In the matter of an arbitration under the Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (2021)

PCA Case No. 2023-40

Permanent Court of Arbitration
Peace Palace
The Hague
The Netherlands

Day 3

Wednesday, 18 September 2024

Hearing on Preliminary Objections

Before:

PROFESSOR GABRIELLE KAUFMANN-KOHLER

MR WILLIAM KIRTLEY

PROFESSOR DONALD MCRAE

ZEPH INVESTMENTS PTE LTD

Claimant

-A-

THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

Respondent

BRYCE WILLIAMS, registrar and legal counsel, LILIA MENDOZA-ROSALES, assistant legal counsel, and BENJAMIN CRADDOCK, senior case manager, appeared for the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Tribunal Secretary: LUKAS MONTOYA

Transcript produced by Trevor McGowan, Georgina Vaughn and Lisa Gulland. Trevor McGowan CR

APPEARANCES

FOR CLAIMANT

CLIVE F PALMER, Claimant's representative and director GEORGE SPALTON KC, counsel and Claimant party assisting DR ANNA KIRK, counsel and Claimant party assisting KRIS BYRNE, counsel and Claimant party assisting MICHAEL SOPHOCLES, counsel and Claimant party assisting ANNA PALMER, counsel and Claimant party assisting BALJEET SINGH, administrator, Claimant party assisting and director DANIEL JACOBSON, counsel and Claimant party assisting THOMAS BROWNING, counsel and Claimant party assisting JONATHAN SHAW, counsel EMILY PALMER, director DECLAN SHERIDAN, director LEANNE McCORMACK, administrative assistant DOMENIC MARTINO, corporate advisor to the Claimant SANDRA MARTINO, assistant to Mr Martino NUI HARRIS, director of Claimant's subsidiary company REGINA NOMMENSEN, assistant to Mr Harris YEVHENIYA SOPHOCLES, counsel SCOTT BIRKETT, expert witness GEORGE SOKOLOV, Claimant party assisting

FOR RESPONDENT

DR STEPHEN DONAGHUE KC, Solicitor-General of Australia SAMUEL WORDSWORTH KC, Essex Court Chambers PROFESSOR CHESTER BROWN, 7 Wentworth Selborne Chambers DR NAOMI HART, Essex Court Chambers DR ESME SHIRLOW, Shirlow International Law Office PENELOPE BRISTOW, counsel assisting the Solicitor-General JESSE CLARKE, general counsel, Office of International Law LUCY MARTINEZ, counsel (investor-state disputes), Office of International Law KYLE DICKSON-SMITH, principal legal officer, Office of International Law STEPHANIE BROWN, senior legal officer, Office of International Law CHARLES LIGHT, senior legal officer, Office of International Law

ERIN MANUEL, senior legal officer, Office of International Law

JEREMY SHIRM, director, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade

CRAIG BYDDER, Solicitor-General of Western Australia
ANNIE TAN, senior assistant state solicitor,
Western Australia

ELECTRONIC PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE

JOHN LOPEZ, Opus 2 International

Wednesday, 18 September 2024

1				
1	Wednesday, 18 September 2024	10:34	1	that issue.
2	(10.32 am)		2	So could we have F1/1/158 on the screen, please.
3	THE PRESIDENT: Good morning to everyone. We are starting		3	This is Article 11(1) of the FTA (CLA-1), which you will
4	Day 3 of this hearing. We are ready to listen to the		4	be very familiar with.
5	Respondent's answers to the Tribunal questions and		5	Opus, can we please have F1/1/158.
6	closing remarks.		6	THE PRESIDENT: We have it with us, so I think you can
7	Is there anything that needs to be raised before		7	proceed.
8	we start?		8	MR WORDSWORTH: Thank you very much.
9	DR DONAGHUE: No, there is not.		9	"Following notification"
10	THE PRESIDENT: Not on your side.		0	And that, of course, is one potential date:
11	Dr Kirk?		.1	" a Party may deny the benefits of this
12	DR KIRK: Not from our side.		2	Chapter"
13	THE PRESIDENT: No, fine.		.3	Which is another potential date:
14	Then we can start. As you know, you have two hours,		4	"(b) to an investor of another Party that is
15	and then we will have the lunch break, and thereafter we		.5	a juridical person of such other Party and to
16	will listen to the Claimants.		6	investments of that investor if an investor of the
17	Dr Donaghue.		7	denying Party [1] owns or controls the juridical person
18	Closing statement on behalf of Respondent		8	and [2] the juridical person has no substantive business
19	DR DONAGHUE: Thank you, Madam President, members of		9	operations in the territory of any Party other than the
20	the Tribunal.		20	denying Party."
21	We propose to focus in our closing remarks on		21	This obviously contains no express date for
22	answering the questions that the Tribunal has asked. So		22	assessing the alleged substantive business operations.
23	to that end, we will structure our address this morning		23	One possible date would be the date of actual
24	as follows: Mr Wordsworth KC will address the answers to		24	denial, and this would always be a backstop date.
25	the Tribunal's questions 1 and 4; Professor Brown will	2	25	However, the aim of the application of Article 11(1)
	Page 1			Page 3
10.22 1	d II d C 2 M CI I II	10.26		
10:32 1	then address the answer to question 3; Mr Clarke will		1	must be a fair assessment of the business operations of
2	address the answer to question 5. Then Dr Hart will		2	the investor in the natural course of that business; for
3	then make some submissions about burden of proof before		3	example, before any potential adverse impact by
4	handing back to me. I'll address question 2 and then,		4	potentially unlawful acts of the respondent state.
5	depending how we're going for time, I might make some		_	It also follows from this that the date of actual
	brief every expensions by way of alosing about the		5	It also follows from this that the date of actual
_	brief overview submissions by way of closing about the		6	denial would make little sense in many cases because the
7	facts as they relate to the key issues as we see them.	,	6 7	denial would make little sense in many cases because the investor would already have been put on notice under
7 8	facts as they relate to the key issues as we see them. There are some slides that various members of our		6 7 8	denial would make little sense in many cases because the investor would already have been put on notice under Article 11(1) by receipt of the notification of the
7 8 9	facts as they relate to the key issues as we see them. There are some slides that various members of our closing team will be using, which we'll provide to the		6 7 8 9	denial would make little sense in many cases because the investor would already have been put on notice under Article 11(1) by receipt of the notification of the intent to deny.
7 8 9 10	facts as they relate to the key issues as we see them. There are some slides that various members of our closing team will be using, which we'll provide to the Tribunal in hard copy and which will be coming up on the	1	6 7 8 9	denial would make little sense in many cases because the investor would already have been put on notice under Article 11(1) by receipt of the notification of the intent to deny. So if the date of actual denial was regarded as the
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7 8 9 10 11 12	facts as they relate to the key issues as we see them. There are some slides that various members of our closing team will be using, which we'll provide to the Tribunal in hard copy and which will be coming up on the screen. Some of us will be using slides, and some, Opus 2.	1 1 1	6 7 8 9 .0 .1	denial would make little sense in many cases because the investor would already have been put on notice under Article 11(1) by receipt of the notification of the intent to deny. So if the date of actual denial was regarded as the relevant date, it would be open to the investor to seek to improve its position post-notification, and that
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5 (Pages 1 to 4)

10:37 1			
10.57	consultations, which may include the use of non-binding,	10:41 1	a lighthouse, decides to station its troops, or
2	third party procedures, shall be initiated by a written	2	otherwise seeks to assert its jurisdiction to try and
3	request for consultations delivered by the disputing	3	build up its position in relation to a dispute that
4	investor to the disputing Party."	4	everybody already has identified as existing, and
5	This obligation to consult must, of course, be	5	thereby seek to improve its claim. There is no point in
6	performed in good faith, and it is also predicated on	6	giving effect to a position where a party is seeking
7	the existence of a dispute. And the aim is that the	7	literally sometimes just to try to put facts on the
8	parties may be able to resolve and, through	8	ground.
9	consultation, seek to resolve the dispute without	9	So that is the basic thinking behind why Australia
10	arbitration.	10	is saying that 14 October 2020, the date of the request
11	It would follow that although the dispute has been	11	of the consultations, at the latest, is the relevant
12	notified through the request, and there may be	12	date in this case. And that's also why we've been
13	subsequent events that, for example, fall within the	13	a little hesitant of just accepting the Claimant's
14	dispute and amount to a breach of the treaty, a tribunal	14	suggested date of 13 August 2020 that is the date of
15	will always be wary of a party seeking to put subsequent	15	the alleged breach as at that date Australia had not
16	facts on the ground simply with a view to improving its	16	been formally notified of the alleged breach and the
17	position on the dispute.	17	claim being brought with respect to that breach.
18	This is not a strict rule, but we say it just is	18	But we do say that this is an issue on timing where
19	a rule that's really going to the weight of the	19	there is no one answer. For example, the investor would
20	evidence. It's of less value to you as a Tribunal if,	20	not be appropriately protected if, prior even to the
21	subsequent to the request for consultation, either the	21	alleged breach, the state had engaged in some
22	state or the investor has been seeking to change the	22	potentially unlawful acts that reduced the operations of
23	position in relation to the substantive business	23	the investor in the home state. To similar effect, if
24	operations.	24	an investor had purported to create substantive business
25	That approach, which reflects a more general	25	operations a few weeks before it alleges breach, or
	D 6		
	Page 5		Page 7
10:39 1	approach in terms of assessing evidence, protects both	10:43 1	before the alleged breach, this is a matter a tribunal
2	parties' interests. Investors should not, in the usual	2	would likely also consider when assessing relevant
3	course, be able to improve its position on substantive	3	dates.
4	business operations by putting new facts on the ground,		
		4	All of this comes with the caution that of course
5	such as suddenly employing 50 new people after the	5	the Tribunal is going to have in mind that it's going to
5 6	consultation period has begun. And likewise, the state	5 6	the Tribunal is going to have in mind that it's going to be very important to approach past cases by reference to
6 7	consultation period has begun. And likewise, the state should not, in the usual course, be able to improve its	5 6 7	the Tribunal is going to have in mind that it's going to be very important to approach past cases by reference to the specific treaty wording they're looking at, but also
6 7 8	consultation period has begun. And likewise, the state should not, in the usual course, be able to improve its position by seeking to impact the status of the	5 6 7 8	the Tribunal is going to have in mind that it's going to be very important to approach past cases by reference to the specific treaty wording they're looking at, but also very much by reference to the specific facts that they
6 7 8 9	consultation period has begun. And likewise, the state should not, in the usual course, be able to improve its position by seeking to impact the status of the investor's operations. And those operations of the	5 6 7 8 9	the Tribunal is going to have in mind that it's going to be very important to approach past cases by reference to the specific treaty wording they're looking at, but also very much by reference to the specific facts that they are looking at. Of course, there's the treaty point
6 7 8 9 10	consultation period has begun. And likewise, the state should not, in the usual course, be able to improve its position by seeking to impact the status of the investor's operations. And those operations of the investor and their viability may for example, in the	5 6 7 8 9	the Tribunal is going to have in mind that it's going to be very important to approach past cases by reference to the specific treaty wording they're looking at, but also very much by reference to the specific facts that they are looking at. Of course, there's the treaty point that many treaties don't have the same steps of
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10:45	1	377. The Contracting Parties to the BIT could have	10:49 1	the same applies so far as concerns the 22 [December]
	2	agreed otherwise, but they decided not to do so.	2	2020 and 14 June 2021 dates.
	3	Instead they agreed that a Contracting Party could deny	3	So with your leave, I would move on to question 4.
	4	benefits (including the benefit of having a dispute	4	And again, if we can go back to Article 11(1) of the
	5	decided by an arbitral tribunal) subject to meeting	5	treaty on the screen, at F1/1/158. Thank you.
	6	certain conditions, none of which entails that such	6	If we could go, in fact, on to the next page,
	7	denial is only effective in relation to disputes arising	7	because here, as a starting point, of course we are
	8	after the notification of such denial or any other	8	focusing on the phrase "substantive business
	9	limitation period" Et cetera.	9	operations". And the Tribunal already has on board our
	10		10	point that the term "substantive" already itself imports
	11	"378. On the contrary, the Tribunal agrees that the	11	the requirement that the business operations be real and
	12	denial can and usually will be used whenever an investor decides to on invoke one of the benefits of the BIT. It	12 13	genuine, and as such would not include operations set up
	13 14		13	for a sham purpose. The need for the business operations to be real,
	15	will be on that occasion that the respondent State will analyse whether the objective conditions for the denial	15	authentic and genuine is, as we understand it from the
	15 16	are met and, if so, decide on whether to exercise its	16	Claimant's pleadings, common ground, and I didn't
	10 17	right to deny the benefits contained in the BIT, up to	17	understand the Claimant to withdraw from that position
	18	the submission of its statement of defence.	18	in its opening submissions on Monday. But of course our
	19	379. As a matter of fact, it would be odd for	19	position as to the need for the substantive business
	20	a State to examine whether the requirements of	20	operations to be real, authentic and genuine is
	21	Article XII had been fulfilled in relation to	21	supported by the various cases that the
	22	an investor with whom it had no dispute whatsoever. In	22	Solicitor-General took you to on Monday morning.
	23	that case, the notification of the denial of benefits	23	THE PRESIDENT: Maybe I should say: the Tribunal's question
	24	would per se be seen as an unfriendly and	24	goes to whether you can have real, genuine operations,
	25	groundless act, contrary to the promotion of foreign	25	authentic operations. Because in real life, the
•	23	groundless act, contrary to the promotion of foreign	23	audiente operations. Because in real ine, the
		Page 9		Page 11
10.47	1	'and the same of the same of the same of the	10:51 1	anarotions are those vertibour one those for a number
10:47	1	investments. On the other side, the fulfilment of the aforementioned requirements is not static and can change	2	operations are there, yet they are there for a purpose that is not really the business purpose of these
	2	from one day to the next, which means that it is only	3	operations, but for a different purpose that in this
	4	when a dispute arises that the respondent State will be	4	case would allegedly be treaty protection. And that is
	5	able to assess whether such requirements are met and	5	why we thought that the very words of "genuine",
	6	decide whether it will deny the benefits of the treaty	6	"authentic", "real" do not necessarily answer our
	7	in respect of that particular dispute."	7	question.
	8	So we would submit that is persuasive reasoning.	8	MR WORDSWORTH: Absolutely, Madam President, and I want to
	9	But within that persuasive reasoning, there is a degree	9	approach that through two angles: first, the issue of
	10	of flexibility that is being accorded to the tribunal.	10	interpretation, of course good faith interpretation; but
	11	I would note that Guaracachi is cited with approval	11	then the second prism, which is of performance, and good
	12	in Big Sky v Kazakhstan that's Exhibit RLA-85	12	faith performance.
	13	which you'll recall the Claimant relied on in opening,	13	What I'm doing in making this introductory
	14	and I refer you to paragraph 276. There, you may	14	submission is that when you're looking at the term
	15	recall, the tribunal saw the need for some flexibility	15	"substantive" and you're interpreting that as a matter
	16	because it was concerned about pre-notice steps being	16	of good faith and of course the Tribunal does that
	17	taken by the state to undermine the substantive business	17	under Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention the word
	18	operations in the home state.	18	"substantive", as understood correctly as genuine, real,
	10			, , ,
	19	Before departing this topic, there is the point on	19	authentic, takes on the meaning of "genuine" as in not
		the facts, which is to make the point that in this case	19 20	
<u> </u>	19 20 21	the facts, which is to make the point that in this case not too much turns on whether the Tribunal in fact were	20 21	authentic, takes on the meaning of "genuine" as in not being of a sham nature, i.e. put in place for an improper purpose.
2	19 20 21 22	the facts, which is to make the point that in this case not too much turns on whether the Tribunal in fact were to settle on dates 1, 2, 3 or 4, because no one is, as	20 21 22	authentic, takes on the meaning of "genuine" as in not being of a sham nature, i.e. put in place for an improper purpose. One gets to that, as a matter of good faith
: :	19 20 21 22 23	the facts, which is to make the point that in this case not too much turns on whether the Tribunal in fact were to settle on dates 1, 2, 3 or 4, because no one is, as we understand it, pointing to a marked increase of	20 21 22 23	authentic, takes on the meaning of "genuine" as in not being of a sham nature, i.e. put in place for an improper purpose. One gets to that, as a matter of good faith interpretation, simply by asking the question: could it
	19 20 21 22 23 24	the facts, which is to make the point that in this case not too much turns on whether the Tribunal in fact were to settle on dates 1, 2, 3 or 4, because no one is, as we understand it, pointing to a marked increase of activity between dates 1 and 2, the alleged breach [and]	20 21 22 23 24	authentic, takes on the meaning of "genuine" as in not being of a sham nature, i.e. put in place for an improper purpose. One gets to that, as a matter of good faith interpretation, simply by asking the question: could it have been the intention of the treaty parties to
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	19 20 21 22 23 24	the facts, which is to make the point that in this case not too much turns on whether the Tribunal in fact were to settle on dates 1, 2, 3 or 4, because no one is, as we understand it, pointing to a marked increase of activity between dates 1 and 2, the alleged breach [and]	20 21 22 23 24	authentic, takes on the meaning of "genuine" as in not being of a sham nature, i.e. put in place for an improper purpose. One gets to that, as a matter of good faith interpretation, simply by asking the question: could it have been the intention of the treaty parties to

7 (Pages 9 to 12)

