to the second point of disagreement between the parties, namely regarding
3 4 5 6	benefits."  As a general proposition, the EU can agree that spatial closures may have these effects.  So, essentially, all of the elements on which the	3 4 5 6	So unless the Tribunal has questions at this juncture, I will turn to the second point of disagreement between the parties, namely regarding the economic and social impacts of the measure.
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15:40 1	" [either] to other stocks in UK waters and would	15:43 1	And the same is said in the other ministerial
2	be able to continue to finish their sandeel quota in EU	2	submission, which I would ask the Tribunal to turn to,
3	waters"	3	which is at tab 26. This is a ministerial submission of
4	And then if one goes on to the next paragraph of the	4	26 January 2024. And the UK explains in its Written
5	United Kingdom's Written Statement, there's a reference	5	Submission, paragraph 414.5, that this is the
6	to the fact that:	6	ministerial submission concerning whether to approve
7	"Conditions of access were considered both as	7	the closure of sandeel fishing in Scottish waters.
8	regards access to UK waters to fish sandeel (which was	8	And there, if I could ask the Tribunal to turn to
9	to cease) and access to UK waters to continue to fish	9	page 583 of the bundle, so it's the last page of the
10	other agreed stocks"	10	relevant annex. There it is the second paragraph:
11	So there again, the position is being stated that	11	"However, it is expected that there will be
12	any impacts on the EU because of the prohibition of	12	an impact on EU vessels, primarily the Danish fleet."
13	fishing sandeel in UK waters are mitigated.	13	And then there are figures given.
14	And the same is true in the ministerial submissions,	14	"However, this does not account for the likelihood
15	which I will now take you to. So there are two	15	that EU vessels will move their fishing of sandeel to
16	documents. The first is the ministerial submission	16	other waters and therefore offset the loss of a closure
17	which is at R-0077, which is tab 17 of your core bundle.	17	in Scottish waters."
18	We will come back to this ministerial submission	18	We will come back to this ministerial submission
19	several times in the next few minutes. But just as	19	a little later. But what it shows, and what all of the
20	background, this is the ministerial submission so the	20	documents I have taken the Tribunal to show well,
21	United Kingdom explains in its Written Submission,	21	these submissions primarily is that this is simply
22	paragraph 409.7, that this was a submission made to UK	22	an irrelevant consideration whether or not EU vessels
23	ministers concerning whether to approve the sandeel	23	that previously fished sandeel in UK waters of the
24	fishing prohibition insofar as it concerns English	24	North Sea can still access EU waters to fish sandeel or
25	waters of the North Sea.	25	UK waters to fish other stocks. That is simply
	D 165		
	Page 165		Page 167
15:41 1	And there what is relevant for present purposes	15:45 1	an irrelevant consideration when assessing the economic
2	it's page 5, so 273 of the core bundle. It's the last	2	and social impacts of the measure.
3	sentence of paragraph 25, where it is said:	3	Why is that? Because Article 2(1)(a) of Annex 38 of
4	"Therefore, it is likely [that] these vessels"	4	the TCA grants EU vessels the right of full access to UK
5	So these are EU vessels, as the start of the	5	water to fish the EU share of each and every stock for
6	paragraph confirms:	6	which a quota has been agreed. So it was therefore
7	"Therefore, it is likely [that] these vessels	7	the economic and social impacts associated with the
8	currently fish other pelagic and industrial stocks and	8	impairment, and we would go further the
9	would continue to be able to do this."	9	nullification of that specific right of the EU, that the
10	So this is being stated within the framework of the	10	UK was required to assess. So that was why the UK has
11	impact on the EU industry of the potential measure at	11	understated the economic and social impacts of the
12	that stage. So the impact again is being said to be	12	measure.
13	mitigated because of the ability of EU vessels to fish	13	One final point before I move on: more generally,
14	other stocks.	14	the degree of scrutiny during the UK's decision-making
15	Then if one turns over the page to paragraph 26,	15	process was, we would submit, UK-centric. And the EU
16	again there is a reference to the facts, at the end,	16	would like to illustrate that by referring the Tribunal
17	that:	17	to two documents.
18	" we would expect the EU sandeel fleet to	18	The first is tab 13, which is Exhibit C-0044. This
19	primarily target herring when outside the sandeel	19	is what is called the "De Minimis Assessment", so it's
20	season and some vessels may target other pelagic	20	part of the English consultation document. And I would
21	stocks"	21	ask the Tribunal to turn to page 4 of that document, and
22	So again it's a reference to the fact that whatever	22	it's the heading "Rationale for producing [a] DMA", so
23	the impact of the measure on EU vessels, it can be	23	a de minimis assessment, as opposed to an impact
24	mitigated by the fact that EU vessels can fish other	24	assessment.