10:52	1	that could be subverted by the creation of business	10:56		obligation to arbitrate in good faith. One can get that
	2	operations in essence in bad faith, in order simply to		2	by various routes: of course, one gets there by
	3	deprive the host state of the important right of being	3	3	Article 26 of the Vienna Convention, obligation to
	4	able to deny benefits?	4	4	perform in good faith. It applies to all international
	5	So as a matter of good faith interpretation, purpose	4	5	agreements. Of course, one also gets there as a matter
	6	does feature; but it also features as a matter of good	6	6	of general principle. And of course, in this case, the
	7	faith performance of the arbitration agreement.	7	7	Claimant has on multiple occasions asserted the
	8	If I can take this in a number of steps.	8	8	existence of an obligation to arbitrate in good faith in
	9	First, as is common ground between the parties, and	ç	9	the various preliminary issues that the parties have
	10	as is, of course, supported by the ordinary wording of	10	0	been fighting over. And indeed, the Tribunal has taken
	11	Article 11(1), as well as multiple cases, the denial of	1	1	the step in its procedural order of 12 September 2023 to
	12	benefits provision applies just as much to the existence	12	2	refer to this essential principle.
	13	of the offer to arbitrate as it does to the substantive	1.	3	And where a claimant state seeks to prevent a state
	14	provisions of Chapter 11.	14	4	from being able to exercise a right that the treaty
	15	Of course, you can see that if we go back to the	1:	5	confers with respect to the offer to arbitrate, through
	16	preceding page, because the ordinary meaning of the	10	6	establishing business operations in a claimed home state
	17	words (Pause)	1'	7	for the purpose of defeating that right, and then seeks
	18	"Following notification, a Party may deny the	18	8	to rely before the arbitral tribunal on the facts on the
	19	benefits of this Chapter:"	19	9	ground that it has brought into being, it is engaged in
	20	And of course "this Chapter" includes the offer to	20	0	a performance of the arbitration agreement that is
	21	arbitrate and all the related provisions in Section B of	2		otherwise than in good faith. And it follows that the
	22	Chapter 11.	22		motivation or the reason for setting up the operations
	23	As is also uncontroversial, the Claimant has	2.		very much do matter.
	24	purported to accept the offer to arbitrate contained in	24		One can see that again in one of Professor
	25	Article 20; and of course a claimant is not able to	2:	5	Bin Cheng's classic formulations. If we could have
		Page 13			Page 15
		-			
10:55	1	change any of the terms pursuant to which an offer to	10:58 1		F2/101/6 on the screen, please. This is
	2	arbitrate was made or that condition its existence or	2		Exhibit RLA-101. If I can pick it up roughly halfway
	3	application. These are all established, of course, by	3		down:
	4	the relevant treaty parties, and all the Claimant can do	4		"A reasonable and bona fide exercise of a right in
	5	is either accept the offer or not accept the offer. It	5		such a case is one which is appropriate and necessary
	6	cannot change any of the relevant conditions or	6		for the purpose of the right (i.e. in furtherance of the
	7	preconditions.	7		interests which the right is intended to protect). It
	8	Of course, when the offer is accepted, that is	8		should at the same time be fair and equitable as between
	9	generally regarded as establishing an agreement to	9		the parties and not one which is calculated to procure
	10	arbitrate, which is likewise generally regarded as being	10		for one of them an unfair advantage in the light of the
	11	governed by international law. And of course it's very	11		obligation assumed."
	12	difficult to see what other law it could be governed by	12 13		And the premise of the Tribunal's question 4 is that there is precisely such a calculation.
	13	in a situation where the offer is contained within	14		HE PRESIDENT: So would you say this is an abuse of the
	14	a treaty governed by international law and all the	15		arbitration agreement?
	15	Claimant does is to accept the offer; it can't change	16		IR WORDSWORTH: I am going to come to that, Madam President,
	16	any of the terms, it can't change the nature of the	17		in a moment. But yes, of course you can see it through
	17	offer. So the resultant agreement must be governed by international law.	18		the prism of abuse of the arbitration agreement. The
	18		19		submission that I'm making before I get to that point is
	19	Now, two things follow from those preliminary	20		actually: it's a failure to perform the arbitration in
	20 21	points. First, the offer has been accepted subject to the right of the host State to deny benefits. As part	20		good faith.
	21	of its acceptance, the Claimant has accepted that the	22		You can go that extra step, as of course many of the
	23	State may deny the right to arbitrate in certain	23		cases on abuse of right or abuse of process do, and they
	23 24	specified situations.	24		characterise there being a specific abuse of the right
	2 4 25	Second, the agreement to arbitrate is subject to the	25		to arbitrate. We're putting this slightly differently,
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		Page 14	i e		Dog 16
		rage 14			Page 16

8 (Pages 13 to 16)

Wednesday, 18 September 2024

11:00 1	in the sense there is an obligation to perform the	11:03 1	If we look at Phoenix Action at F2/91/44 (RLA-91),
2	arbitration agreement in good faith; here, as I've	2	paragraph 107:
3	identified, there is a failure to perform that	3	"The principle of good faith has long been
4	arbitration agreement in good faith.	4	recognized in public international law, as it is also in
5	THE PRESIDENT: And the difference is a difference in level	5	all national legal systems. This principle requires
6	because the threshold for abuse of right is higher? Or	6	parties 'to deal honestly and fairly with each other, to
7	what difference does it make to say "performance not in	7	represent their motives and purposes truthfully, and to
8	good faith" as opposed to "abuse"?	8	refrain from taking unfair advantage' This principle
9	MR WORDSWORTH: Potentially, there is a difference possibly		governs the relations between States, but also the legal
		9	-
10	in threshold. It's rather unclear, isn't it? Because	10	rights and duties of those seeking to assert
11	when one looks at the case on abuse, there is that	11	an international claim under a treaty. Nobody shall
12	conflation between a failure to exercise the right to	12	abuse the rights granted by treaties, and more
13	arbitrate in good faith, and then leaping on a little	13	generally, every rule of law includes an implied clause
14	bit to say: well, that is positively an abuse of right	14	that it should not be abused. This is stated for
15	or abuse of process.	15	example by Hersch Lauterpacht:
16		16	There is no right, however well established, which
17	concepts, in the reasoning.	17	could not, in some circumstances, be refused recognition
18	MR WORDSWORTH: I think the concepts are very, very closely	18	on the ground that it has been abused."
19	related indeed, because the existence of the abuse is	19	Then as to the issue of the effect of the
20	predicated on the failure to exercise the right in good	20	motivation, which question 4 asks, because there is
21	faith. So maybe it's just a difference in terms of	21	a lack of good faith and/or an abuse, there are
22	formulation, as opposed to a real difference in the	22	inevitably procedural consequences so far as concerns
23	principle.	23	denial of benefits. The right to arbitrate under the
24	THE PRESIDENT: I see abuse as a manifestation of the	24	arbitration agreement, which must be performed in good
25	principle of good faith, but I'm not sure about the	25	faith, must be "refused recognition", to borrow the
	D 17		D 10
	Page 17		Page 19
11:02 1	level.	11:06 1	words of Hersch Lauterpacht.
11:02 1 2	level. MR WORDSWORTH: Yes. Well, certainly the submission we are	11:06 1 2	words of Hersch Lauterpacht. So on the assumed facts of question 4, the claim is
2	MR WORDSWORTH: Yes. Well, certainly the submission we are	2	So on the assumed facts of question 4, the claim is
2 3	MR WORDSWORTH: Yes. Well, certainly the submission we are putting to you is about that same manifestation of	2 3	So on the assumed facts of question 4, the claim is inadmissible and the Tribunal would be precluded from
2 3 4	MR WORDSWORTH: Yes. Well, certainly the submission we are putting to you is about that same manifestation of a failure to act in good faith.	2 3 4	So on the assumed facts of question 4, the claim is inadmissible and the Tribunal would be precluded from exercising its jurisdiction.
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9 (Pages 17 to 20)

11:07 1 ins	sofar as there is a difference.	11:11 1	to look at all the relevant facts. In the facts of this
	(Slide 2) So, Madam President, if I can turn briefly	2	case, when we say all that's happened is that MIL has
	the issues of "no investor" and "no investment".	3	acquired the astonishingly valuable shares in Mineralogy
	The Tribunal will recall that the Claimant on Monday	4	for nothing, and then MIL has transferred those valuable
		5	shares to Zeph for nothing, and we also know what is the
	nded up a list of cases, and on that list I think		
	ere were 40 or so that were said to go to "no	6	purpose behind that transaction, that's just a feature
	vestor"/"no investment". It wasn't being said what	7	which helps you identify that there has been no
	rticular issue they went to or why they are relevant.	8	contribution. Looking at those relevant facts, there
	You will also recall that on Monday we put up	9	has been no contribution, no making of an investment.
	wo-page slide identifying the relevant treaty	10	THE PRESIDENT: Do I understand your submission correctly
	aguage in the cases on "making an investment", the	11	that if the Tribunal thinks that an investment has the
_	ecific Article 2(d) issue, and we identified the	12	inherent characteristic of contribution, that actually,
	aguage; we identified whether there was a contribution	13	in and of itself, would suffice to require an allocation
	those cases.	14	of resources by the investor?
	(Slides 3-5) So that table is now on the screen	15	MR WORDSWORTH: That's correct, Madam President.
	fore you. What we've done is simply to add, so far as	16	THE PRESIDENT: And that the word "making" does reinforce
	can see, the cases from the Claimant's list handed up	17	that understanding? Or do I over-interpret what you're
	you on Monday that go to that issue of the making of	18	saying?
	investment. So we hope that is of assistance.	19	MR WORDSWORTH: Well, I wouldn't put it as "reinforcing",
	I don't propose to take you through that now, but	20	because we're putting these as separate points on
21 I s	uspect all these cases are reasonably familiar to the	21	interpretation. But if you look at some of the cases,
22 Tri	ibunal. You will see the key point is that they all	22	what you do see is that they treat them as being
23 hav	ve different wording, and indeed they all involve some	23	reinforcing.
24 for	m of active contribution by a foreign investor.	24	I think it's AMF or Rasia where they're looking
25 THE	PRESIDENT: I have been asking myself whether the	25	specifically at the treaty language, including the fact
	Page 21		Page 23
	1 age 21		i age 23
11:09 1 distin	ction active/passive is not unnecessary because	11.13 1	of making an investment. And in looking at the question
	ction active/passive is not unnecessary, because	11:13 1	of making an investment. And in looking at the question
2 if you	have a requirement for a contribution, then	2	of whether an investment has inherent characteristics,
2 if you 3 a con	have a requirement for a contribution, then tribution is making an allocation, and so it would	2 3	of whether an investment has inherent characteristics, even though it's the "every kind of asset" type of
2 if you 3 a con 4 imply	have a requirement for a contribution, then tribution is making an allocation, and so it would an active behaviour, would it not?	2 3 4	of whether an investment has inherent characteristics, even though it's the "every kind of asset" type of language, it is saying: yes, because we look at all the
 2 if you 3 a con 4 imply 5 MR WC 	have a requirement for a contribution, then tribution is making an allocation, and so it would an active behaviour, would it not? ORDSWORTH: Well, that	2 3 4 5	of whether an investment has inherent characteristics, even though it's the "every kind of asset" type of language, it is saying: yes, because we look at all the relevant language.
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10 (Pages 21 to 24) Trevor McGowan Amended by the parties

11:15 1	management".	11:19 1	Zeph"
2	Of course, none of the people relied on as witnesses	2	Tellingly:
3	are here, save for Mr Palmer. And there are no	3	" if I had decided to pay it or, sorry, if the
4	documents to support the alleged contribution through	4	Claimant wanted it, they could have got it."
5	some active management, save for the alleged	5	So there indeed the corporate forms are truly
6	contribution of Emily Palmer, which you'll recall was	6	ignored and one sees that what's really happening here,
7	covered yesterday in the evidence, and there was	7	which is that it is Mr Palmer who controls what happens,
8	reference to the function she fulfilled at Mineralogy.	8	Zeph has done nothing, and the actual corporate forms
9	But of course, she would anyway be fulfilling that	9	are neither here nor there.
10	function, regardless of whether she is said to have	10	It's useful here to point to the unchallenged
11	a Zeph hat on or not. And I refer you to Day 2,	11	evidence of Professor Lys that the profits of Mineralogy
12	page 237, lines 13 to 22.	12	somehow count four times as retained earnings. If we
13	You'll recall the third way the contribution was put	13	could go to D2/7/16, and this is Professor Lys's second
14	was by way of the supposed reinvestment of profits. And	14	report. (Pause) You see paragraph 57 at the bottom:
15	of course that fails at the first hurdle. Article 2(j):	15	"To the extent that the decision to retain profits
16	there was never an investment in the first place. You	16	instead of paying them out can be considered a form of
17	don't even get within this provision by reference to the	17	investment from an economics point of view, such
18	definition of returns in the treaty.	18	a decision represents an investment made by Mineralogy
19	(Slide 6) Then as to the second point, which is that	19	to reinvest them into itself, and Zeph has no role
20	the supposed return has to be invested by the Claimant,	20	whatsoever in that decision Zeph cannot control or
21	there was never a recommendation even of a dividend by	21	force that issue. (As an aside, Mr Palmer, in his
22	the Mineralogy directors. That's Day 2, [page] 228	22	capacity as owner of MIL, also has no direct say in the
23	lines 6 to 10. And Mr Palmer accepted that it was	23	matter. I explain this matter in more detail in my
24	a requirement for a dividend to be declared, and we can	24	discussion on the board of directors)"
25	see that on the slide, we've got the relevant evidence,	25	Could we then go to footnote 32 at the bottom of the
	Page 25		Page 27
	1 age 25		Tage 27
11:17 1	and that's Day 2, page 222. You see there he is	11:21 1	page:
2	accepting what is plain from the relevant clause of the	2	"I note that the logic underlying the Claimant's
3	Mineralogy constitution.	3	assertion leads to a paradoxical conclusion of quadruple
4	(Slide 7) He also accepted that the annual accounts	4	counting any retention of earnings by Mineralogy: first
5	could not somehow be changing retrospectively what had	5	as an investment by Mineralogy, second as an investment
6	happened in the relevant financial year; that's on our	6	by Zeph, third as an investment by MIL, and finally as
7	second slide here. That's Day 2, page 232:	7	an investment by Mr Palmer."
8	"Question: the decision to approve the accounts	8	So of course it just doesn't make sense, the way
9	can't be changing what happened retrospectively in the	9	this is being put to you. And all these same points on
10	financial year to which the accounts relate? You would	10	the absence of contribution also go to the absence of
11	agree with that?	11	risk. Mr Palmer was unable to point to any legally
12	"Answer: Yes."	12	relevant risk.
13	(Slide 8) It also became all the more evident that	13	(Slide 9) If we go to the fourth slide here, that's
14	what is happening in terms of any relevant decisions is	14	at page 269 of the transcript of Day 2. I think we have
15	that these are taken by Mr Palmer, and the Claimant	15	a slide of this. You see there, there was in essence
16	simply does not enter into the picture in any meaningful	16	the acceptance that the inherent risk was of losing the
17	way. You can see that at page 230 of yesterday's	17	dollar; and Mr Palmer said:
18	transcript:	18	"Of losing the dollar, but also losing part of it
19 20	"Question: So we can just ignore the corporate	19 20	is rights and obligations that you have in shares;
20 21	forms? "Answer: All I'm saying is that I don't live my	20 21	they're dealt with in the constitution of the
	Answer. An rin saying is that riddle live lify		companies."
		າາ	So again there is no serious case of any real risk
22	life on corporate forms; I make decision. And the	22	So again, there is no serious case of any real risk
22 23	life on corporate forms; I make decision. And the decision that I made, in whatever capacity, was to keep	23	in making the investment.
22 23 24	life on corporate forms; I make decision. And the decision that I made, in whatever capacity, was to keep the money in Mineralogy and not pay it to Zeph.	23 24	in making the investment. Madam President, may I hand over to Professor Brown
22 23	life on corporate forms; I make decision. And the decision that I made, in whatever capacity, was to keep	23	in making the investment.
22 23 24	life on corporate forms; I make decision. And the decision that I made, in whatever capacity, was to keep the money in Mineralogy and not pay it to Zeph.	23 24	in making the investment. Madam President, may I hand over to Professor Brown

11 (Pages 25 to 28)

11.23 THE PRESIDENT. Thanky you 2 PROPESSOR RECOVEN: (Stelle 10) Madaum President, members of 3 the Tribunal, I will be addressing the third question 4 that you posed, on the foreseesability is more relevant. 5 come arouse in the context of the about of precess 6 objection. 7 To recell, that question is an assumption, and it is 8 an assumption in three parts, followed by a number of 9 questions. 10 First, we were asked to assume that a exoporation 11 restrictions to gain trends principles of the great of the same that a first part of a sumption it, it matters that the 12 disagreement inmid; and that in that case, if the 13 coporation has that specific disagreement in guestion des- 14 in the part of the same of the assumption in the parts, followed by a number of 15 questions. 16 presenting the properties of the present of the designation of the present of the present of the present of the designation of the present of the present of the present of the designation of the present o				
PROFESSOR BROWN. (Silke 10) Madean President, members of a the firmular, twill be addressing the shirt discussion with a specific course arises in the context of the above of process of objection. To recal, the question is an assumption, and it is a suspension in the context of the above of process of objection. To recal, the question is an assumption, and it is a suspension in the past followed by a number of questions. To recal, the question is an assumption and it is a suspension in the past followed by a number of questions. To recal, the question is an assumption and it is a suspension in the past followed by a number of questions. To recal, the question is an assumption and it is a suspension in the past followed by a number of questions. To recal, the question is an assumption and it is a number of questions. To recal, the question is an assumption and it is a number of questions. To recal, the question is an assumption and it is a number of questions. To recal, the question is an assumption and it is a number of questions. To recal, the question is an assumption of questions. To recal the question is an assumption of questions. To recal the question is an assumption of the contractive of the restructuring. And in the restructure is a number of the restructure in the first part of assumption. The same shall be indeed to assume that it is presented in question does not lead to the invocation of these previous districts of the invocation of the use questions. Whether is an above the contract of the previous does not lead to the invocation of the use question with a specific disagreement in mind. The new we are few add on questions with the other provided in the propertion of the procession for the contraction of these provided to use the weed To designeement is about to the weed To designeement is about the other weed the proceeding in the propertion with a specific disagreement in mind, and if it has it in indict, it measure that it is presented in the treat production of the presented in	11:23 1	THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.	11:25 1	protection"
the Tribunal, I will be adheseing the hird question 4 that you posed, on the foreseability is not relevant. 5 course arises in the context of the abuse of process 6 objection. 7 To result, that question is an assumption, and it is 8 an assumption in three parts, followed by a number of 9 questions. 10 First, we were asked to assume that a corporation 11 restructures to gain treaty protection in the fact taken 12 disagreement minds, and that in that case, if the 13 coporation has that specific disagreement in mind, 14 it means that it's foreseable. We are then asked to 15 assume, further, that the disagreement in question does 16 not lead on the invocation of reavy protection. And 17 then we are asked to assume, finally, that another 18 disagreement arise, as such not foreseable. And the 19 Tribunal's question in relation to these three steps was 19 Whether the invocation of treaty protection for the 20 whether the invocation of treaty protection for the 21 continued the appearance of the Tribunal, 22 and then, Madam Festion, members of the Tribunal, 23 there was a reward harm, we would use the term "measure". 11:24 1 "dispute" [or] we would use the term "measure". 21 Till hegin with the first part of the assumption: 3 that is, if a corporation restructures to gain treaty 4 protection with a specific disagreement mind, and if 5 it has it in mind, it means that it's foreseeable. 4 protection with a specific disagreement mind, and if 5 it has it in mind, it means that it's foreseeable. 5 the way that assumption it is stated is of course 6 correct, but it's not the case that foreseeable; 10 where there is a pre-existing dispute, which is well 11 the Philip Morris Asia case, which is RIA-95, and of the decisions and awards such as Fax Rim 12 vet Salvador, RLA-43, faulf Tilewater Venezuela, 13 the Philip Morris Asia award all paragraphs 545 14 to the Philip Morris Asia award all paragraphs 205, which is restricted on the screen, their 15 to 54. 16 (Sike II) One of those other deci	2	PROFESSOR BROWN: (Slide 10) Madam President, members of		•
thuy our posed, on the foresceability is sue, which of coljection. To recall, that question is an assumption, and it is a susamption in the past. Followed by a number of questions. To recall, that question is an assumption, and it is a susamption in the past. Followed by a number of questions. For this, we were asked to assume that a corporation in the past of questions. For this, we were asked to assume that a corporation in the past of the past of questions. For this, we were asked to assume that a corporation in the past of questions. For this question is an assumption with a specific disagreement in mind, and there is no question that it has fined taken in the tasks. If the corporation has that yeeffic disagreement in mind, and there is no question that it has fined taken in the context of the assumption. For this question is a disagreement in mind, and there is no a need for a test as to whether the investion of treaty protection with a specific disagreement in mind, and there is no an extraction of the treaty protection with respect to that dispute. For this question is disagreement in passion does not have disagreement in should not provide to the disagreement is absorbe or not. For this question is a disagreement in passion does not have disagreement is absorbe or not. For this question is a disagreement in passion does not have disagreement is absorbe or not. For this question is a disagreement in passion does not have disagreement is absorbe or not. For this question is a disagreement in passion does not have disagreement in should any expect to any unknown future dispute. For this question is a dispute, which is the answer of the passion of the passion dispute, which is well as the passion of	3			
6 objection. 7 To recall, that question is an assumption, and it is 8 an assumption in three parts, followed by a number of 9 questions. 9 questions. 10 First, we were asked to assume that a corporation 11 restructure by the provided of the protection with a specific disagreement in mind, and there is no question that this in fact taken in mind, and there is no question that this in fact taken in mind, and there is no question that its has in fact taken place with an abusive purpose in mind, and there is no question that its has in fact taken place with an abusive purpose in mind, and there is no question that has in fact taken place with an abusive purpose in mind, and there is no question that has in fact taken place with an abusive purpose in mind, and there is no questions that the first part of assumption. It man that it's foreoreable. We are then asked to assume, farably, that another disagreement as instance of the place with an abusive purpose in mind, and there is no questions that the first part of seasumption. It may be structured in order to guestions with a specific disagreement in maked to the invocation of the treaty protection with respect to any abusive purpose. It is different on the treaty protection of the treaty protection. Including ISISS protection, with respect to an investment treaty in respect of anknown future Page 29 111.24 1 "dispute" [or] we would use the term "measure". 21 11 begin with the first part of the assumption. 22 1 I'll begin with the first part of the assumption. 23 2 1 I'll begin with the first part of the assumption is stated of society and the provided to use the protection with a specific disagreement in mind, and the read provided to use the protection with a specific disagreement in mind, and the read provided to use the protectio	4	that you posed, on the foreseeability issue, which of	4	•
To recall, that question is an assumption and it is an assumption in three parts, followed by a number of questions. The standing factor for the restructuring. And in the first part of assumption I, it matters that the restructure has taken place with an abusive purpose in mind, and there is no questions that the passes in mind, and that in that case, if the disagreement in mind, and that in that case, if the disagreement in mind, and that in that case, if the disagreement in mind, and that in that case, if the assumption is a seame, further, that the disagreement in question does not lead to the invocation of trenty protection. And there we are asked to assume, furthly, that another the disagreement is abusive or not. The in part B of the assumption, the disagreement does not be different from the usual situation, where a law addone questions, whether the invocation of trenty protection. And then we are asked to assume, finally, that another the disagreement is abusive or not. And then Madam President, members of the Tribunal, the very all the more clear because there is a foreseeable dispute, and the intention to the treaty protection with respect to that dispute. The in part B of the assumption the disagreement doesn't lead to the invocation of the treaty protection. This is different from the usual situation, where an animal content of the protection and distributed in the restructure in deep the assumption of the structure in color to secure the benefit of treaty protection and varied that confirm that it is permissible to structure investment to take advantange of an investment treaty in respect to many unknown future dispute. 11:24 1 "dispute" [or] we would use the term "measure". 22 1 The begin with the first part of the assumption: 23 2 the work of the Phote case that foreseeable. 34 4 protection with a specific disagreement in mind, and if it is a trib, and it is a trib, and it may be a succeeded to a specific disagreement in mind, and if it is a proportion beat the case that foreseeable. 35	5	course arises in the context of the abuse of process	5	a dispute, but there is a need for a test as to whether
a sassumption in three parts, followed by a number of questions. First, we were asked to assume that a corporation First, we were asked to assume that a corporation First, we were asked to assume that a corporation First, we were asked to assume that a corporation First, we were asked to assume that a corporation First, we were asked to assume that a corporation and that in that case, if the corporation has that specific disagreement in mind. The corporation has that specific disagreement in mind. The corporation has that specific disagreement in mind, and there is no question that it has in fact taken and the intent is to gain investment treaty protection. And the corporation restricts and the intent is to gain investment treaty protection of the treaty protection. And the disagreement in advanced to the invocation of the treaty protection. The way that assumption of treaty protection of the assumption: The corporation has the specific disagreement in much, and the specific disagreement in due to the disagreement in much and the specific disagreement in much and the first part of the assumption: The corporation has the specific disagreement in much and the specific disagreement in advanced to a such as of social properties. The protection with a specific disagreement and the place with an abusive purpose in mind, and there is no question that it has in fact taken and the invocation does in the the more clear because there is a foreseable dispute, and the intent is to gain investment treaty protection of the treaty protection. The man part of the assumption in the disagreement in dispute. The in part I of the assumption in the disagreement in mind, and there is no question that in the corporation treatment treaty protection doesn't lead to the invocation of the treaty protection. The in part I of the assumption in the disagreement in mind, and there is no question of the treaty protection. The in part I of the assumption in the disagreement in mind, and there is no question that in the invocatio	6	objection.	6	the dispute that is then notified in the future is
9 restructure has taken place with an abusive purpose in mind, and there is no questions in mind, and there is no question that it has in fact the state of the surport of the mind. The abuse is all the more clear because there is a foreseeable dispute, and the internal state is part of the samption. The state is foreseeable dispute, and the internal state is foreseeable. The analysis purpose in mind, and there is a foreseeable dispute, and the internal state is foreseeable. The analysis purpose in mind, and the term state is foreseeable. The analysis purpose in mind, and there are subsisted purpose in mind, and the term state is foreseeable. The analysis purpose in mind, and the term state is foreseeable. The analysis purpose in mind, and the term state is foreseeable. The analysis purpose in mind, and the term state is foreseeable. The analysis purpose in the structure investment to take advantage of an investment treaty in respect of unknown future. 11:24 1 "dispute" for lwe would use the term "measure". 2 11:25 1 disputes. And there are multiple audiorities on that profession in relation to the assumption which has been provided t	7	To recall, that question is an assumption, and it is	7	a motivating factor for the restructuring. And in the
10 First, we were asked to assume that a corporation restructures to gain treaty protection with a specific disagreement in mind, and that in that case, if the corporation has that specific disagreement in mind, and the intent is to gain investment treaty protection. And in a means that its foresceable. We are then asked to assume, further, that the disagreement in question does not lead to the invocation of treaty protection. And in them we are asked to assume, finally, that another a doesn't lead to the invocation of treaty protection. And the first part of the assumption of treaty protection for the other disagreement absolute or the disagreement absolute or the doesn't lead to the invocation of the treaty protection. And the first part of the assumption of treaty protection for the other disagreement absolute or other disagreement, which a doesn't lead to the invocation of the treaty protection. And the minute doesn't lead to the invocation of the treaty protection. This is different from the usual situation, where an investment treaty protection. This is different from the usual situation, where an investment treaty protection. This is different from the usual situation, where the samption of treaty protection. 12 disputes of the invocation of treaty protection. 13 disputes dispute doesn't lead to the invocation of the treaty protection. 14 in the more clear because the dispute. 15 doesn't lead to the invocation of the treaty protection. 16 doesn't lead to the invocation of the treaty protection. 17 This is differ	8	an assumption in three parts, followed by a number of	8	first part of assumption 1, it matters that the
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Page 30 Page 32				
		Page 30		Page 32

12 (Pages 29 to 32)

11:28 1	in the second disagreement. I will address these in	11:31 1	Serbian companies were already in dispute with the
2	turn.	2	respondent, the Republic of Serbia, and had in fact been
3	The first of these factors is the substance of the	3	in dispute with the Serbian authorities for around
4	second disagreement. And this is relevant if there is	4	12 years at the time of the restructuring.
5	any connection between the two disagreements: if they,	5	At paragraph 208, as you can see on the slide, the
6	for instance, involve the investor being exposed to the	6	tribunal observed that:
7	same sort of state conduct, which the investor has	7	" what needs to be foreseeable is a dispute
8	responded to already through seeking the treaty	8	originating from deteriorated circumstances affecting
9	protection in the first place.	9	an investment in the host State. The abuse is in
10	It would also be relevant if the second disagreement	10	manipulating the system, being aware that facts at the
11	concerned the same state actors, the same investment	11	root of a dispute"
12	vehicle, and the same investment for instance, the	12	And I interpose that that is the type of factors
13	same investment contract, such as a state agreement	13	that I've been outlining in the present case:
14	as well as any other relevant factors. This has to be	14	" have already taken place negatively affecting
15	a holistic assessment.	15	the investment and could lead to investment treaty
16	Another relevant factor may be the involvement of	16	arbitration, irrespective of how a claimant labels the
17	the same specific state representative, where there are	17	same facts as leading to a 'domestic' or
18	cases of personal animosity. For example, where	18	an 'international' dispute."
19	something is happening like two bulls are butting heads,	19	(Slide 13) In Cascade v Turkey (RLA-98), a case
20	first in relation to disagreement 1 and then the same	20	which I took you to a number of times on Monday morning,
21	thing happens in relation to disagreement 2, then we say	21	here the Belgian claimant had acquired shares in CMD,
22	this is a relevant factor in relation to considering	22	a media company in Turkey, which was being shut down on
23	whether commencing an investment treaty claim in	23	national security grounds as part of the Government of
24	relation to disagreement 2 would be abusive.	24	Turkey's actions against the movement inspired by the
25	Turning to the timing of the second disagreement,	25	exiled cleric Fethullah Gülen.
	Page 33		Page 35
11:29 1	one can think of hypothetical examples which throw this	11:32 1	I took you, as I said, to a number of passages of
2	issue into sharp relief. For instance, suppose the	2	Cascade on Monday, but not to this particular paragraph.
3	situation is that the corporate restructure is carried	3	At paragraph 347, the tribunal held that:
4	out in week 1 to gain treaty protection with	4	" the Tribunal agrees with prior awards that
5	disagreement 1 in mind; that might be a taxation	5	describe foreseeability as a continuum between
6	measure. But then in week 2, disagreement 2 arises; and	6	unforeseeable disputes and highly probable disputes,
7	that might be the cancellation of a permit. And then in	7	with most cases falling somewhere between the two
8	week 3, the treaty is invoked in relation to	8	extremes (and thus, by definition, not precisely at
9	disagreement 2, being the cancellation of the permit.	9	either). That is because in many cases, specific
10	Now, it would appear rather odd for that not to be	10	government action is preceded by some period of
11	considered abusive. There has been no investment other	11	deteriorating relationships, and the longer the
12	than for the purposes of treaty protection for	12	relationship deteriorates, the more foreseeable adverse
13	an abusive purpose during a period of just two weeks.	13	State action may become. That is presumably why the
14	There has been no possibility for the state to get any	14	Pac Rim tribunal described the exercise of drawing
15	benefit in relation to a genuine investment before	15	a line on the continuum as not necessarily clear cut,
16	a claim is submitted.	16	and 'recognize[d] that, as a matter of practical
17	These first two factors, substance and timing,	17	reality, the dividing-line will rarely be a thin red
18	explain why recent cases have emphasised the	18	line, but will include a significant grey area.' And
19	significance of there being deteriorating relations	19	that is precisely why it is necessary to conduct
20	between the investor and the host state.	20	a holistic analysis that focuses on all relevant factors
21	(Slide 12) In this respect, in the case BRIF	21	and not to focus too rigidly on just one, such as the
22	v Serbia, which is RLA-136, which is extracted on the	22	precise degree of foreseeability on the date of
23	slide, the claim was brought by two Serbian companies	23	investment. In considering all relevant factors, the
24	which had acquired Luxembourg nationality through	24	Tribunal does agree that there will be a high threshold
25	a restructure in 2019, in circumstances where the two	25	to meet the test for showing abuse of process, but that
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	Page 34		Page 36

13 (Pages 33 to 36)

*			
11:33 1	is because it will be only in unusual circumstances that	11:36 1	same sort of state conduct by the same state actors,
2	the evidence points to a likely sham transaction, rather	2	particularly in a context of deteriorating relations or
3	than one made for genuine commercial purposes. But	3	personal animosity, and where that conduct is directed
4	a high threshold for proving abuse does not equate to	4	at the same investment vehicle.
5	a requirement to prove that adverse State action is	5	Secondly, where the second disagreement is
6	already highly probable on the date of the investment."	6	sufficiently proximate in time; again, this being
7	(Slide 14) And in this case, in Cascade v Turkey,	7	a fact-specific enquiry. In the usual course, if this
8	the tribunal ultimately held, at paragraph 444, that the	8	happens many years later, it may be insufficiently
9	claimant's acquisition of the shares in the media	9	proximate, leaving aside other considerations.
10	company was:	10	And thirdly, where the second disagreement is
11	" designed to repackage under a foreign flag	11	effected by the same sort of measure, having regard to
12	an investment actually made by domestic investors in	12	its character, effect and the relevant author of that
13	their home State, at a time and in an atmosphere when	13	state measure.
14	adverse actions by the"	14	I come then to the Tribunal's further follow-up
15	The redacted text is no doubt the Turkish	15	questions. The first of these is what the impact would
16	authorities:	16	be if the word "disagreement", which the Tribunal
17	" were reasonably foreseeable."	17	deliberately chose as being a neutral term, were
18	I come then to the third factor to be considered,	18	replaced by the term "dispute".
19	and that is the relevant measure at issue in the second	19	We see the terms "disagreement" and "dispute" as
20	disagreement, and whether that specific type of measure	20	being interchangeable. This, accordingly, does not
21	is foreseen. This is also linked to the second part of	21	affect our analysis.
22	the Tribunal's question, which I'll come to.	22	(Slide 15) This is consistent with the well-known
23	Here what is relevant is the character of the	23	dictum of the International Court of Justice which was
24	government measure; in our case, being a legislative	24	exemplified in the ICJ's judgment in Georgia v Russia,
25	measure adopted by the Western Australian Parliament	25	which is RLA-133, at paragraph 30, where the
	Page 37		Page 39
11:34 1	that effected a unilateral modification of the	11:37 1	International Court of Justice collected its consistent
2	State Agreement. This is, firstly, what was threatened	2	jurisprudence on this matter:
3	in relation to the mine continuation proposals issue	3	"The Court recalls its established case law
4	involving the CITIC parties; secondly, what was	4	beginning with the frequently quoted statement by the
5	anticipated might be used in relation to the Balmoral	5	Permanent Court of International Justice in the
6	South proposal and the arbitration proceedings; and	6	Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions case in 1924:
7	thirdly, what in fact happened, with the Amendment Act	7	'A dispute is a disagreement on a point of law or fact,
8	as enacted in August 2020.	8	a conflict of legal views or of interests between
9	Now, turning to the Tribunal's hypothesis of this	9	two persons."'
10	second disagreement, Australia's submission is that this	10	If the term "measure" were inserted instead of the
11	has to be assessed on a fact-sensitive basis.	11	neutral term "disagreement", that would make the test
12	We note at the outset that it is not Australia's	12	more exacting. But that is not the approach of
13	position that the submission of a claim to arbitration	13	investment tribunals. In this respect, I refer to the
14	in respect of such a second disagreement would always be	14	cases I cited in opening on Monday morning; and I also
15	abusive; nor is Australia's position that it would never	15	refer to Australia's submissions in the SOPO at
16	be abusive. Clearly there are cases where the	16	paragraphs 312 to 316 and in the ROPO at paragraph 248
17	substance, the timing and the character of the measure	17	to 250.
18	at issue in the second disagreement will be such that it	18	(Slide 16) On this issue, let me come to the
19	would be abusive for an investment treaty claim to be	19	Claimant's slide on foreseeability, which was slide 32
20	submitted in relation to that second disagreement.	20	of its slide deck.
21	Thus, in Australia's submission, it will be abusive	21 22	In that slide, the Claimant suggests that there were
22 23	to submit a claim concerning the second disagreement to	22 23	certain decisions and awards which supported two propositions. Firstly, that the measure giving rise to
			propositions. Firstly, that the measure giving rise to
	investor-state arbitration in the following		
24	circumstances.	24	the dispute must be well defined, and there are a series
24	circumstances.	24	the dispute must be well defined, and there are a series