25	stocks.	25	Before turning to that, if one looks at the previous
	Page 166		Page 168

15:47	1 paragraph, "Summary of monetised impacts", it talks	15:51 1	is it that is being nullified? And it's that right, or
13.17	2 about the costs having been monetised on UK businesses,	2	it's, I would say, the economic and social impacts of
	and there are references to figures which are all below	3	impairing or nullifying that right that need to be put
	4 £5 million. And then under the next box, "Rationale for	4	on one end of the scale, and then balanced with the
	5 producing [a] DMA (as opposed to an IA)", it is said	5	benefits on the other end of the scale.
	6 that they "fall under the 'low cost' criteria", given	6	So in this particular context, the European Union's
	7 that essentially the impact is under £5 million.	7	position is that whether or not the losses or the impact
	8 And the EU's point there simply is that this is	8	can be offset by the ability of vessels to fish other
	9 a reference to the impact on UK's businesses, and not	9	stocks in UK waters or sandeel in EU waters is not
	0 the impact on EU businesses.	10	something that can be put on that end of the scale.
	The same is also true when one looks at the	11	So indeed it may be possible, in a way, to litigate
	documents from the Scottish consultation. And if I can	12	those losses, but that is not a relevant consideration
	take the Tribunal to tab 22 of the core bundle, which is	13	in deciding what should be put on the scales in the
1	essentially the Scottish consultation document (C-49),	14	balancing exercise.
1	at page 23, so it's (core bundle) page 338, under the	15	JUSTICE UNTERHALTER: And are you saying that is so as
1	heading "Potential impact on business", and there	16	a matter of law, or is that so as a matter of, as it
1	it says:	17	were, factual assessment of costs and benefits?
1	8 "Sandeel quota has not been allocated to UK vessels	18	MR DAWES: I'm saying that as a matter of law, what needs
1	since 2021, therefore only a partial Business and	19	to be put on the cost side of the scale is the losses
2	Regulatory Impact Assessment has been produced."	20	associated with the impairment or nullification of that
2	Now, the EU's submission is: whether or not this may	21	specific right to fish sandeel in EU waters.
2	be permissible as a matter of UK law, that may very well	22	Now, as a factual matter, the EU would not dispute
2	be the case. But the EU's submission is simply that	23	that, factually, EU vessels can indeed fish for other
2	this shows that the UK's decision-making process, and in	24	stocks in UK waters and in EU waters.
2	25 particular its assessment of the economic and social	25	JUSTICE UNTERHALTER: Thank you. That's helpful.
	Page 169		Page 171
15.40	1 impacts was informed by the view that what was relevant	15.50 1	THE CHAIDDEDSON, Thouleston Ma Daviso
15:49		15:52 1	THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Dawes.
	were not the impacts on the European Union.	2	I wonder if this would be an appropriate time to
	<ul> <li>were not the impacts on the European Union.</li> <li>JUSTICE UNTERHALTER: Mr Dawes, I wonder if I could just</li> </ul>	2 3	I wonder if this would be an appropriate time to take a 15-minute break, because you've both been very
	<ul> <li>were not the impacts on the European Union.</li> <li>JUSTICE UNTERHALTER: Mr Dawes, I wonder if I could just take you back to the proposition that you were raising</li> </ul>	2 3 4	I wonder if this would be an appropriate time to take a 15-minute break, because you've both been very patient with us and taking us through documents.
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47 (Pages 169 to 172)

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16:12 1	is also the subject of the Tribunal's advance	16:16 1	benefits'"
2	question 14, to a certain extent.	2	I would like to take the Tribunal through the actual
3	The European Union and the United Kingdom have	3	language of the ministerial submission, which is at
4	fundamentally different understandings as to what	4	tab 17, and see whether it supports that statement.
5	a weighing exercise entails.	5	So if the Tribunal could turn to tab 17 (R-77), and
6	The United Kingdom's position seems to be that it is	6	starting with paragraph 19, which is on page 272, under
7	sufficient to identify elements in a document that	7	the heading "EU Considerations".
8	formed part of a decision-making process in order to	8	Paragraph 19 merely recalls and these are figures
9	show that the weighing exercise has been conducted	9	that are also referred to in the written submissions
10	properly.	10	the economic impact on the EU fishing industry, so just
11 12	By contrast, the European Union's position is that this Tribunal should scrutinise not only what elements	11 12	the numbers. And then paragraph 20 also refers to other impacts on fishmeal and fish oil factories. So they are
13	the UK has identified, but have those elements been	13	recalled as background.
14	properly weighed; and if so, whether the measure could	13	Then if the Tribunal could turn over the page to 273
15	or could not have been adopted.	15	and paragraph 25, it is said:
16	In its Written Submission, paragraphs 734 to 742,	16	"The impact on EU industry is difficult to quantify
17	the European Union demonstrated the United Kingdom's	17	and limited information has been provided"
18	failure to weigh properly the benefits and the impacts	18	And then the rest of the paragraph refers to other
19	by reference to the information available in the public	19	documents, and also to the statements that we have
20	domain. This was the only information that was	20	already gone through regarding the inability of the EU
21	available to the European Union at the time of	21	fleet to fish either other stocks or in other waters.