14 (Pages 37 to 40)

11:38 1			
	Tidewater, Mobil, Aguas del Tunari and Clorox. And then	11:41 1	completed'."
2	other cases that supported the proposition, apparently,	2	So this was about certain existing disputes and then
3	that the specific measure must be foreseeable, and there	3	a future dispute, with no discussion as to the
4	were cited: Philip Morris Asia, again Clorox, Natland,	4	foreseeability of that future dispute.
5	Alverley and Ipek.	5	(Slide 19) As for Tidewater v Venezuela, RLA-93,
6	But the Claimant's citation of cases under these two	6	this also doesn't support the proposition that the
7	headings is incorrect, and I'll briefly go through those	7	Claimant asserts. Here the ICSID tribunal noted at
8	decisions and awards. If I can begin then with the	8	paragraph 193 that there was:
9	cases cited for the proposition that the measure giving	9	" [a] possibility that a dispute between the
10	rise to the dispute must be well defined.	10	Claimants and the Republic in relation to the
11	(Slide 17) The first of those, chronologically at	11	expropriation of the Claimants' assets in Venezuela was
12	least, is Aguas del Tunari v Bolivia, which is CLA-185.	12	reasonably foreseeable", et cetera.
13	Now, this is, with respect, a rather dated case, from	13	Now, the Tribunal there is not talking in terms of
14	2005, and it predates many of the decisions and awards	14	identifying with any specificity the expropriation
15	that have considered this question.	15	measure. It's talking about the substance of a dispute,
16	The tribunal's award and decision on this point is	16	such as, for instance: what is the conflict of legal
17	really not to the point. It doesn't subject this issue	17	views or interests? And here it was the parties' rights
18	to close analysis. There is really no discussion of	18	and obligations in relation to a possible expropriation
19	relevant findings by the ICSID tribunal in this case of	19	under the treaty.
20	the foreseeability of the dispute or of the measure	20	(Slide 20) I turn then to Clorox v Venezuela
21	giving rise to the dispute, nor is there anything about	21	(RLA-142), and I addressed this case in opening. And
22	anything being well defined.	22	the Swiss Federal Tribunal here is concerned again about
23	The only discussion of foreseeability in that case	23	the foreseeability of the dispute, not the particular
24	concerns the foreseeability of rights and civil unrest	24	measure.
25	in Bolivia in relation to the claimant's concession,	25	If we can look at paragraph 5.4.2 on the slide.
	Page 41		Page 43
11:40 1	which you can see extracted at paragraph 329 on the	11:42 1	I didn't show you this in opening on Monday, but
2	slide. So no assistance can be found from that award.	2	I'll bring it up today. We can see in the extract
3	(Slide 18) As for Mobil v Venezuela (RLA-92), this	3	that's not highlighted that:
4	case is, in fact, not about foreseeability. Rather, if	4	"To assess the foreseeability of the dispute during
5	we can look at the extract of paragraphs 204 and 205 on	5	the restructuring of the investment, one must not focus
6	the slide:	6	on the point of view of the investor concerned. To the
7	"As stated by the Claimants"	7	extent that recourse to abuse of rights aims to limit
8	Quoting from paragraph 204:	8	
	" the aim of the restructuring of their		maneuvers that objectively do not deserve any
9	——————————————————————————————————————	9	protection, it is rather appropriate to ask whether
10	investments in Venezuela through a Dutch holding was to	9 10	protection, it is rather appropriate to ask whether a specific dispute would have been foreseeable for
10 11	investments in Venezuela through a Dutch holding was to protect those investments against breaches of their	9 10 11	protection, it is rather appropriate to ask whether a specific dispute would have been foreseeable for a reasonable investor placed in the same situation as
10 11 12	investments in Venezuela through a Dutch holding was to protect those investments against breaches of their rights by the Venezuelan authorities by gaining access	9 10 11 12	protection, it is rather appropriate to ask whether a specific dispute would have been foreseeable for a reasonable investor placed in the same situation as the investor concerned."
10 11 12 13	investments in Venezuela through a Dutch holding was to protect those investments against breaches of their rights by the Venezuelan authorities by gaining access to ICSID arbitration through the BIT."	9 10 11 12 13	protection, it is rather appropriate to ask whether a specific dispute would have been foreseeable for a reasonable investor placed in the same situation as the investor concerned." So again, looking at the dispute, not the particular
10 11 12 13 14	investments in Venezuela through a Dutch holding was to protect those investments against breaches of their rights by the Venezuelan authorities by gaining access to ICSID arbitration through the BIT." And the tribunal says this was "perfectly legitimate	9 10 11 12 13 14	protection, it is rather appropriate to ask whether a specific dispute would have been foreseeable for a reasonable investor placed in the same situation as the investor concerned." So again, looking at the dispute, not the particular specific measure.
10 11 12 13 14 15	investments in Venezuela through a Dutch holding was to protect those investments against breaches of their rights by the Venezuelan authorities by gaining access to ICSID arbitration through the BIT." And the tribunal says this was "perfectly legitimate as concerned future disputes".	9 10 11 12 13 14 15	protection, it is rather appropriate to ask whether a specific dispute would have been foreseeable for a reasonable investor placed in the same situation as the investor concerned." So again, looking at the dispute, not the particular specific measure. (Slide 21) At paragraph 5.6, the tribunal applied
10 11 12 13 14 15	investments in Venezuela through a Dutch holding was to protect those investments against breaches of their rights by the Venezuelan authorities by gaining access to ICSID arbitration through the BIT." And the tribunal says this was "perfectly legitimate as concerned future disputes". And in paragraph 205, the tribunal notes that it was	9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	protection, it is rather appropriate to ask whether a specific dispute would have been foreseeable for a reasonable investor placed in the same situation as the investor concerned." So again, looking at the dispute, not the particular specific measure. (Slide 21) At paragraph 5.6, the tribunal applied this test. And in that case, there had been a speech
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	investments in Venezuela through a Dutch holding was to protect those investments against breaches of their rights by the Venezuelan authorities by gaining access to ICSID arbitration through the BIT." And the tribunal says this was "perfectly legitimate as concerned future disputes". And in paragraph 205, the tribunal notes that it was different with respect to pre-existing disputes, and	9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	protection, it is rather appropriate to ask whether a specific dispute would have been foreseeable for a reasonable investor placed in the same situation as the investor concerned." So again, looking at the dispute, not the particular specific measure. (Slide 21) At paragraph 5.6, the tribunal applied this test. And in that case, there had been a speech made by the former President of Venezuela, where there
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	investments in Venezuela through a Dutch holding was to protect those investments against breaches of their rights by the Venezuelan authorities by gaining access to ICSID arbitration through the BIT." And the tribunal says this was "perfectly legitimate as concerned future disputes". And in paragraph 205, the tribunal notes that it was different with respect to pre-existing disputes, and that that would be abusive, quoting Phoenix Action. And	9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	protection, it is rather appropriate to ask whether a specific dispute would have been foreseeable for a reasonable investor placed in the same situation as the investor concerned." So again, looking at the dispute, not the particular specific measure. (Slide 21) At paragraph 5.6, the tribunal applied this test. And in that case, there had been a speech made by the former President of Venezuela, where there had been in fact a particular measure that had been
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	investments in Venezuela through a Dutch holding was to protect those investments against breaches of their rights by the Venezuelan authorities by gaining access to ICSID arbitration through the BIT." And the tribunal says this was "perfectly legitimate as concerned future disputes". And in paragraph 205, the tribunal notes that it was different with respect to pre-existing disputes, and that that would be abusive, quoting Phoenix Action. And the claimants were indeed conscious of this, looking at	9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	protection, it is rather appropriate to ask whether a specific dispute would have been foreseeable for a reasonable investor placed in the same situation as the investor concerned." So again, looking at the dispute, not the particular specific measure. (Slide 21) At paragraph 5.6, the tribunal applied this test. And in that case, there had been a speech made by the former President of Venezuela, where there had been in fact a particular measure that had been referred to. But that wasn't specifically identified;
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	investments in Venezuela through a Dutch holding was to protect those investments against breaches of their rights by the Venezuelan authorities by gaining access to ICSID arbitration through the BIT." And the tribunal says this was "perfectly legitimate as concerned future disputes". And in paragraph 205, the tribunal notes that it was different with respect to pre-existing disputes, and that that would be abusive, quoting Phoenix Action. And the claimants were indeed conscious of this, looking at the highlighted section in the last few lines, that the	9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	protection, it is rather appropriate to ask whether a specific dispute would have been foreseeable for a reasonable investor placed in the same situation as the investor concerned." So again, looking at the dispute, not the particular specific measure. (Slide 21) At paragraph 5.6, the tribunal applied this test. And in that case, there had been a speech made by the former President of Venezuela, where there had been in fact a particular measure that had been referred to. But that wasn't specifically identified; it wasn't necessary for that to be specifically
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10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	investments in Venezuela through a Dutch holding was to protect those investments against breaches of their rights by the Venezuelan authorities by gaining access to ICSID arbitration through the BIT." And the tribunal says this was "perfectly legitimate as concerned future disputes". And in paragraph 205, the tribunal notes that it was different with respect to pre-existing disputes, and that that would be abusive, quoting Phoenix Action. And the claimants were indeed conscious of this, looking at the highlighted section in the last few lines, that the Claimants had stated that: " they 'invoke ICSID jurisdiction on the basis of	9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	protection, it is rather appropriate to ask whether a specific dispute would have been foreseeable for a reasonable investor placed in the same situation as the investor concerned." So again, looking at the dispute, not the particular specific measure. (Slide 21) At paragraph 5.6, the tribunal applied this test. And in that case, there had been a speech made by the former President of Venezuela, where there had been in fact a particular measure that had been referred to. But that wasn't specifically identified; it wasn't necessary for that to be specifically identified, in the view of the tribunal. Put simply, it was just something that the
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	investments in Venezuela through a Dutch holding was to protect those investments against breaches of their rights by the Venezuelan authorities by gaining access to ICSID arbitration through the BIT." And the tribunal says this was "perfectly legitimate as concerned future disputes". And in paragraph 205, the tribunal notes that it was different with respect to pre-existing disputes, and that that would be abusive, quoting Phoenix Action. And the claimants were indeed conscious of this, looking at the highlighted section in the last few lines, that the Claimants had stated that: " they 'invoke ICSID jurisdiction on the basis of the consent expressed in the Treaty only for disputes	9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	protection, it is rather appropriate to ask whether a specific dispute would have been foreseeable for a reasonable investor placed in the same situation as the investor concerned." So again, looking at the dispute, not the particular specific measure. (Slide 21) At paragraph 5.6, the tribunal applied this test. And in that case, there had been a speech made by the former President of Venezuela, where there had been in fact a particular measure that had been referred to. But that wasn't specifically identified; it wasn't necessary for that to be specifically identified, in the view of the tribunal. Put simply, it was just something that the tribunal the court, rather, the Swiss Federal
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	investments in Venezuela through a Dutch holding was to protect those investments against breaches of their rights by the Venezuelan authorities by gaining access to ICSID arbitration through the BIT." And the tribunal says this was "perfectly legitimate as concerned future disputes". And in paragraph 205, the tribunal notes that it was different with respect to pre-existing disputes, and that that would be abusive, quoting Phoenix Action. And the claimants were indeed conscious of this, looking at the highlighted section in the last few lines, that the Claimants had stated that: " they 'invoke ICSID jurisdiction on the basis of the consent expressed in the Treaty only for disputes arising under the Treaty for action that the Respondent	9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	protection, it is rather appropriate to ask whether a specific dispute would have been foreseeable for a reasonable investor placed in the same situation as the investor concerned." So again, looking at the dispute, not the particular specific measure. (Slide 21) At paragraph 5.6, the tribunal applied this test. And in that case, there had been a speech made by the former President of Venezuela, where there had been in fact a particular measure that had been referred to. But that wasn't specifically identified; it wasn't necessary for that to be specifically identified, in the view of the tribunal. Put simply, it was just something that the tribunal the court, rather, the Swiss Federal Tribunal, said that something has to be threatened or in
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	investments in Venezuela through a Dutch holding was to protect those investments against breaches of their rights by the Venezuelan authorities by gaining access to ICSID arbitration through the BIT." And the tribunal says this was "perfectly legitimate as concerned future disputes". And in paragraph 205, the tribunal notes that it was different with respect to pre-existing disputes, and that that would be abusive, quoting Phoenix Action. And the claimants were indeed conscious of this, looking at the highlighted section in the last few lines, that the Claimants had stated that: " they 'invoke ICSID jurisdiction on the basis of the consent expressed in the Treaty only for disputes arising under the Treaty for action that the Respondent took or continued to take after the restructuring was	9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	protection, it is rather appropriate to ask whether a specific dispute would have been foreseeable for a reasonable investor placed in the same situation as the investor concerned." So again, looking at the dispute, not the particular specific measure. (Slide 21) At paragraph 5.6, the tribunal applied this test. And in that case, there had been a speech made by the former President of Venezuela, where there had been in fact a particular measure that had been referred to. But that wasn't specifically identified; it wasn't necessary for that to be specifically identified, in the view of the tribunal. Put simply, it was just something that the tribunal the court, rather, the Swiss Federal Tribunal, said that something has to be threatened or in some way likely, but not specifically identified; and
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	investments in Venezuela through a Dutch holding was to protect those investments against breaches of their rights by the Venezuelan authorities by gaining access to ICSID arbitration through the BIT." And the tribunal says this was "perfectly legitimate as concerned future disputes". And in paragraph 205, the tribunal notes that it was different with respect to pre-existing disputes, and that that would be abusive, quoting Phoenix Action. And the claimants were indeed conscious of this, looking at the highlighted section in the last few lines, that the Claimants had stated that: " they 'invoke ICSID jurisdiction on the basis of the consent expressed in the Treaty only for disputes arising under the Treaty for action that the Respondent	9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	protection, it is rather appropriate to ask whether a specific dispute would have been foreseeable for a reasonable investor placed in the same situation as the investor concerned." So again, looking at the dispute, not the particular specific measure. (Slide 21) At paragraph 5.6, the tribunal applied this test. And in that case, there had been a speech made by the former President of Venezuela, where there had been in fact a particular measure that had been referred to. But that wasn't specifically identified; it wasn't necessary for that to be specifically identified, in the view of the tribunal. Put simply, it was just something that the tribunal the court, rather, the Swiss Federal Tribunal, said that something has to be threatened or in

15 (Pages 41 to 44)

11:43 1			
11.TJ 1	what was going to happen would actually have to infect	11:46 1	investment would not be subject to a similar measure; in
2	the investment; and that the effect of that would be of	2	that case, something like the solar levy.
3	such an extent as to lead to a conflict of legal views	3	Now, the Swiss Federal Tribunal thereby implicitly
4	or interests between the parties.	4	confirmed that the dispute between the investors and the
5	So again, in the view of the Swiss Federal Tribunal,	5	host state encompassed not only the adaptation of the
6	no need for an investor to foresee the specific measure	6	feed-in tariff, the measure in that case that was
7	that would be implemented. Rather, what had to be	7	originally envisaged, but also similar measures that the
8	foreseen was a real possibility that something would	8	host state could implement to achieve the same outcome.
9	happen.	9	(Slides 23-34) Now, the Claimant then cited Alverley
10	(Slide 22) I turn then to the Claimant's cases that	10	and Ipek, and these are in fact cases that assist the
11	apparently stand for the proposition that the specific	11	Respondent. I'll come to those in a moment. But before
12	measure must be foreseeable. And the Claimant here	12	doing so, I also note that the Claimant failed to
13	cites Philip Morris Asia v Australia, RLA-95.	13	mention other decisions cited by the Respondent in its
14	That is plainly not right on the face of	14	written submissions, like the award in Cascade v Turkey
15	paragraph 554 of the award. I took you to this passage	15	(RLA-98). I've raised this case already. But the
16	on Monday, as I recall. I don't need to read it all	16	tribunal there provided a persuasive analysis, which it
17	into the transcript. It is simply there as a reference	17	described as being consistent with the approach in
18	to there being:	18	Philip Morris Asia, of what must be foreseeable for the
19	" gain[ing] the protection of an investment	19	purposes of an abuse of process objection.
20	treaty at a point in time when a specific dispute [is]	20	I took you to paragraphs 350 and 351 in opening on
21	foreseeable."	21	Monday morning; I don't need to read them to you again.
22	And then the tribunal said:	22	But we submit that this is the correct approach in
23	" [it] is foreseeable when there is a reasonable	23	cases such as the present, particularly the express
24	prospect, as stated by the Tidewater tribunal, that	24	recognition by the Cascade tribunal that the state might
25	a measure which may give rise to a treaty claim will	25	adopt measure X, rather than measure Y, against
23	a measure which may give rise to a treaty claim will	23	adopt measure A, ramer than measure 1, against
	Page 45		Page 47
11.44 1		11.47 1	a hardrangum d of a detenionating neletionship between the
11:44 1	materialise."	11:47 1	a background of a deteriorating relationship between the investor and the host state; and the investor who seeks
2	So the tribunal didn't consider it necessary that Philip Morris Asia could foresee the plain packaging	2	to bring a claim in respect of measure X, rather than
3 4		3	
4		4	
	measure. It could have been some other measure that	4	measure Y, is no less guilty of an abuse.
5	interfered with their investment, such as another	5	measure Y, is no less guilty of an abuse. (Slide 25) This is also the way that the awards in
5 6	interfered with their investment, such as another tobacco control measure having an equivalent effect.	5 6	measure Y, is no less guilty of an abuse. (Slide 25) This is also the way that the awards in Alverley, RLA-71, and Ipek, RLA-99, should be correctly
5 6 7	interfered with their investment, such as another tobacco control measure having an equivalent effect. In any [event], we have to recall that the facts of	5 6 7	measure Y, is no less guilty of an abuse. (Slide 25) This is also the way that the awards in Alverley, RLA-71, and Ipek, RLA-99, should be correctly understood.
5 6 7 8	interfered with their investment, such as another tobacco control measure having an equivalent effect. In any [event], we have to recall that the facts of this case were peculiar, as I explained in opening, in	5 6 7 8	measure Y, is no less guilty of an abuse. (Slide 25) This is also the way that the awards in Alverley, RLA-71, and Ipek, RLA-99, should be correctly understood. The Alverley tribunal expressly recognised that
5 6 7 8 9	interfered with their investment, such as another tobacco control measure having an equivalent effect. In any [event], we have to recall that the facts of this case were peculiar, as I explained in opening, in that a very specific measure had in fact be announced by	5 6 7 8 9	measure Y, is no less guilty of an abuse. (Slide 25) This is also the way that the awards in Alverley, RLA-71, and Ipek, RLA-99, should be correctly understood. The Alverley tribunal expressly recognised that disputes may evolve over time, such that:
5 6 7 8 9	interfered with their investment, such as another tobacco control measure having an equivalent effect. In any [event], we have to recall that the facts of this case were peculiar, as I explained in opening, in that a very specific measure had in fact be announced by Australia, and draft legislation had been published	5 6 7 8 9	measure Y, is no less guilty of an abuse. (Slide 25) This is also the way that the awards in Alverley, RLA-71, and Ipek, RLA-99, should be correctly understood. The Alverley tribunal expressly recognised that disputes may evolve over time, such that: " it is not necessary that every contour of the
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5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	interfered with their investment, such as another tobacco control measure having an equivalent effect. In any [event], we have to recall that the facts of this case were peculiar, as I explained in opening, in that a very specific measure had in fact be announced by Australia, and draft legislation had been published in the form of the exposure draft of the plain packaging bill well in advance. But even so, the test, as	5 6 7 8 9 10 11	measure Y, is no less guilty of an abuse. (Slide 25) This is also the way that the awards in Alverley, RLA-71, and Ipek, RLA-99, should be correctly understood. The Alverley tribunal expressly recognised that disputes may evolve over time, such that: " it is not necessary that every contour of the dispute as it is eventually laid before an arbitral tribunal has to be foreseeable."
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16 (Pages 45 to 48)

11 40 -		11.51	
11:48 1	So it cannot be right that this award in any way	11:51 1	well-established rules and principles of treaty
2		2	interpretation.
3	1	3	Should the Tribunal nevertheless itself propose to
4		4	request a joint interpretation from the AANZFTA treaty
5		5	parties, the Respondent would respectfully ask the
6	•	6	Tribunal to consult the parties prior to issuing any
7	ž	7	such request, particularly identifying the specific
8		8	provision or provisions of AANZFTA on which a joint
9	č	9	interpretation might be requested, and the proposed
10		10	terms of any request.
11 12		11 12	Thank you, Madam President, members of the Tribunal.
13			That concludes my answer to that question. THE PRESIDENT: We thank you for this answer. And we trust,
13		13 14	of course, that you have paid careful attention to the
15		15	wording of Article 27(2), which is the reason why we
16		16	asked the question. Once more:
		17	"The tribunal shall request a joint
17 18		18	
18		19	interpretation of any provision of this Agreement that is in issue in a dispute."
20		20	It's quite a broad scope. And it's mandatory
20		20	language: it says, "The tribunal shall".
22		22	I am just emphasising this because we will have to
23		23	assess what exactly our task is under the treaty and of
23		23	course take this into account, and we will necessarily
25		25	also take into account the disputing parties' views.
23	OI AAIVZITA.	23	also take into account the disputing parties views.
	Page 49		Page 51
11:50 1	As the Tribunal observed in its question, when it	11:53 1	MR CLARKE: Thank you, Madam President.
2	previously raised this matter in October 2023, neither	2	THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
3	the Respondent nor the Claimant proposed to request	3	Should we take a break now? How much more time do
4	a joint interpretation at that time. And,	4	you think you will spend, now being started?
5	Madam President, members of the Tribunal, the position	5	DR DONAGHUE: Madam President, contrary to my initial
6	of the Respondent on this issue has not changed. At	6	assessment, I think we will take our two hours. But
7	this advanced procedural stage of the arbitration,	7	that is now only, by my reckoning, about 35 minutes from
8	Australia does not propose to request a joint	8	now. So if you would prefer us just to continue and
9	interpretation.	9	complete, then we're content to do that. But we're
10		10	THE PRESIDENT: We can certainly continue. Let me look at
11	, , ,	11	the court reporter. (Pause)
12			
		12	DR DONAGHUE: I wasn't seeking to press the Tribunal to take
13	need to resolve. The Respondent has full confidence in	13	that course. We're happy either way.
13 14	need to resolve. The Respondent has full confidence in the Tribunal completing this important task without	13 14	that course. We're happy either way. THE PRESIDENT: No, that's fine. Let's move on then.
13 14 15	need to resolve. The Respondent has full confidence in the Tribunal completing this important task without needing to request a joint interpretation.	13 14 15	that course. We're happy either way. THE PRESIDENT: No, that's fine. Let's move on then. DR DONAGHUE: Thank you.
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17 (Pages 49 to 52) Amended by the parties

Wednesday, 18 September 2024

11:54 1	2022, RLA-29, paragraph 147.	11:57 1	paragraph 364 that where a respondent alleges an abuse
2	(Slide 29) In any event, the Claimant has readily	2	of process:
3	accepted that it bears this burden, as shown on the	3	" a claimant may not simply shield itself behind
4	current slide.	4	the fact that the burden is on the respondent."
5	But the Claimant has fallen well short of	5	Evidence on matters such as "the motive for
6	discharging the burden of showing it made a contribution	6	a transfer of assets and the nature of the corporate
7	or that it assumed a risk. Take two examples from	7	structure are possessed by the claimant", which
8	yesterday alone.	8	therefore "bear[s] the burden of adducing evidence to
9	First, in relation to Zeph's argument that it has	9	explain its actions evidence to which it alone has
10	contributed to Mineralogy through so-called "active	10	access".
11	management", Dr Donaghue asked Mr Palmer why Zeph had	11	(Slide 33) How have these principles played out in
12	not asked Ms Emily Palmer, Mr Sheridan, Mr Wong and	12	this case? Madam President, allow me to show you
13	Ms Singh to present evidence of their roles. Mr Palmer	13	Procedural Order No. 4, and specifically the grounds on
14	responded:	14	which the Claimant resisted many of the Respondent's
15	"None of your people have approached them and asked	15	requests for document production.
16	them would they be a witness, which you could have."	16	As part of its so-called "Over[arching] Objection",
17	That's at the transcript of yesterday, page 241,	17	the Claimant expressly recognised that on the rationales
18	line 25. But the onus was not on Australia to adduce	18	for the restructure, it bore the burden of proof. In
19	this evidence.	19	this response, which is now on the screen, the Claimant
20	Secondly, on the reinvesting dividends argument,	20	was telling the Tribunal that there was no need to order
21	Mr Birkett conceded yesterday that he had no evidence	21	it to produce documents: it, the Claimant, already had
22	that Zeph had turned its mind to this issue at all; see	22	every incentive to provide any documents it had because,
23	pages 284 to 286 of the draft transcript. Zeph has not	23	unsurprisingly, it was required to prove its own
24	otherwise offered any evidence of decision-making	24	commercial rationale.
25	specifically by Zeph as opposed to Mr Palmer, as the	25	(Slides 34-35) It made similar statements
	Page 53		Page 55
11:56 1	controller of the Mineralogy Group on the question of	11:59 1	specifically in relation to Australia's request 3,
2	retained earnings. Given its burden of proving it has	2	concerning the purpose of the corporate restructuring,
3	made an investment, this lack of evidence is fatal to	3	as well as requests 4 and 8, each concerning aspects of
4	its argument.	4	the availability of financing for coal projects from
5	Australia accepts that it formally bears the burden	5	Singaporean banks.
6	in relation to its denial of benefits and abuse of	6	Given those statements, it really is remarkable that
7	process objections. But, given the Claimant's unique	7	Zeph has been unable to provide a cogent explanation,
8	access to facts and evidence relevant to these	8	let alone one supported by evidence, for the
9	objections, the appropriate approach to the burden of	9	restructuring.
10	proof is more nuanced than that.	10	(Slide 36) It gave the same response to Australia's
11	(Slide 30) In relation to denial of benefits, this	11	request 14, which concerned due diligence reports and
12	was confirmed in AMTO v Ukraine, RLA-72, paragraph 65,	12	business valuations by Zeph relating to the Kleenmatic
13	which undoubtedly the Tribunal is well familiar with.	13	and the engineering companies. And yet, to this day,
14	That tribunal referred to the "negative inferences"	14	Zeph has not been able to explain its involvement in
15	which a tribunal could draw against a claimant which	15	these companies, and has instead resorted to
16	does not provide evidence of those matters; "those	16	increasingly outlandish explanations.
17	matters" including its activities within its home	17	For example, yesterday Mr Palmer suggested for the
18	jurisdiction.	18	first time that the urgency of incorporating Zeph was
19	(Slide 31) In Bridgestone v Panama, being RLA-30,	19	driven by the need to acquire the three failing
20	the tribunal stated at paragraph 289 that the burden	20	engineering companies, which he saw as "a good
21	would be readily shifted to a claimant on "matters that	21	opportunity", despite having no documented due
22 23	fall essentially within [its] knowledge". (Slide 32) That same approach applies in relation to	22 23	diligence. That's at page 35 of yesterday's transcript.
23	Australia's abuse of process objection. In the Alverley	23 24	When Dr Donaghue asked him why he had never given this evidence in his seven witness statements in these
25	v Romania case, RLA-71, the tribunal explained at	24 25	proceedings, Mr Palmer answered:
2.5	. Tomana caso, rest 11, aic atomiai explanaea ai	23	proceedings, the rannor answered.
	Page 54		Page 56
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18 (Pages 53 to 56)

12:00 1	"Well, you've never asked me before."	12:03 1	back to the legal submissions that Professor Brown has
2	That's page 36, line 12.	2	already made in the context of question 3, because the
3	But on issues where Zeph is required to explain and	3	legal framework obviously affects the factual connecting
4	evidence its behaviour, there is no question of it	4	factors that need to exist.
5	needing to be asked.	5	As Professor Brown explains, we contend that where
6	Zeph has attacked Australia's evidence on the ground	6	one has the same state actors, the same investment
7	that its multiple expert witnesses, as well as	7	company, the same investment contract as in the State
8	Mr Vickers, weren't there on the ground with Zeph, and	8	Agreement underlying the matter, the same personnel
9	thus can't speak to the facts.	9	at the heart of the dispute Premier McGowan on the
10		10	one hand, Mr Palmer on the other that they are all
11	recognised, of course a respondent state isn't witness	11	relevant. So if the Tribunal accepts that legal
12	-	12	framework that Professor Brown has just developed, then
13		13	that broadens out the range of connective factors that
14		14	are relevant to the answer to question 2. We submit
15	* *	15	that here you have overlap on all of those matters.
16		16	Of course, as Professor Brown also developed, in
17	relevant experience, to take an objective look at the	17	point of time, you have the "BSIOP dispute", if I can
18		18	call it that, that goes right back to 2012, and that
19		19	continues until the Amendment Act. So it's
20		20	a long-running dispute; broader in point of time than
21	in light of the rationales presented by the Claimant.	21	the CITIC proposal, relating in part to an issue under
22		22	the same State Agreement, in relation to an area of land
23		23	closely proximate to the BSIOP area of land, and
24		24	involving as I'll come to develop in just a moment
25	evidence by individuals who it felt possessed the	25	at least some level of shared facilities with the
23	evidence by individuals who it left possessed the	23	at least some level of shared facilities with the
	Page 57		Page 59
12:02 1	necessary credentials. It also could have	12:05 1	Balmoral proposal. So there is some evidence that the
2	cross-examined Australia's experts. When it came to	2	Tribunal hasn't yet seen that I'll take you to that
3	Mr Vickers, it could have provided documents showing,	3	shows those levels of proximity.
4	for example, that Zeph did have a real physical presence	4	But the overlap with people, the overlap with time
5	in Singapore at its registered addresses. But it did	5	and the overlap in the general subject matter are all
6	none of those things.	6	important, in our submission, because where those
7	Instead, what we heard from Mr Palmer yesterday is	7	matters aren't present, it's not difficult to untangle
8	that he hadn't even read Australia's evidence. See the	8	facts; but where they are, where the same people are
9	draft transcript at page 37, line 5; page 38, line 21;	9	doing thing at the same time in relation to multiple
10	page 87, line 23; and page 161, line 5.	10	different matters, you have the problem that events in
11	Madam President, I will now hand over to the	11	the real world don't come with subheadings or with
12	Solicitor-General, Dr Donaghue.	12	labels. So when people are speaking, and in what
13	THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.	13	Mr Palmer called a "war" yesterday, between himself and
14	DR DONAGHUE: Thank you, Madam President, members of	14	Western Australia, there aren't clear demarcation lines,
15	the Tribunal.	15	necessarily, as to who might get damaged in particular
16	(Slide 37) Can I start with question 2. The	16	salvos, if I can continue that analogy.
17	Tribunal will recall that that question asks us again to	17	So here we submit and I know the Tribunal has
18	make some assumptions to assume the Tribunal views	18	this point, so I won't waste too much of our time
19	the facts on the record as showing two streams of	19	repeating it. But you will recall I took Mr Palmer
20	events: one stream linked to the disagreement with the	20	yesterday and I won't take the Tribunal back to it
21	CITIC parties and one stream relating to the	21	now to Exhibit R-90, which was a document from
22	disagreement about the BSIOP proposal and, under this	22	Mineralogy on 6 August 2018 submitting the notice of
23	assumption, asks about the connecting factors that may	23	arbitration that instituted what led to the second
24	exist between those two streams.	24	McHugh award. So that was Mineralogy stating in terms
25	Can I start my answer to that question by referring	25	with Western Australia, "We are in dispute with you as
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	Page 58		Page 60
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19 (Pages 57 to 60)