22	its Written Submission.	22	But the simple point here to be made is that
23	The United Kingdom has, as part of its Written	23	paragraph 25 does not disclose any weighing as such.
24	Submission, exhibited additional documents which	24	It's just a reference to what is to be put on the
25	it claims show that the weighing exercise was conducted	25	scales, if one can call it like that, but not any actual
	Page 173		Page 175
1614 1	1 MM TO TT I I IN THE COLUMN	16.10 1	
16:14 1	properly. The European Union's position is that those	16:18 1	weighing of what has been put on the scales.
2	document do not change anything. On the contrary, they	2	The same is true of the next paragraph, which is
2 3	document do not change anything. On the contrary, they support the European Union's position. Some of those	2 3	The same is true of the next paragraph, which is paragraph 26. The Tribunal has been taken to that
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2 3 4 5	document do not change anything. On the contrary, they support the European Union's position. Some of those additional documents include what we have already referred to as ministerial submissions. There are six	2 3 4 5	The same is true of the next paragraph, which is paragraph 26. The Tribunal has been taken to that paragraph. Again, it's about what should be put on the scale, but not in fact any actual weighing of the costs
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16:20	1	it considered, for example, the EU's position whether	16:23 1	simply a discussion of the EU's claim about
	2	a full closure could lead to a large negative impact on	2	discrimination; nothing on proportionality or any
	3	industry, compared to the benefits.	3	weighing.
	4	What paragraph 376 of the UK's Written Submission	4	Then there is a section on 582 which is irrelevant
	5	states is simply the following:	5	for purposes of the present dispute.
	6	"The alleged disproportionality of the proposed	6	And then finally, we get to page 583, "Financial
	7	prohibition was also raised directly by the EU and	7	considerations". There are three paragraphs.
	8	Denmark in their responses to the consultation and	8	The first paragraph refers to Scottish vessels, so
	9	correspondence to the Scottish government. In response	9	not relevant for present purposes.
1	10	to this concern, the Ministerial submission of	10	The second paragraph there says:
1	11	26 January 2024 concluded that the measure was	11	" it is expected that there will be an impact on
1	12	'appropriate and proportionate given the current	12	EU vessels, primarily the Danish fleet."
1	13	evidence base and the precautionary principle'."	13	There's a reference to the amounts:
1	14	So the UK itself, in its Written Submission, doesn't	14	"However, this does not account for the likelihood
1	15	claim, in relation to the closure in the Scottish	15	that EU vessels will move their fishing of sandeel to
1	16	waters, that there was any consideration or weighing and	16	other waters and offset the loss"
1	17	balancing.	17	But again, nothing in that paragraph about any
1	18	Now, the EU accepts that that's not the end of	18	weighing or balancing.
	19	the story, and that one must also look at the actual	19	And that brings us to the end of the Scottish
2	20	language of the ministerial submission of 26 January,	20	ministerial submission.
	21	and there the EU would ask the Tribunal to turn to	21	So the EU's simple point is that when one looks at
	22	tab 26 (R-98). We will go through the relevant	22	the evidence the EU already, in its Written
	23	passages, but there the core point is: again, this	23	Submission, explained why the consultation documents do
	24	submission does not disclose any weighing by	24	not show there was any weighing of the benefits or the
	25	the decision-maker.	25	costs. And when one looks at these additional documents
		Page 177		Page 179
16:21	1	If the Tribunal could start with page 568, under the	16:25 1	that I've taken the Tribunal to, this is confirmed by
	2	heading "Options Considered and Advice". And there it's	2	those documents.
	3	the last sentence:	3	So that was the third point of disagreement between
	4	"Our considerations on these and other key elements,	4	the parties about how the actual weighing took place.
	5	including compliance with the Trade [and] Cooperation	5	Unless the Tribunal has any questions at this stage,
	6	Agreement are set out in Annex F for Ministers	6	I'll move on to the fourth point of disagreement between
	7	consideration."	7	the parties, namely whether another proportionate
	8	So what does Annex F actually say? You will find	8	measure could have been adopted.
	9	that as of page 580 of the core bundle.	9	The EU's position is that one or more spatially
1	10	Maybe just to go through it by sections we don't	10	targeted prohibitions on sandeel fishing in parts of UK
1	11	need to go through them, but there are several sections.	11	waters of the North Sea, coinciding with the feeding
1	12	The first is the "Scientific advice for the preferred	12	range of chick-rearing seabirds for which sandeel
1	13	option"; that's on page 580. There's no reference in	13	comprises a substantial proportion of their diet, would
1	14	there to any weighing or balancing or to any rights.	14	have been a proportionate measure. Why? Because such
	15	The same under the heading "ICES advice on forage	15	a measure was both reasonably available to the UK and
1	16	fish", which is on page 581. Under the heading	16	could have been designed in a way to ensure that the
1	17	"Compliance of the measures with the [TCA]", there's the	17	economic and social impacts would have been commensurate
1	18	references to the shares of the parties; that's at the	18	with the benefits.
1	19	bottom of page 581. There is a reference to the fact	19	So starting with the reasonable availability.
2	20	that:	20	This alternative measure was reasonably available
2	21	" until 30 June 2026"	21	because it fell within the range of measures
2	22	And then you have to turn the page:	22	contemplated by the UK's legal framework and it would
2	23	" the UK and the EU have full mutual access to	23	also not impose an undue burden on the UK. And the EU
2	24	their respective "waters""	24	has set out its position on these matters in
2	25	And then when one carries on, on page 582 there is	25	paragraphs 751 and 755 of its Written Submission.
		Page 178		Page 180
i e				

16:26	1	The EU also explained in its Written Submission why	16:30 1	these TACs.
	2	the social and economic impacts would have been	2	But all these documents, they also matter because
	3	commensurate with the benefits. To put matters simply,	3	they show a simple factual proposition: they show that
	4	while such a measure would still have entailed economic	4	the United Kingdom overstated the benefits of the
	5	and social impacts that would have been borne by EU	5	measure that it adopted; they show that the European
	6	vessels and the EU fishmeal and fish oil factories, such	6	Union's interests were not properly considered; and
	7	impact would have been significantly lower.	7	therefore they show that the weighing and balancing
	8	As I said, the European Union made these points in	8	
	9	its Written Submission, and the UK has not addressed	9	the United Kingdom was simply not done in a correct
	10	them. This is despite what was said by the bodies that	10	manner, neither what was to be weighed or how those
	11	authored the English scientific report.	11	costs and benefits were to be weighed.
	12	And this will be the last document in the core	12	So unless the Tribunal has any further questions at
	13	bundle that I will take the Tribunal to today. It is	13	this juncture, I will pass the floor to my co-Agent to
	14	document R-0076, which is at tab 16.	14	
	15	This document, as its name indicates it's called	15	claim.
	16	"Summary review of the evidence presented by respondents	16	JUSTICE UNTERHALTER: I just wanted to be sure that
	17		17	
	18		18	_
	19		19	
	20		20	•
	21	there, the authors of the English scientific report	21	
	22	note, at the bottom of the page:	22	the EU contends for is not what proportionality entails,
	23	"Benefits of the fishery closure may therefore be	23	then a fair amount of this factual material won't
	24	disproportionately greater in areas with greater	24	matter, I suppose, because there is a greater freedom to
	25	predator dependence or forage overlap."	25	
		D 101		D 102
		Page 181		Page 183
16:29	1	The EU submits that this statement confirms that	16:32 1	that be correct?
	2	an alternative measure was available, and that the UK	2	MR DAWES: I will let my colleague deal with it.
	3	should be required to justify why it did not	3	JUSTICE UNTERHALTER: Yes, of course. This is just to shape
	4	consider it.	4	the differences, obviously.
	5	JUSTICE UNTERHALTER: Sorry, would you tell me exactly where	5	So the thrust of the EU's position is that
	6	that is? I don't have it.	6	proportionality entails a cost/benefit analysis and
	7	MR DAWES: Pardon me. The bottom of 266 and at the top of	7	a proper balancing that must take place. If the UK says
	8	267; it literally runs over it.	8	that is not the content of the principle of
	9	JUSTICE UNTERHALTER: Yes, thank you.	9	proportionality, then some of this factual material will
	10	MR DAWES: It is very unhelpful in that sense.	10	not really matter, will it?
	11	So to conclude, the EU has taken the Tribunal to	11	That's, I suppose, my first question.
	12	a large number of documents in the last few minutes.	12	MS NORRIS: As the European Union said at the beginning,
	13	The Tribunal may be asking: why do all these documents	13	the parties do have a very different position as to the
	14	matter? What do they show? They matter for several	14	content of proportionality; but more than that, they
	15	reasons.	15	have a different position as to when that is relevant,
	16	They matter firstly because of the specific context	16	for instance, in the decision-making process, or does it
	17	in which the proportionality claim arises, because of	17	even apply to the measure at the end. So I think that
	18	the provisions on TACs in the TCA. The TACs are	18	all of those differences would play into the extent to
	19	negotiated individually for each and every stock,	19	which this evidence goes to the question.
	20	including sandeel, and then there is a right associated	20	JUSTICE UNTERHALTER: Yes. But if the let us call it
	21	with each and every agreed TAC to fish the agreed stock	21	the stronger doctrine of proportionality that the EU
	22	in the waters of the parties. And if one follows the	22	proposes is the right interpretation, then the fact that
	23	United Kingdom's logic, this right related to each and	23	you say there wasn't the balancing undertaken in the
	24	every TAC could be eroded on a gradual basis if it were	24	process of coming to a decision would suffice for the
	25	possible to restrict the rights that are derived from	25	purposes of non-compliance in your argument.