12:06 1	to our entitlement to damages under the BSIOP proposal".	12:09 1	foreseeing unilateral action against Mineralogy with
2	Obviously, because that's the second award, it takes	2	respect to Balmoral South. But he didn't foresee that
3	its place in what was already a very long-term decline	3	because Premier McGowan made another threat, made
4	of relationships between Mineralogy and Western	4	a threat in relation to Balmoral. Nothing happened in
5	Australia. But it does mean that only a few months	5	October to precipitate that letter except the making of
6	before the restructure took place, Mineralogy had	6	the award. The threat that Mr Palmer was responding to
7	instituted a formal arbitral proceeding about damages	7	in drafting that letter about Balmoral and the McHugh
8	under Balmoral with respect to Balmoral South, and that	8	award was the November threat that had been made
9	dispute was there at the same time as the CITIC dispute,	9	originally by Premier McGowan. There was no further
10	which was the immediate subject matter for Premier	10	or
11	McGowan to announce in the Western Australian Parliament	11	So it wasn't so much that Mr Palmer was seeing CITIC
12	that, with the support of the opposition, they were	12	as in a silo from Balmoral. Premier McGowan makes
13	looking at unilaterally amending the State Agreement.	13	a threat about unilateral amendments, and Mr Palmer sees
14	And notwithstanding Mr Palmer's repeated references	14	that threat as extending to his victory in the second
15	yesterday to an academic paper provided by a former	15	McHugh award in a way that warrants the shot across the
16	Premier of Western Australia in the mid-1990s, we had	16	bow represented by the letter one sees at R-145.
17	proximate statements by the current Premier, with the	17	Can I just ask the operator to bring up Mr Palmer's
18	support of the current opposition leader, that expressly	18	answers about this. I think it is G/2/41 (Day 2),
19	threatened unilateral amendment of the State Agreement.	19	page 147 of the transcript, or actually starting on
20	Now, Mr Palmer says it was inconceivable that that	20	page 146 at line 8. So I put to Mr Palmer:
21	would ever happen. But in our submission, it was very	21	" that's the same language as appears in the
22	conceivable that it would happen, because it was being	22	4 February letter[?]"
23	announced as a prospect with bipartisan support in the	23	We're discussing Exhibit R-145. And he says:
24	Western Australian Parliament.	24	"And it was written for the same reasons."
25	Once that's on the table as something that the	25	So he's saying he was writing about Balmoral for the
	Page 61		Page 63
12:08 1	Western Australian Parliament might be prepared to do,	12:11 1	same reasons as he'd written on 4 February in making the
2	in my submission it's necessarily on the table in	2	first threat that Zeph would bring investor-state
3	relation to any problems under the State Agreement,	3	proceedings.
4	including the very long-running problems relating to the	4	Then over the page at 147:
5	BSIOP. That may not have been the trigger for the	5	"Question: What it shows is that in October 2019,
6	immediate announcement, but once that tool is on the	6	you were contemplating the possibility that there might
7	table, in our submission, it's not hard to see that the	7	be a legislative interference with the awards made by
8	tool might be deployed in relation to any of the	8	Michael McHugh?
9	dimensions of the ongoing disagreements between	9	"Answer: I was contemplating that the Premier had
10	Western Australia and Mineralogy.	10	said in Parliament that he planned to do this
11	In strong support of that submission is the fact	11	interfere with the agreement back in 2018"
12	that this is exactly how Mr Palmer himself understood	12	And I said:
13	it. You will recall that I took Mr Palmer to a letter	13	" just [to] clarify: 'to do this' [you mean] to
	that he signed on 15 October 2019 (R-145), four days	14	unilaterally amend the State Agreement?"
14	•	1	
15	after the second McHugh award was granted. It was	15	Mr Palmer said:
	after the second McHugh award was granted. It was a letter evidently copied from the 4 February letter,		Mr Palmer said: "To repeal unilaterally the State Agreement [that's
15 16 17	after the second McHugh award was granted. It was a letter evidently copied from the 4 February letter, Exhibit R-141, which was the first threatened	15 16 17	Mr Palmer said: "To repeal unilaterally the State Agreement [that's what I meant]."
15 16 17 18	after the second McHugh award was granted. It was a letter evidently copied from the 4 February letter, Exhibit R-141, which was the first threatened investor-state proceeding on behalf of Mineralogy.	15 16 17 18	Mr Palmer said: "To repeal unilaterally the State Agreement [that's what I meant]." So he viewed the threat as extending across the
15 16 17 18 19	after the second McHugh award was granted. It was a letter evidently copied from the 4 February letter, Exhibit R-141, which was the first threatened investor-state proceeding on behalf of Mineralogy. The text is almost identical, except for the first	15 16 17 18 19	Mr Palmer said: "To repeal unilaterally the State Agreement [that's what I meant]." So he viewed the threat as extending across the board to issues between Mineralogy and WA, and the
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15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	after the second McHugh award was granted. It was a letter evidently copied from the 4 February letter, Exhibit R-141, which was the first threatened investor-state proceeding on behalf of Mineralogy. The text is almost identical, except for the first paragraph. And it expressly says, "Zeph is concerned that the State not act in a way that will undermine our right to damages pursuant to the second McHugh award". Now, the critical thing about that letter that's a very important letter, in our submission, because it	15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	Mr Palmer said: "To repeal unilaterally the State Agreement [that's what I meant]." So he viewed the threat as extending across the board to issues between Mineralogy and WA, and the letter at [R-]145 supports that. So in terms of connective tissue between the two disputes, we submit that because Mr Palmer and Premier McGowan were, to use Mr Palmer's words, "butting heads", they were at war over all of these issues, a new

20 (Pages 61 to 64)

12:12	1 relationship, which was, "If you don't play ball, we	12:15 1	being done with respect to the port; or there were
	will legislate unilaterally to take away your rights",	2	proposals extended to things that CITIC wanted to do,
	that can't just be put in the box of CITIC; it was	3	rather, with respect to the port.
	4 broader.	4	Now, I emphasise that because if one then goes to
	5 That's all by way of material the Tribunal had	5	the next document, which is C-196
	6 already seen; can I just alert you to a few other	6	THE PRESIDENT: Just to make sure that we get the reference
	documents you may not have.	7	right, this is R-113, page 33; is that what it is?
	8 Can we first bring up R-113, which is E2/113/10.	8	DR DONAGHUE: I think 32, but
	9 This is the mine continuation proposal that CITIC had	9	THE PRESIDENT: But it's R-113?
	submitted in December 2017. So this is the revised	10	DR DONAGHUE: R-113, that is correct.
	version. It was initially submitted in 2016; a revised	11	THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
	12 version in 2017.	12	DR DONAGHUE: If we could next bring up C-196. I think it
	13 If the operator could then bring up so it's	13	is E1/196/1085.
	14 E2/113/10, I hope. You can see near the bottom of that	14	Now, this document I think I've actually probably
	page, the last paragraph:	15	taken you well into the text. But the front page of
	16 "Mineralogy"	16	this document shows that it is the Balmoral South Iron
	So this is CITIC writing this:	17	Ore Project proposal for the Western Australian
	"Mineralogy raised a concern with respect to the	18	Government, dated August 2012. So this is the original
	interaction between this Proposal"	19	Balmoral South proposal.
	The mine continuation proposal:	20	And if we go back to the page I specified, which was
	" and the proposed Balmoral South Iron Ore	21	1085, you can see 1.[10], "Common land use":
2	Project particularly in relation to the proposed	22	"This section has been prepared in accordance with
2	location of the Port stockyard layout at Cape Preston."	23	Clause 6(2) of the [State Agreement]. It describes
2	24 That's the shipping facility that Mr Palmer referred	24	areas of common use land and facilities required for the
2	to a number of times, where you ship the ore out of the	25	BSIOP.
	Prov. 65		D (7
	Page 65		Page 67
12:14	1 area.	12:17 1	The SIP"
		12:17 1 2	
2			The SIP" Which is defined at the top of the page, Sino Iron Project:
	2 "To address Mineralogy's concerns, Sino Iron and	2	Which is defined at the top of the page, Sino Iron
2	 "To address Mineralogy's concerns, Sino Iron and Korean Steel have modified the proposed configuration of 	2 3	Which is defined at the top of the page, Sino Iron Project:
2	 "To address Mineralogy's concerns, Sino Iron and Korean Steel have modified the proposed configuration of [the] stockyard" 	2 3 4	Which is defined at the top of the page, Sino Iron Project: " will be entering into production within the
2	 "To address Mineralogy's concerns, Sino Iron and Korean Steel have modified the proposed configuration of [the] stockyard" So CITIC is saying, "Well, we've addressed the 	2 3 4 5	Which is defined at the top of the page, Sino Iron Project: " will be entering into production within the next 6 to 12 months."
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	 "To address Mineralogy's concerns, Sino Iron and Korean Steel have modified the proposed configuration of [the] stockyard" So CITIC is saying, "Well, we've addressed the problem". But Mineralogy continued not to agree to approve this proposal, so evidently it was not satisfied that CITIC had successfully addressed its difficulty. 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	Which is defined at the top of the page, Sino Iron Project: " will be entering into production within the next 6 to 12 months." This is back in 2012. "Under commercial agreements with Mineralogy that govern the development, operation and use of shared
2 2 3 3 4 3 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4	"To address Mineralogy's concerns, Sino Iron and Korean Steel have modified the proposed configuration of [the] stockyard" So CITIC is saying, "Well, we've addressed the problem". But Mineralogy continued not to agree to approve this proposal, so evidently it was not satisfied that CITIC had successfully addressed its difficulty. In this same document, if we bring up E2/113/[32], you can see a map. I'm not sure that the Tribunal has seen one of these maps before, and it's entirely our	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	Which is defined at the top of the page, Sino Iron Project: " will be entering into production within the next 6 to 12 months." This is back in 2012. "Under commercial agreements with Mineralogy that govern the development, operation and use of shared infrastructure facilities for the transport and export of iron ore products, the SIP and BSIOP will share existing common infrastructure, with BSIOP extending
2 2 3 3 4 3 4 4 1 1 1	"To address Mineralogy's concerns, Sino Iron and Korean Steel have modified the proposed configuration of [the] stockyard" So CITIC is saying, "Well, we've addressed the problem". But Mineralogy continued not to agree to approve this proposal, so evidently it was not satisfied that CITIC had successfully addressed its difficulty. In this same document, if we bring up E2/113/[32], you can see a map. I'm not sure that the Tribunal has seen one of these maps before, and it's entirely our fault. Late in the piece, we thought the Tribunal might	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	Which is defined at the top of the page, Sino Iron Project: " will be entering into production within the next 6 to 12 months." This is back in 2012. "Under commercial agreements with Mineralogy that govern the development, operation and use of shared infrastructure facilities for the transport and export of iron ore products, the SIP and BSIOP will share existing common infrastructure, with BSIOP extending those facilities as required."
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21 (Pages 65 to 68)

12:18 1	On the first page, you can see a list, in the second	12:21 1	So that, we submit, is another illustration of
2	half of the page, of the parties. Sino Iron,	2	connective tissue, which supports the primary argument
3	Korean Steel and CITIC are suing: (1) Mineralogy;	3	I made and the propositions that I put based on R-145.
4	(2) Mr Palmer; and (3) the State of Western Australia.	4	That's all I propose to say in answer to question 2.
5	So while it is true that this was litigation between	5	Can I use our last ten minutes to make some pretty brief
6	CITIC and Mineralogy, it is not true that Western	6	overarching observations about some of the key
7	Australia were out of the picture. They were a party to	7	evidentiary issues as they relate to point in contest
8	this litigation and they were represented by senior	8	between the parties.
9	counsel, KC, or SC in Western Australia. So they were	9	The first is and these points all really go to
10	there as a participant in the litigation.	10	a combination of the denial of benefits objection and
11	I obviously can't and the Tribunal doesn't need	11	the abuse objection. I will rely on what Mr Wordsworth
12	to go to all of the detail of this. But the judge,	12	already said about "no investor"/"no investment" and the
13	Justice Kenneth Martin, had to deal with a lot of the	13	evidence that fell from Mr Palmer about that.
14	alleged problems between Mineralogy and CITIC in respect	14	The first point is that while the evidence has
15	of the mine continuation proposal.	15	journeyed broadly across various explanations for the
16	If the operator could take us forward to page 85, so	16	restructure and various explanations for the urgency of
17	F1/70/85. Sorry, if we go to the previous page first,	17	the restructure, it happily landed on a clear statement
18	you can see that the judge is describing "Key functional	18	from Mr Palmer that he agreed that Zeph was incorporated
19	components of the 2017 [mine continuation proposal]";	19	in a situation of urgency in January 2019. He said that
20	that's the first document I showed you.	20	at G/2/13 (Day 2), which is page 34 of the transcript,
21	Then if we could go back over to paragraph (d), you	21	and it was quite unequivocal.
22	will see:	22	So Zeph was incorporated urgently in January 2019.
23	" an increase in the capacity for existing stock	23	Why? Well, as I say, we've had a lot of reasons in the
24	piles and associated infrastructure at the Sino Iron	24	seven witness statements from Mr Palmer; or not in all
25	Terminal Facility situated within Mineralogy's"	25	of them, but I think in four of them. The reasons for
	Page 69		Page 71
12:20 1	That's one of Mineralogy's tenements.	12:23 1	the urgency that we were given yesterday were wholly
12:20 1 2	That's one of Mineralogy's tenements. "This aspect of the MCPs also carries acquisition of	12:23 1 2	the urgency that we were given yesterday were wholly new.
2	"This aspect of the MCPs also carries acquisition of	2	new.
2 3	"This aspect of the MCPs also carries acquisition of extra tenure ramifications, manifested in the context of	2 3	new. The business opportunity provided by the engineering
2 3 4	"This aspect of the MCPs also carries acquisition of extra tenure ramifications, manifested in the context of Mineralogy's long-standing and openly communicated plan	2 3 4	new. The business opportunity provided by the engineering companies, that's again page 34 of the transcript, and
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2 3 4 5 6	"This aspect of the MCPs also carries acquisition of extra tenure ramifications, manifested in the context of Mineralogy's long-standing and openly communicated plan to [expand the] multi-user export facility at Cape Preston. The extra areas at the Cape Preston Port	2 3 4 5 6	new. The business opportunity provided by the engineering companies, that's again page 34 of the transcript, and the need urgently to purchase industrial property in an industrial estate in Christchurch in New Zealand as
2 3 4 5 6 7	"This aspect of the MCPs also carries acquisition of extra tenure ramifications, manifested in the context of Mineralogy's long-standing and openly communicated plan to [expand the] multi-user export facility at Cape Preston. The extra areas at the Cape Preston Port proposed to be used for greater volumes of stockpiling	2 3 4 5 6 7	new. The business opportunity provided by the engineering companies, that's again page 34 of the transcript, and the need urgently to purchase industrial property in an industrial estate in Christchurch in New Zealand as to MIL: in our submission, both of those, that shifted
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22 (Pages 69 to 72)

12:24 1			
	As to the absence of due diligence, Mr Palmer said,	12:27 1	unassisted recall of a 16-year-old conversation, said to
2	"Well, SGD 3.5 million is trivial to me". But then	2	have occurred in Singapore in 2008, with lawyers who
3	almost in the next breath, he says, "But I acquired	3	were there to talk about an IPO. It's not a strong
4	an \$11 million property in New Zealand because it gave	4	foundation for saying he needed to incorporate
5	me great financial comfort to have some assets offshore	5	a Singaporean company.
6	in a different jurisdiction". Not only is that a very	6	So he didn't need a Singaporean company. There are
7	difficult answer to accept on its face, given the value	7	no contemporaneous documents to suggest that the
8	of Mineralogy in the hundreds of millions of dollars,	8	reasoning had anything to do with coal finance. The
9	and not only was it not an explanation he's ever given	9	coal finance rationale does not explain the urgency at
10	before, but there's an evident tension between saying,	10	all, because Waratah Coal was years away from being
11	on the one hand, "I wouldn't even blink if I lose	11	ready to be funded, as Mr Rogers explains in some detail
12	3.5 million", and then saying, "I get significant	12	in his reports.
13	comfort from 11 million", in the next breath.	13	Fourth, as Mr Rogers also explains, publicly
14	Now, what Mr Palmer had said in his witness	14	available lending policies of the banks, on the one
15	statement, in his first witness statement at	15	hand, with respect to new thermal coal projects, and the
16	paragraph 131, is that when the Chinese Government	16	amount of debt that was sought to be raised which
17	lodged an appeal from the royalties judgment, he	17	Mr Palmer says was 8 billion, in circumstances where
18	concluded that the appropriate and prudent course was to	18	less than 300 million had been loaned globally across,
19	wait for the judgment, because that judgment was worth	19	I think, the last 20 years both of those
20	at least hundreds of millions, and I think he said in	20	considerations cause Mr Rogers to explain that even
21	answer to me yesterday actually billions of dollars to	21	a cursory examination of the issue would have made it
22	Mineralogy.	22	plain that there was no prospect of raising debt finance
23	Having made a decision that you shouldn't	23	for Waratah Coal.
24	restructure until you know the outcome of such a very	24	What have you got against that? Almost nothing.
25	substantial revenue stream, the proposition that you	25	You've got a press report in The Straits Times,
	D 72		
	Page 73		Page 75
12:26 1	change your plans to acquire failing engineering	12:28 1	which refers to the same database that Mr Rogers looks
2	companies or an industrial property in New Zealand is	2	at. But when Mr Rogers interrogates the Straits Times
3	ridiculous.	3	article, mostly it was about coal power stations;
4	The Tribunal should, in our submission, accept that	4	it wasn't about coal mines at all.
5	the urgency that Mr Palmer now agrees attended the	5	
6		5	You've got reliance on the Coal-Fired Power Bill,
	incorporation of Zeph is only able to be explained by	6	You've got reliance on the Coal-Fired Power Bill, which I put to Mr Palmer, which just had nothing to do
7	the fact that there was an imminent threat, as he saw		
7 8		6	which I put to Mr Palmer, which just had nothing to do
	the fact that there was an imminent threat, as he saw	6 7	which I put to Mr Palmer, which just had nothing to do with the funding of new coal mines at all. So he gave
8	the fact that there was an imminent threat, as he saw it, of unilateral amendment of the State Agreement to Mineralogy's disadvantage; that the attempt to acquire treaty protection against that threat in New Zealand had	6 7 8	which I put to Mr Palmer, which just had nothing to do with the funding of new coal mines at all. So he gave you, as one of the three main reasons for restructuring his corporate group to Singapore, a bill which he said he studied, and which evidently, on its face, is about
8 9	the fact that there was an imminent threat, as he saw it, of unilateral amendment of the State Agreement to Mineralogy's disadvantage; that the attempt to acquire treaty protection against that threat in New Zealand had failed because of the side agreement between Australia	6 7 8 9 10	which I put to Mr Palmer, which just had nothing to do with the funding of new coal mines at all. So he gave you, as one of the three main reasons for restructuring his corporate group to Singapore, a bill which he said he studied, and which evidently, on its face, is about Commonwealth Government funding for power stations, not
8 9 10 11 12	the fact that there was an imminent threat, as he saw it, of unilateral amendment of the State Agreement to Mineralogy's disadvantage; that the attempt to acquire treaty protection against that threat in New Zealand had failed because of the side agreement between Australia and New Zealand, and so he needed a Singaporean company.	6 7 8 9 10 11	which I put to Mr Palmer, which just had nothing to do with the funding of new coal mines at all. So he gave you, as one of the three main reasons for restructuring his corporate group to Singapore, a bill which he said he studied, and which evidently, on its face, is about Commonwealth Government funding for power stations, not about private funding for coal mines. So that
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23 (Pages 73 to 76)