		Page 182		Page 184

50 (Pages 181 to 184)

4 - 0 4			14.05		
16:34	1	In other words, as I understand your argument,	16:37		fundamentally supported by looking at the reasonable
	2	at the least, there has to be a weighing in order to		2	alternative measure.
	3	come to a compliant decision. If the weighing didn't		3	So the evidence that is being presented to the
	4	take place, as you say it should have, then that would		4	Tribunal this afternoon is aimed to show you those
	5	give rise to a breach. Is that right?		5	different elements in that process. So the question of
		AS NORRIS: I think there are two limbs to what the		6	the scientific evidence showing you whether the benefits
	7	European Union is arguing as part of its proportionality		7	were really as great as is claimed, the evidence showing
	8	assessment. So to paraphrase what my co-Agent said,		8	whether the costs are really as small as is claimed,
	9	there's also a question of what it is that you're		9	that's goes to what's going into the equation. But then
	10	weighing. And there I think that there is also	10		how it's all considered it's very difficult to
	11	a disagreement between the European Union and the UK	1		divorce them completely the one from the other.
	12	as to qualitatively what is on one side versus the	1:		JUSTICE UNTERHALTER: I understand. And I understand
	13	other, and that is part of what this evidence goes to.	1:		the first line is what are the inputs into the
	14	A large part of what was discussed is: how do you	14		cost/benefit analysis, and you've explained that.
	15	assess the benefits in the first place? We say they've	1:		Then you come to the balancing. Is your contention
	16	been overstated. How do you assess the costs? We say	10		that had a proper balancing been done in conformity with
	17	they've been understated or not properly considered	1		the treaty, the outcome that was reached in other
	18	understated, in fact.	13		words, the decision that was reached of prohibition
	19	Then you come to the second limb, which is how you	19		does not match up to a standard of reasonableness or
	20	weigh and balance them. Now, the European Union does	20		rationality? Or is there some other standard that you
	21	not understand the UK to argue that proportionality in	2		would like us to think about in relation to why this
	22	general does not require a weighing and balancing;	2:		decision is not supported by a measured balancing of
	23	I think that the difference is again when it comes into	2:		the costs and benefits?
	24	play.	2.		I'm just trying to understand what standard we need
	25	But I think we would argue that all of the evidence	2:	.5	to measure it against if you say, as I think you do,
		Page 185			Page 187
16.25	1		16.00		
16:35		we've said is material when you're looking at how you		1	that we are not to be placed in the shoes of the United
16:35	2	weigh and balance, for the simple reason that you can't		2	Kingdom to do a fine-grain determination of the
16:35	2 3	weigh and balance, for the simple reason that you can't divorce what's on the scales from how they relate to one	<u>:</u>	2	Kingdom to do a fine-grain determination of the exercise. There's some other standard.
16:35	2 3 4 4 4	weigh and balance, for the simple reason that you can't divorce what's on the scales from how they relate to one another.	:	2 3 4	Kingdom to do a fine-grain determination of the exercise. There's some other standard.  MS NORRIS: The language of proportionality takes you
16:35	2 3 4 4 5 JU	weigh and balance, for the simple reason that you can't divorce what's on the scales from how they relate to one another.  STICE UNTERHALTER: Because one of the propositions that	:	2 3 4 5	Kingdom to do a fine-grain determination of the exercise. There's some other standard.  MS NORRIS: The language of proportionality takes you towards this question of: is it commensurate? One could
16:35	2 3 4 3 5 JU 6	weigh and balance, for the simple reason that you can't divorce what's on the scales from how they relate to one another.  STICE UNTERHALTER: Because one of the propositions that was advanced was to suggest that the weighing that has	:	2 3 4 5 6	Kingdom to do a fine-grain determination of the exercise. There's some other standard.  MS NORRIS: The language of proportionality takes you towards this question of: is it commensurate? One could argue that that doesn't take you much further. But that
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	2 3 4 4 3 4 5 JU 5 6 7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	weigh and balance, for the simple reason that you can't divorce what's on the scales from how they relate to one another.  STICE UNTERHALTER: Because one of the propositions that was advanced was to suggest that the weighing that has to be done is susceptible of review as to whether the best outcome is achieved in respect of a consideration of costs and benefits. Is that the standard that you say must be met for the purposes of the weighing and balancing that you say should take place?  S NORRIS: The European Union hasn't said that the Tribunal has to identify the best possible outcome. The Tribunal has to look at the exercise that was undertaken, which is precisely what the inputs into that exercise go to show. Here, as I've said, the European Union challenges the way in which the two sides were constituted, as it were.  Then there's also a question of the actual exercise itself. And in very simple terms, the European Union would probably be able to say: had the United Kingdom done this exercise properly, it simply could not have concluded that a total prohibition on access to waters [was possible], because of the full impairment of	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 6 7 8 9 0 0 1 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 1 2 1 2 2 3 1 2 2 3 1 2 2 3 2 3 4 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 4 3 2 3 2	Kingdom to do a fine-grain determination of the exercise. There's some other standard.  MS NORRIS: The language of proportionality takes you towards this question of: is it commensurate? One could argue that that doesn't take you much further. But that is the language of proportionality.  So what we tried to address is to say that we are not arguing that you have to have equality between the costs and the benefit; it's really a question of examining the delta between the two. Is there such a large distinction that one cannot reasonably conclude that the measure is commensurate, proportionate, that there is an imbalance that is so great it's about the magnitude of the imbalance between the rights and the benefits.  JUSTICE UNTERHALTER: Yes.  And then just lastly, on the lesser measure, again just so that we can be clear as to what precisely you're saying.  Is it the claim that there must be a lesser measure analysis, or simply that it's an important sense-check to see whether, as you've put it here, the incommensurate relationship between costs and benefits

16:40 1	with a better measure? Is it a sense-check or is it	16:43 1	in doing so, the UK has nullified the EU's right to full
2	a necessary requirement to comply with the principle of	2	access to UK waters of the North Sea to fish for
3	proportionality?	3	sandeel. The claim is addressed in paragraph 765 to 781
4	MS NORRIS: The notion of there being an alternative measure	4	of the EU's Written Submission.
5	comes directly from the way that necessity has been	5	The EU will first address the legal standard.
6	analysed in WTO law, but it also comes from the way that	6	We will then move on to explain what the application of
7	proportionality has been generally considered in the	7	the legal standard means for the present dispute.
8	domestic law of the parties.	8	The EU will insist on three points on which the parties
9	If one takes the idea of there being another measure	9	disagree in order to assist the Tribunal.
10	in a necessity test, then there have been circumstances	10	On the legal standard, firstly, Article 2(1)(a) of
11	in which the Appellate Body has held that you wouldn't	11	Annex 38 of the TCA provides that:
12	need to conduct an analysis of whether there's another	12	"By way of derogation from Article 500(1), (3), (4),
13	less restrictive measure, but the general proposition is	13	(5), (6) and (7) of [the] Agreement, during the
14	that it provides a useful framework.	14	adjustment period each Party shall grant to the vessels
15	The European Union's position is that this is a term	15	of the other Party full access to its waters to
16	which we all agree is in the TCA, but it's not defined	16	fish:"
17	as such in the TCA, but yet it must mean something.	17	For each and every stock listed in Annex 35, which
18	The European Union's position is it must give a legal	18	includes sandeel:
19	standard.	19	" at a level that is reasonably commensurate with
20	And it argues that this idea of presenting	20	the Parties' respective shares of the [agreed TAC]"
21	an alternative measure once the European Union comes	21	In that regard, and in reply also to advance
22	forward and says, "There is an alternative measure which	22	question 4 from the Tribunal on the operation of
23	would have contributed significantly towards the stated	23	Annex 38, the EU's position is that Annex 38 is
24	environmental aim, and which would have had	24	an integral part of Heading Five, as stated clearly in
25	significantly less impairment to the rights", then there	25	Article 778(1) of the TCA.
	Page 189		Page 191
16:42 1	is a question of the extent to which you can look at the	16:46 1	The appear which relates to an adjustment period
16:42 1	is a question of the extent to which you can look at the	16:46 1	The annex, which relates to an adjustment period,
2	added benefits and the added costs as compared to that,	2	operates as a derogation from the mentioned paragraphs
2 3	added benefits and the added costs as compared to that, and therefore it is a useful framework of assessment.	2 3	operates as a derogation from the mentioned paragraphs of Article 500 TCA, an article which is an article that
2 3 4	added benefits and the added costs as compared to that, and therefore it is a useful framework of assessment. That's different to saying that there is a binding	2 3 4	operates as a derogation from the mentioned paragraphs of Article 500 TCA, an article which is an article that is part of Heading Five.
2 3 4 5	added benefits and the added costs as compared to that, and therefore it is a useful framework of assessment.  That's different to saying that there is a binding legal obligation always to consider whether there's	2 3 4 5	operates as a derogation from the mentioned paragraphs of Article 500 TCA, an article which is an article that is part of Heading Five.  Secondly, the parties agree that the right to full
2 3 4 5 6	added benefits and the added costs as compared to that, and therefore it is a useful framework of assessment.  That's different to saying that there is a binding legal obligation always to consider whether there's a reasonable, proportionate alternative measure. But	2 3 4 5 6	operates as a derogation from the mentioned paragraphs of Article 500 TCA, an article which is an article that is part of Heading Five.  Secondly, the parties agree that the right to full access to fish under Annex 38 may be derogated from.