12:30 1	the restructure to achieve that, because you could	12:32 1 stage?
2	control when dividends were paid?"	2 (12.33 pm)
3	And he said:	3 Questions from TRIBUNAL
4	"Exactly on that point, there was no urgency to	4 MR KIRTLEY: My only question would be where you draw
5	do it."	5 the line in terms of when a restructuring can take
6	So it's accepted it doesn't explain the urgency	6 place. When do you draw the line? I think it is
7	because he could control the dividends. He accepts that	7 accepted by Australia that a restructuring can take
8	he didn't even raise the plan with his wife until two	8 place in order to take advantage of treaty protection.
9	and a half years later, at which point it was	9 But at what point does that become abusive?
10	immediately vetoed.	10 PROFESSOR BROWN: Thank you for the question, Mr Kirtle
11	And there was evidence that Mr Palmer wasn't able to	11 I think it would be simply through application of
12		the tests that have been developed through tribunals,
13		such as the Philip Morris Asia tribunal. If there's
14		14 an existing dispute, obviously, at the time of the
15		restructure, that's something that would be abusive.
16	•	16 And where there's a foreseeable dispute, and the purpose
17	think, and no evidence, that to satisfy the residency	of the restructure is in order to gain treaty
18	requirements, even if you needed to put some money into	18 protection, then through that test of foreseeability, as
19	the economy, that the only way to do that was to	19 I developed in my submissions earlier today, that would
20		20 also be abusive; including in that sort of situation
20	Obviously Mr Palmer had money available that he could	where there are potentially two disagreements, or
22	·	22 a second disagreement can be developed.
23	some kind, if that were necessary. And he didn't even	23 That would be the orthodox application of the
23	seek advice about what he needed to do until 2004.	24 principles that have been developed by tribunals.
25	So, given that it doesn't explain the urgency and	25 MR KIRTLEY: Okay, thank you.
23	50, given that it doesn't explain the digency and	25 WIK KIKTLE 1. Okay, thank you.
	Page 77	Page 79
		44.04 4 5775 5575 5775 577 577 577 577 577 5
12:31 1	you didn't need a corporate restructure, in our	12:34 1 THE PRESIDENT: Fine. If there's nothing further for now,
2	submission, that rationale fails as well.	we can take the lunch break.
2 3	submission, that rationale fails as well. So you have ultimately, at the end of the day,	 we can take the lunch break. I said yesterday that we would take an hour and 15.
2 3 4	submission, that rationale fails as well. So you have ultimately, at the end of the day, an accepted urgent restructure, unexplained by the	 we can take the lunch break. I said yesterday that we would take an hour and 15. If that is still fine with the Claimant, then we could
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2 3 4 5 6	submission, that rationale fails as well. So you have ultimately, at the end of the day, an accepted urgent restructure, unexplained by the reasons that Mr Palmer has given you, but explained completely by the only contemporaneous documents that we	 we can take the lunch break. I said yesterday that we would take an hour and 15. If that is still fine with the Claimant, then we could resume at 2.00. Is this fine? DR KIRK: Yes, thank you.
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25 request for consultation under the treaty. The third Page 81 14:02 1 one is 22 December, when the Respondent announces it is 2 considering denying benefits; that's Exhibit C-153. And 3 the fourth and last one is 14 June 2021, which is 4 Exhibit C-155, which is the actual date of the denial of 5 benefits letter. 6 So we would be assisted if you could comment on 7 these dates and say which one[] may be relevant" 9 THE PRESIDENT: Can I just interrupt you for a logistical 10 point. 11 Is the public webcast on? Because it's not on the 12 screen on which I usually watch it. That's fine. 14:05 1 provision and its operation in practice. 2 I make that submission for the following reason. 3 It makes sense to take the earliest date of the four provided by the Tribunal because the extent to which added to the state in provided by the Tribunal because the extent to which added to the state in provided by the Tribunal because the extent to which added to the state in provided by the Tribunal because the extent to which added to the state in provided by the Tribunal because the extent to which added to the state in provided by the Tribunal because the extent to which added to the state in provided by the Tribunal because the extent to which added to the state in provided by the Tribunal because the extent to which added to the state in provided by the Tribunal because the extent to which added to the state in provided by the Tribunal because the extent to which added to the state in provided by the Tribunal because the extent to which added to the state in provided by the Tribunal because the extent to which added to the state in provided by the Tribunal because the extent to which added to the four provided by the Tribunal because the extent to which added the state in provided by the Tribunal because the extent to which added the state in provided by the Tribunal because the extent to which added the state in the provided by the Tribunal because the extent to which a provided by the Tribunal because the extent to	2	23 13 August 2020: that's the amendment of the Amendment	23	to construction of treaty provisions. The third, and
Page 81 Page 83 14:02 1 one is 22 December, when the Respondent announces it is considering denying benefits; that's Exhibit C-153. And the fourth and last one is 14 June 2021, which is Exhibit C-155, which is the actual date of the denial of benefits letter. So we would be assisted if you could comment on these dates and say which one[] may be relevant" That was the question that The PRESIDENT: Can I just interrupt you for a logistical point. Page 83 14:05 1 provision and its operation in practice. I make that submission for the following reason. It makes sense to take the earliest date of the four provided by the Tribunal because the extent to which an investor falls within a denial of benefits clause should be tested by reference [to] the events at the date of the state's wrongful act. Any later date risks the test which the investor might never be in a positical to meet, given the conduct of the state. The PRESIDENT: Can I just interrupt you for a logistical point. Is the public webcast on? Because it's not on the screen on which I usually watch it. That's fine.	2	Act. The second one is 14 October 2020, which is the	24	aligned with the second, is that the construction is the
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12 screen on which I usually watch it. That's fine. 12 of business, a test which adopts a later date will risk	10		10	For example, if it faced a full expropriation which
				· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
12 Livet wout to be an experience it is a manine.				
		3	13	imposing on an investor a hurdle that would be
				impossible to overcome, because it would never have
15 THE PRESIDENT: Fine. Good. Apologies. 15 a business at the relevant date which is capable of				
				complying with a denial of benefits clause, regardless
has identified 13 August 2020 as the date on which it is 17 of the propriety of its conduct.				
18 appropriate to consider the tests under the denial of 18 That is the point made by the tribunal in Big Sky,				
19 benefits issue, and the Respondent then alighted on that 19 which is Exhibit RLA-85, albeit obiter, at 276, and 20 which is exhibit received and that date. The Chimant has				
20 submission and focused on that date. The Claimant has, 20 without any real discussion of the jurisprudence				
				concerning the various possible points in time at which
22 adopts, the Respondent's objection should be dismissed. 23 Without prejudice to that position, and turning to 24 the test could be assessed. It says: 25 "For this purpose, it does not logically follow that				
Without prejudice to that position, and turning to 23 "For this purpose, it does not logically follow that 24 the Tribunal's question and recognising that what 24 the only relevant date for examining such activities				"For this purpose, it does not logically follow that
the Tribunal's question and recognising that what 24 the only relevant date for examining such activities would be the date of a request for arbitration. It is				•
23 would be the date of a request for arothanic features are correct	2.	Matters here is that the Tribulian reaches the Confect	23	would be the date of a request for arbitration. It is
Page 82 Page 84		Page 82		Page 84
	-		1	

14:07 1	quite a common characteristic of investment treaty	14:10 1	declined, they still traded and existed on all the dates
	arbitrations that by the time a request for arbitration	2	mentioned by the Tribunal. The cleaning joint venture
	* *		
3	is filed, a claimant-investor is fairly or completely	3	was a sizeable, profitable business as at January 2020,
4	inactive aside from the arbitration itself, in large	4	and remains so today. In fact, it has increased its
5	part because of the negative business effects it	5	profitability. Accordingly, there is no material
6	attributes to a host State. Because of this, if the	6	difference in the Claimant's business operations on any
7	only relevant date was the start of an arbitration,	7	of the dates proposed by the Tribunal.
8	then, in theory, a respondent State could assure itself	8	I will now refer to question 2.
9	of protection under the denial of benefits clause as	9	Firstly, I understood Mr Wordsworth raised
10	long as it took such significant action against	10	a question of the connection between the CITIC project
11	a claimant-investor as to completely rid it of any	11	and the litigation between Sino Iron and Mineralogy in
12	current business activities (e.g. a complete and total	12	the Supreme Court of Western Australia. I'll just make
13	expropriation). This simply cannot be the proper	13	a few comments on that.
14	analysis under such a clause, which is why tribunals	14	The first is that both the State and myself and
15	have analyzed business activities more broadly with	15	Mineralogy were defendants in that [case], and
16	respect to the relevant date."	16	Sino Iron, Korean [Steel] and CITIC were the plaintiffs.
17	That approach provides a predictable framework for	17	So it wasn't a dispute between the State of Western
18	the test. And it's consistent with the analysis that	18	Australia and myself.
19	the relevant dispute, for the purposes of the abuse of	19	And secondly, I'd point out here that the State of
20	process test, i.e. if one looks at the specific dispute	20	Western Australia sought no relief, and was not granted
21	which has arisen and considers whether it was	21	any relief, even though we won the judgment; that the
22	foreseeable at the date of incorporation of the relevant	22	plaintiff's action was dismissed; and that the State
23	entity, then one uses the date on which the dispute	23	really was just there as an observer.
24	crystallised for the purpose of the denial of benefits	24	It's appalling that this matter has not been
25	test. It's a sensible, predictable and fair basis on	25	accurately stated by the Respondent.
	_		• • •
	Page 85		Page 87
14.00 1	and the same and the same	14.11 1	I will a company of the agreement of highest of the
14:08 1	which to approach the test.	14:11 1	I will now proceed to answer, on behalf of the
2	It is also a fair approach bearing in mind that the	2	Claimant, question 2.
3	state bears the burden of proving that the requirements	3	In responding to this question, it is the Claimant's respectful position that there are no connecting factors
4	of a denial of benefits clause have been met; a point	4	• •
5	which ought to be emphasised in this instance, given	5	between the CITIC disagreement and the BSIOP
6	that the Respondent has failed to adduce direct factual	6	
			disagreement. Instead, it's important that the Tribunal
7	evidence in support of its position that there was no	7	approaches them as two discrete matters.
8	substantive business being conducted at the material	7 8	approaches them as two discrete matters. The Claimant refers the Tribunal in the first
8 9	substantive business being conducted at the material time. Instead, it relies upon third parties, whether	7 8 9	approaches them as two discrete matters. The Claimant refers the Tribunal in the first instance to its written submissions, and in particular
8 9 10	substantive business being conducted at the material time. Instead, it relies upon third parties, whether experts or investigators, none of whom are in a position	7 8 9 10	approaches them as two discrete matters. The Claimant refers the Tribunal in the first instance to its written submissions, and in particular the section of the Rejoinder starting at paragraph 289,
8 9 10 11	substantive business being conducted at the material time. Instead, it relies upon third parties, whether experts or investigators, none of whom are in a position to comment on the actual business being carried on as	7 8 9 10 11	approaches them as two discrete matters. The Claimant refers the Tribunal in the first instance to its written submissions, and in particular the section of the Rejoinder starting at paragraph 289, in which the disputes are analysed one by one.
8 9 10 11 12	substantive business being conducted at the material time. Instead, it relies upon third parties, whether experts or investigators, none of whom are in a position to comment on the actual business being carried on as direct witnesses.	7 8 9 10 11 12	approaches them as two discrete matters. The Claimant refers the Tribunal in the first instance to its written submissions, and in particular the section of the Rejoinder starting at paragraph 289, in which the disputes are analysed one by one. The best way to deal with this is to start with the
8 9 10 11 12 13	substantive business being conducted at the material time. Instead, it relies upon third parties, whether experts or investigators, none of whom are in a position to comment on the actual business being carried on as direct witnesses. For good order, a similar point well may be made	7 8 9 10 11 12 13	approaches them as two discrete matters. The Claimant refers the Tribunal in the first instance to its written submissions, and in particular the section of the Rejoinder starting at paragraph 289, in which the disputes are analysed one by one. The best way to deal with this is to start with the CITIC dispute. There has perhaps been relatively little
8 9 10 11 12 13 14	substantive business being conducted at the material time. Instead, it relies upon third parties, whether experts or investigators, none of whom are in a position to comment on the actual business being carried on as direct witnesses. For good order, a similar point well may be made about the 14 October 2020 date; from the State's	7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	approaches them as two discrete matters. The Claimant refers the Tribunal in the first instance to its written submissions, and in particular the section of the Rejoinder starting at paragraph 289, in which the disputes are analysed one by one. The best way to deal with this is to start with the CITIC dispute. There has perhaps been relatively little discussion of this, and so hopefully this summary will
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	substantive business being conducted at the material time. Instead, it relies upon third parties, whether experts or investigators, none of whom are in a position to comment on the actual business being carried on as direct witnesses. For good order, a similar point well may be made about the 14 October 2020 date; from the State's perspective, being the date of the request for the	7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	approaches them as two discrete matters. The Claimant refers the Tribunal in the first instance to its written submissions, and in particular the section of the Rejoinder starting at paragraph 289, in which the disputes are analysed one by one. The best way to deal with this is to start with the CITIC dispute. There has perhaps been relatively little discussion of this, and so hopefully this summary will help the Tribunal, as it's crucial to be 100% about
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26 (Pages 85 to 88)