2 3 4 5 6 7	added benefits and the added costs as compared to that, and therefore it is a useful framework of assessment.  That's different to saying that there is a binding legal obligation always to consider whether there's a reasonable, proportionate alternative measure. But here the European Union is before you submitting there	2 3 4 5 6 7	operates as a derogation from the mentioned paragraphs of Article 500 TCA, an article which is an article that is part of Heading Five.  Secondly, the parties agree that the right to full access to fish under Annex 38 may be derogated from. This means precisely that the parties can take fisheries
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16:48 1	will now explain what this legal standard means to the	16:51 1	exercised by the parties are affirmed in the recitals of
2	present dispute.	2	the annex, the parties also noted:
3	The EU's position is that since the UK decided upon	3	" the social and economic benefits of a further
4	and applied a fisheries management measure that is	4	period of stability, during which fishers would be
5	inconsistent with Article 496 TCA, read together with	5	permitted until 30 June 2026 to continue to access the
6	Article 494, the UK also committed a consequential	6	waters of the other Party as before the entry into force
7	breach of Article 2(1)(a) of Annex 38, and in doing so,	7	of [the] Agreement"
8	it nullified the EU's rights of full access to fish in	8	The annex, moreover, includes Article 2(1)(a), which
9	UK waters guaranteed by that provision.	9	provides for full access to waters to fish, including in
10	The EU notes here that this dispute takes place	10	this regard the stocks listed in Annex 35, which
11	during the adjustment period agreed upon by the parties.	11	includes various fish stocks, among which, sandeels.
12	During that period, when adopting measures such as the	12	And this full access to fish is to be at a level that is
13	sandeel fisheries prohibition, the parties must consider	13	reasonably commensurate with the parties' respective
14	the specific terms and rationale of Annex 38 in view of	14	shares of the fishing opportunities in Annex 35.
15	the further period of stability and the social and	15	The fact that the parties agreed on all these
16	economic benefits of that period of stability.	16	elements in a protocol to the TCA is relevant to the
17	In this regard, the timing matters. The UK agreed	17	nature of the EU's rights. The protocol must be taken
18	to an adjustment period, and to shares on an agreed TAC,	18	into account when considering if the impairment of the
19	in December 2020, and launched a public consultation for	19	right of access to UK waters which results from the
20	the sandeel fisheries prohibition only ten months later.	20	sandeel fisheries prohibition can be justified.
21	This disregard for the period of further stability,	21	Moreover, the EU notes that the UK not only
22	and its economic and social rationale, and to access to	22	misrepresents the rationale of Annex 38 in its Written
23	waters that is reasonably commensurate with the parties'	23	Submission, it has also not explained what it considers
24 25	respective shares, must also be considered when	24	to be the objective of Annex 38 and what terms it
25	determining whether the nullification of the right to	25	affords to this protocol, which was agreed by the
	Page 193		Page 195
16:50 1	full access to fish which results from the sandeel	16:54 1	parties as an integral part of Heading Five.
2	fisheries prohibition is justified.	2	We will now move to the second point.
3	The EU adds here, and in regard to advance	3	The EU has clearly stated in its Written Submission
4	question 17, that it is not aware of any urgency	4	at paragraph 774 that it does not claim that the right
5	involved in implementing the sandeel fisheries	5	
6	1.11.1.1		of full access to waters to fish in Annex 38 must
6	prohibition. It is in any case for the UK to reply to	6	of full access to waters to fish in Annex 38 must systematically take precedence over the legitimate
7	this specific question 17.		
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	6	systematically take precedence over the legitimate
7	this specific question 17.	6 7	systematically take precedence over the legitimate objectives of other provisions of Heading Five. The EU
7 8	this specific question 17.  The Union will now focus on three key points on	6 7 8	systematically take precedence over the legitimate objectives of other provisions of Heading Five. The EU maintains this position, and therefore reiterates that
7 8 9	this specific question 17.  The Union will now focus on three key points on which the parties disagree, and on which the Tribunal	6 7 8 9	systematically take precedence over the legitimate objectives of other provisions of Heading Five. The EU maintains this position, and therefore reiterates that claim 3 is consequential on claims 1 and 2. On this,
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16:56 1	afforded any meaning.	16:59 1	the UK argues that it continues to observe the right of
2	In this regard, the EU would like to highlight	2	access simply because EU vessels retain the right to
3	the following.	3	access UK waters to fish, but not for sandeel.
4	First, the temporary nature of the adjustment period	4	The EU cannot accept that narrative. Because if
5	has a specific purpose; it has to be given meaning.	5	this reasoning were to be followed, prohibitions of
6	That adjustment period follows the entry into force of	6	specific fisheries could never be considered to be
7	the TCA, which is an agreement that regulates the EU-UK	7	against the right of full access to fish under
8	partnership following the UK's withdrawal from the EU.	8	Article 2(1)(a), as long as they are adopted in relation
9	As has already been stated, the TCA comes after	9	to specific fish, and not the global array of fish
10	decades of the parties regulating fisheries by their	10	covered by Heading Five of the TCA and the relevant
11	vessels to the EU Common Fisheries Policy. It is,	11	annexes.
12	hence, logical that the parties sought to provide some	12	The EU's position is a simple one. It is not
13	stability for vessels, fishers and related industry.	13	because the EU vessels can access UK waters to fish
14	The parties, by concluding this annex, deemed it	14	other stocks that EU rights guaranteed under Annex 38,
15	necessary to ensure not only the long term cooperation	15	read together with the provisions in Heading Five, are
16	of fisheries between the parties provided under	16	not impaired by a prohibition such as the one on access
17	Heading Five, but also to have a protocol with specific	17	to fish in the UK waters of the North Sea for sandeel.
18	provisions that ensured this further period of	18	Before concluding, the EU will reply to question 7
19	stability.	19	on the burden of proof, insofar as it concerns this
20	Moreover and this is also in reply to the	20	claim.
21	Tribunal's question 4(c) if the parties' aim was to	21	Since the EU accepts that a fisheries management
22	prioritise the regulatory autonomy of each party above	22	measure that complies with Article 496, read together
23	all else, as the UK seems to claim in its	23	with Article 494, could be a justifiable derogation from
24	paragraph 425.4 of its Written Submission, then it is	24	Annex 38, this means that it is for the EU to prove that
25	difficult to understand the objective of Heading Five of	25	its full right of access to UK waters of the North Sea
25	difficult to understand the objective of fleading 11ve of	23	its full light of decess to OK which of the Politi Sed
	Page 197		Page 199
16.57 1			
1 10.2/ 1	the TCA let alone the specific provisions of Annex 38	I 17·01 1	to fish sandeel under Annex 38 has been impaired, which
16:57 1	the TCA, let alone the specific provisions of Annex 38.  At this juncture, the EU refers the Tribunal to	17:01 1	to fish sandeel under Annex 38 has been impaired, which
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2 3	At this juncture, the EU refers the Tribunal to paragraph 428.1 of the UK's Written Submissions. The EU	2 3	it has proven in its submissions. However, the UK has the burden to prove that the measure is consistent with
2 3 4	At this juncture, the EU refers the Tribunal to paragraph 428.1 of the UK's Written Submissions. The EU emphasises that it has not used the terms which the UK	2 3 4	it has proven in its submissions. However, the UK has the burden to prove that the measure is consistent with Article 496, read together with Article 494, and taking
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17.02 1		
17:03 1	a consequential breach if claims 1 or 2 are found. But	17:07 1 that there hasn't been a breach of Annex 38 and its
2	you also, in your first statement, said that your third	2 access rights. Does that also follow?
3	claim is a claim for additional breach. So you're	3 MS GAUCI: Yes.
4	arguing it is not only a consequential breach, but there	4 THE CHAIRPERSON: Is it consequential symmetrically, as it
5	is also a separate claim for a separate breach of the	5 were?
6	Annex 38 provisions.	6 MS GAUCI: Yes, the consequential element is symmetrical.
7	Am I correct in that understanding?	What we do add also in claim 3 is that the rationale
8	MS GAUCI: I will go through it again.	8 behind the adjustment period, and the need for the
9	So the EU has formulated this claim as consequential	9 period that provides for stability, needs also to be
10	on claims 1 and 2. It does so because it recognises	10 taken into consideration.
11	that the right of full access under Article 2(1)(a) of	11 JUSTICE UNTERHALTER: Thank you.
12	Annex 38 does not systematically takes precedence over	12 THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you to the Agents, counsel and
13	the other objectives of Heading Five. However, this	delegation of the European Union. That, I believe,
14	does not mean that the claim does not have any value, as	concludes the submissions of the European Union for
15	the UK seeks to claim.	15 today. So we will meet again tomorrow morning at
16	First of all, Article 2(1)(a), the breach to full	16 10 o'clock and hear the submissions of the
17	access to fish in the UK waters, is in the annex and	17 United Kingdom Agents and counsel.
18	it must be taken into account.	18 So I wish you all a very nice evening and we will
19	Moreover, my co-Agents have spoken about the	19 see you back here tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock. Thank
20	balancing act between regulatory autonomy and the rights	20 you very much. We are now adjourned.
21	that the parties derive from other provisions of	21 (5.08 pm)
22	Heading Five. And in that weighing and balancing	21 (3.08 pm) 22 (The hearing adjourned until 10.00 am the following day)
23	exercise, the provisions, the terms and the rationale of	23
23	Annex 38 must also be considered.	23 24
25	So this is how we view the claim tree.	25
23	So this is now we view the claim tree.	23
	Page 201	Page 203
17:05 1	Have I replied to your question?	
2	THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.	
3	Yes, you have stated that you accept that there's	
4	a consequential breach if claims 1 or 2 are found, and	
5	you've also argued that there is a breach of full access	
6		
	under Article 2(1)(a) of Annex 38. So you are seeking	
7	findings of both those two, in a sense, both the	
7 8	findings of both those two, in a sense, both the consequential breach and the separate breach of full	
7 8 9	findings of both those two, in a sense, both the consequential breach and the separate breach of full access under Article 2(1)(a) of Annex 38.	
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