14:13 1	written contracts with Sino Iron and one with	14:16 1	grant tenure to the CITIC parties under the MRSLA, and
2	Korean Steel. These contracts were described as mining	2	no obligation on Mineralogy to submit the MCPs under the
3	right and site lease agreements. I'll call them	3	State Agreement.
4	"MRSLAs" for convenience.	4	Just pausing there, the CITIC claims were purely
5	In 2008, CITIC guaranteed the obligations of	5	commercial disputes between two commercial parties being
6	Korean Steel and Sino Iron under the MRSLAs. However,	6	litigated in the courts. In both cases, the subject
7	from 2013 onwards, following the refusal of the Western	7	matter of the litigation was the interpretation of
8	Australian Government to approve more projects, which	8	rights and obligations under contracts between those
9	was the subject of the domestic arbitration, the	9	parties.
10	relationship between Mineralogy and the CITIC parties	10	Western Australia was not a party to the dispute,
11	deteriorated. The parties became embroiled in a series	11	had no involvement in the contractual aspect of the
12	of commercial disputes. Two of these protracted	12	dispute. No relief was sought against the State in the
13	litigation battles bear mention, in contrast to the	13	CITIC disagreement. The CITIC parties did not seek
14	dispute before the Tribunal.	14	orders compelling the State to force Mineralogy to
15	In 2013, Mineralogy initiated proceedings against	15	submit proposals. It was joined in the proceedings for
16	the CITIC parties in relation to substantial royalties	16	form only, to be kept informed; and joined as
17	under the MRSLA which had not been paid. The dispute	17	a defendant, not as a plaintiff. CITIC's claims
18	turned upon the correct interpretation of the formula	18	concerned proposals yet to be submitted, rather than
19	for the calculation of the royalties under the MRSLA.	19	having already been considered under the
20	Mineralogy's position was vindicated in a judgment	20	State Agreement.
21	delivered by the Western Australian Supreme Court on	21	Despite a measure of political rhetoric, which
22	24 November 2017, which awarded Mineralogy nearly	22	turned out to be entirely empty rhetoric, consistent
23	US\$150 million in unpaid royalties for the period ended	23	with the Claimant's case on foreseeability and my
24	31 December 2013 to 31 March 2017. And on	24	evidence in cross-examination yesterday,
25	9 December 2016, the CITIC parties provided Mineralogy	25	Western Australia did not take any steps to legislate in
	Page 89		Page 91
14:14 1	with a draft mine continuation proposal for the	14:17 1	relation to this dispute.
14:14 1 2	with a draft mine continuation proposal for the expansion of the Sino Iron and Korean Steel projects.	14:17 1 2	relation to this dispute. In terms of the BSIOP matter, Mineralogy and
			-
2	expansion of the Sino Iron and Korean Steel projects.	2	In terms of the BSIOP matter, Mineralogy and
2 3	expansion of the Sino Iron and Korean Steel projects. In December 2017, the CITIC parties submitted a new	2 3	In terms of the BSIOP matter, Mineralogy and International Minerals initiated the BSIOP arbitration
2 3 4	expansion of the Sino Iron and Korean Steel projects. In December 2017, the CITIC parties submitted a new draft proposal to Mineralogy and sought their approval	2 3 4	In terms of the BSIOP matter, Mineralogy and International Minerals initiated the BSIOP arbitration by notice of dispute dated 7 November 2012. The
2 3 4 5	expansion of the Sino Iron and Korean Steel projects. In December 2017, the CITIC parties submitted a new draft proposal to Mineralogy and sought their approval for additional tenements of land without the payment of	2 3 4 5	In terms of the BSIOP matter, Mineralogy and International Minerals initiated the BSIOP arbitration by notice of dispute dated 7 November 2012. The arbitration was commenced under clause 42 of the
2 3 4 5 6	expansion of the Sino Iron and Korean Steel projects. In December 2017, the CITIC parties submitted a new draft proposal to Mineralogy and sought their approval for additional tenements of land without the payment of any money. Under the State Agreement, Mineralogy, as	2 3 4 5 6	In terms of the BSIOP matter, Mineralogy and International Minerals initiated the BSIOP arbitration by notice of dispute dated 7 November 2012. The arbitration was commenced under clause 42 of the State Agreement. The subject of the dispute was that
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8	expansion of the Sino Iron and Korean Steel projects. In December 2017, the CITIC parties submitted a new draft proposal to Mineralogy and sought their approval for additional tenements of land without the payment of any money. Under the State Agreement, Mineralogy, as a co-proponent of any projects being developed on our property, must approve that proposal and the grant of	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	In terms of the BSIOP matter, Mineralogy and International Minerals initiated the BSIOP arbitration by notice of dispute dated 7 November 2012. The arbitration was commenced under clause 42 of the State Agreement. The subject of the dispute was that the Minister for State Development refused to consider the BSIOP proposal for the development of a project
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	expansion of the Sino Iron and Korean Steel projects. In December 2017, the CITIC parties submitted a new draft proposal to Mineralogy and sought their approval for additional tenements of land without the payment of any money. Under the State Agreement, Mineralogy, as a co-proponent of any projects being developed on our property, must approve that proposal and the grant of additional land. However, the CITIC companies refused to negotiate or pay for any additional land that they wanted, and did not offer Mineralogy any payment in return for a substantial additional tenure sought by them. It was in October 2018 that the CITIC parties commenced legal proceedings in the Supreme Court of Western Australia seeking injunctive relief to compel Mineralogy: (1) to grant them additional tenure under the MRSLA for no consideration; and [2] to submit the MCPs as co-proponent under the State Agreement. No tenure was sought, or could be sought, under the State Agreement. This litigation was totally unsuccessful for the CITIC parties in 2023, when the Supreme Court of Western Australia held that there was no implied or expressed	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	In terms of the BSIOP matter, Mineralogy and International Minerals initiated the BSIOP arbitration by notice of dispute dated 7 November 2012. The arbitration was commenced under clause 42 of the State Agreement. The subject of the dispute was that the Minister for State Development refused to consider the BSIOP proposal for the development of a project under the State Agreement. On 19 March 2013, retired Australian High Court judge Michael McHugh AC KC was appointed as the arbitrator by order of the Chief Justice of Western Australia, Wayne Martin. By an award dated 20 May 2014, the first BSIOP award, Mr McHugh held that the BSIOP proposal was a proposal for the purposes of the State Agreement. Mr McHugh further held that Western Australia had breached the State Agreement when the Premier of Western Australia, as the Minister of State Development, failed to give a decision on the BSIOP proposal within the time required by clause 7(2) of the State Agreement. Mineralogy wished to claim damages from Western Australia consequent upon Western Australia's breach of the State Agreement, as found in the first award.

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14:19 1	that the Tribunal considers this chronology carefully	14:22 1	the following actions in furtherance of this third
2	because when one looks objectively at what was going on	2	arbitration, which we have referred to in this
3	and the steps being taken by Western Australia in the	3	arbitration as the "State Agreement arbitration", or the
4	arbitration, it beggars belief that we are even	4	"BSIOP arbitration", I think, from the Respondent.
5	discussing foreseeability of a dispute concerning the	5	The arbitrator raised the question with the parties
6	Amendment Act.	6	that before he would proceed with the arbitration,
7	In August 2018, Mineralogy commenced a second	7	he required that the parties enter into an arbitration
8	arbitration to arbitrate their claim for damages.	8	agreement. On 8 July 2020, Mineralogy and
9	Western Australia considered that the right to recover	9	Western Australia, and Mr McHugh as arbitrator, signed
10	those damages was heard and determined under the first	10	an agreement for the arbitration of damages claims,
11	award, and that the legal effect of the first award was	11	which has been referred to by the Claimant as
12	that Mineralogy was foreclosed from pursuing those	12	"the arbitration agreement" in this arbitration.
13	damages.	13	On 5 August 2020, Mineralogy and Western Australia
14	Ultimately, it was agreed that this dispute should	14	and the Honourable Wayne Martin AC KC, the former
15	be referred to Mr McHugh for determination. On	15	Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Western Australia,
16	20 December 2018, Mr McHugh accepted his appointment as	16	executed an agreement for mediation to be held on a date
17	arbitrator.	17	before 31 October 2020.
18	The second BSIOP arbitration progressed throughout	18	Western Australia received service of Mineralogy's
19	2019. By an award dated 11 October 2019, the second	19	claims and statements of evidence for the arbitration.
20	award, Mr McHugh determined that Mineralogy's right to	20	However, Western Australia itself failed to comply with
21	recover damages had not been heard in the first	21	the obligation to file and serve its own documents.
22	arbitration and had not been determined in the first	22	On 11 August 2020 at 5.00 pm, the Western Australian
23	award. Accordingly, Mineralogy was not foreclosed from	23	Attorney-General, John Quigley, introduced the
24	pursuing damages arising from any breach of the	24	Amendment Act into the Western Australian legislature.
25	State Agreement.	25	On 13 August 2020, the Western Australian Parliament
	Page 93		Page 95
	1 age 73		1 4gc /3
14:20 1	That was the date, 11 October 2019, that Mineralogy	14:23 1	enacted the Amend[ment] Act. The following day, Western
2	even knew that it would be able to pursue a claim for	2	Australia State Solicitor's Office wrote to Mr McHugh to
3	damages, and that was a date which is some nine to	3	inform him that the third arbitration had been
4	ten months after the restructuring that we've been	4	terminated by the Amendment Act.
5	talking about in this arbitration. So up to that time,	5	Now, again pausing, I've already dealt with some
6	the Claimant didn't even know they had a claim.	6	defining features of the CITIC contractual claims. But
7	On 31 October 2019 as I said, please make note of	7	it's also important to emphasise the features of the
8	that date Western Australia challenged the second	8	BSIOP matter which make it wholly separate from the
9	BSIOP award in the Supreme Court of Western Australia	9	CITIC claims.
10	under an appeal and review regime of the Commercial	10	None of the CITIC parties were involved, for
11	Arbitration Act of 1985.	11	a start. It was being pursued in arbitration with
12	The appeal challenging the second award failed. In	12	Western Australia, a state entity. The BSIOP matter
13	a judgment delivered on 28 February 2020,	13	involved a breach by the State of Western Australia, not
14	Kenneth J Martin dismissed the State's appeal.	14	Mineralogy. The timing was different. And the various
15 16	Since Western Australia's challenge to the second	15	ad hoc arbitration agreements being entered into were
16 17	BSIOP award had failed, Mineralogy was entitled to	16 17	between Mineralogy and the State of Western Australia.
17	pursue its damages claim. It remained for the parties	17 18	The relief sought was in no sense connected, whether as a matter of fact, common sense or law.
18 19	to progress to a third phase of arbitration to determine	18	The CITIC matter proceeded to be determined in
20	those damages. On 26 June 2020, Western Australia and Mineralogy	20	Mineralogy's favour in the Supreme Court of Western
20 21	participated in a directions conference before	20 21	Australia, which is Exhibit CLA-70.
21 22	Mr McHugh. Mr McHugh issued procedural directions for	21 22	Australia has sought to conflate the disputes by
22 23	a three-week damages hearing, which was to begin on	23	adopting a crude analysis of certain underlying facts,
23 24	30 November 2020.	23	such as the land sought by CITIC and the land which was
25	Following the directions hearing, the parties took	25	subject to the BSIOP proposal. It's like saying in
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14:25 1	Paris: any dispute in Paris is joined, because it's	14:28 1	the arbitration from my perspective, and I note it's not
2	happening in Paris. There might be 4,000, 5,000	2	said that they were acting in bad faith at that time.
3	disputes at a time in Paris, but they're not all linked	3	If that is right, the Amendment Act dispute simply
4	just because they're in Paris. They're all about	4	cannot be objectively or subjectively foreseeable.
5	different matters, different issues, different parties,	5	It seemed to be suggested in cross-examination
6	different reliefs, different time periods. Certainly	6	yesterday that there was a point of a foreseeable
7	the location is not a basis to link a dispute.	7	dispute at some point in 2019 and 2020. But that is
8	Australia has sought to conflate the disputes by	8	a wholly improper question in light of the Respondent's
9	adopting a crude analysis, as I said, of the underlying	9	concession that the Amend[ment] Act was not foreseeable,
10	facts. But that is preposterous. The disputes were	10	and it is one which I firmly reject.
11	legally and factually distinct. One matter was	11	Western Australia took steps in court in late 2019
12	a contractual dispute with a counterparty and one was	12	and early 2020, and in mid-2020 took part in hearings
13	a dispute with the government; [which] Mr McHugh	13	before the sole arbitrator. Again, no question of them
14	recognis[ed], on the basis of evidence from the State,	14	acting duplicitously or in bad faith in doing so.
15	in the second award, when he observed that the	15	I relied on them taking part in those proceedings, and
16	litigation between Mineralogy and the CITIC parties had	16	it was not put to me yesterday that I somehow thought at
17	no direct connection with the BSIOP arbitrations between	17	the time that they were acting in bad faith or preparing
18	Western Australia and the Australian [companies].	18	to unravel the agreement. Indeed, it would have been
19	This is at the second award by Mr McHugh, which is	19	an abuse of those proceedings for the State not to have
20	Exhibit C-443, and you'll find that at paragraph 100,	20	conducted themselves as they did in good faith.
21	which relevantly stated and I'll put it up for you	21	They signed the documents as part of those
22	now oh, we haven't got it. So I'll just have to read	22	proceedings, the arbitration agreement and the mediation
23	it. It's only short:	23	agreement, just seven days before the Amendment Act;
24	"None of the proceedings had any direct connection	24	namely, agreements to arbitrate and to mediate with
25	with any of the Arbitrations between the present	25	senior Australian judges. Again, no question of
	•		
	Page 97		Page 99
14:27 1	parties."	14:30 1	a dispute being on the horizon; no hint that these
2	That's a finding by a former High Court judge of	2	people were plotting secretly against us and misleading
3	the Australian High Court, an eminent jurist with	3	us dishonestly.
4	an international reputation.	4	So no question of any form of foreseeable dispute in
5	I'm going to turn to the Tribunal's third question	5	2018 or 2020 re the BSIOP matter; far from it. I've
6	next, about foreseeability. But before I do, I want to	6	already explained the position in relation to the CITIC
7	make an important point, while we all have the facts and	7	matter both as a matter which was unrelated to the BSIOP
8	the chronology of the BSIOP matter in our minds.	8	proceedings and one that did not give rise to a dispute
9	If one starts with the events of August 2020, the	9	or a foreseeable dispute.
10	time of the Amendment Act let us not forget that	10	Finally, it's up to Respondent to allege and prove
11	the Respondent accepts that those events were not	11	facts, and to establish the foreseeability of dispute,
12	foreseeable and we work backwards, one can see that	12	but they have not called any witnesses on this issue.
13	there is nothing in the fact pattern which renders the	13	They have instead admitted that the Amendment Act was
14	events more foreseeable at any point in time. Put	14	not foreseeable. They have not called politicians to
15	another way, if the events were not foreseeable the day,	15	substantiate their stance or explain their position.
16	the week, the month before the Act was promulgated, then	16	That alone dictates that the foreseeability arm to the
17	they cannot be foreseeable at a more distant point in	17	Respondent's abuse objection should be rejected very
18	time.	18	firmly by this Tribunal.
19	Just highlighting a few points.	19	I will now deal with question 3. Before turning to
20	In 2018, [Western] Australia took part in the second	20	a detailed response to this very important question,
21	arbitration, agreeing to appoint a sole arbitrator.	21	there are two points to draw to the fore at the outset.
22	There was no suggestion at that time that they were not	22	Firstly, it bears emphasis that when considering
23	acting in good faith in doing so. That proceeded in	23	foreseeability in this particular context, a mere
24	2019: again, absolutely no suggestion that Western	24	possibility that a dispute might occur will not be
25	Australia was not acting in good faith in taking part in	25	sufficient, because it is a perfectly legitimate act of
	Page 98		Page 100
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29 (Pages 97 to 100)

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14:31 1	corporate planning to restructure an investment to	14:35 1	concepts of object foreseeability at a level of
2	obtain treaty protection against a general risk of	2	
3	future disputes with a host state.	3	
4	I refer the Tribunal to the following cases in	4	
5	support of that proposition: Clorox v Venezuela, which	5	
6	is Exhibit RLA-142, at [paragraph] 5.6; Tidewater	6	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
7	v Venezuela, which is Exhibit RLA-93, at	7	•
8	[paragraph] 184; Levy v Peru, which is Exhibit CLA-188,	8	ž
9	at [paragraph] 184; and Philip Morris v Australia, which	9	*
10	is Exhibit RLA-95, at [paragraph] 540.	10	
11	Secondly, the first limb of the question posed	11	•
12	suggests that if a party has a disagreement in mind,	12	
13	it's foreseeable. But we need to be careful about that,	13	
14	as of course the test is objective, leaving aside for	14	• •
15	the purposes any debate arising out of the use of the	15	•
16	word "disagreement".	1.	
17	Turning to the specific question, the invocation of	17	*
18	treaty protection in the circumstances outlined above is		
	not abusive. The general principle is that it's	18	•
19		19	
20	a perfectly legitimate act of corporate planning to	20	
21	restructure an investment to obtain treaty protection	21	
22	against the general risk of future disputes with a host	22	
23	state. The authorities for that proposition were	23	ē ;
24	referred to earlier, namely: Clorox, Tidewater, Levy	24	
25	v Peru, Philip Morris.	25	and it's got to be the one that was eventually
	Page 101		Page 103
14:33 1	Let me be absolutely clear: it is not an abuse of	14:36 1	challenged by the restructured investor.
2	right to invoke treaty protection in respect of	2	So the question for this arbitration is: was the
3	an unforeseeable dispute because the Claimant was	3	Amendment Act dispute foreseeable? Because that's the
4	restructured to gain treaty protection in light of	4	dispute that's being challenged in this arbitration, and
5	a separate foreseeable dispute.	5	all the claims that have been made by the Claimant
6	The dividing-line between a legitimate restructure	6	emanate from breaches incurred by the Amendment Act of
7	and abuse of process occurs when the relevant party can	7	the treaty.
8	see the actual dispute or can foresee a specific future	8	In 450
9	dispute as a very high probability, not merely as	9	THE PRESIDENT: Before you go there, can I just ask
10	a possibility. This is supported in Pac Rim, which is	10	can we just go to the slide before do you see
11	RLA-33, at [paragraph] 2.99; and in Philip Morris,	11	a difference, or is there none, between saying
12	Exhibit RLA-95, at [paragraph] 547.	12	
13	[In] the example provided by the Tribunal, the	13	
14	foreseeable dispute falls on the abusive side of the	14	it's semantic
15	dividing line. The second unforeseeable dispute falls	15	THE PRESIDENT: It's just semantics?
16	on the other side: the restructuring was not carried out	16	MR PALMER: No, no, there's a difference with "a specific
17	in light of that dispute, and it is therefore not	17	type of dispute". It's general, it's not specific.
18	an abuse to invoke treaty protection for that	18	It's a play on words. A specific type: what type?
19	unforeseeable dispute.	19	The word "specific" really means it's a dispute.
20	Starting with Clorox v Venezuela, Exhibit CLA-182,	20	I think the safe way of looking at it is: it's the
21	the Swiss Federal Tribunal observed that because "abuse	21	dispute that's before the Tribunal that's being assessed
22	of rights is an exceptional remedy, the criterion of	22	in the arbitration. That's a "specific dispute",
23	foreseeability of the dispute must be assessed	23	I think.
24	restrictively", at paragraph 5.2.3.	24	And I think in Clorox, later in my reading
25	The arbitral tribunal in that case addressed	25	I can't give you the quote here but it basically
	D. 102		D. 104
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30 (Pages 101 to 104)

14.00 1		1.4.40 1	
14:38 1	indicated that the claims emanating from the measure, if	14:40 1	treaty protection, and where a specific dispute was
2		2	foreseeable, namely when there is a reasonable prospect
3		3	that a measure which may give rise to a treaty claim
4	specific claims that are before the Tribunal, nothing	4	will materialise.
5	else.	5	In the context of this case, the Tribunal proceeds
6	THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.	6	on the basis of what must be reasonably foreseeable
7	MR PALMER: At 450:	7	that is foreseeable to a reasonable person in the
8	" it is important to identify the first	8	position of the investor [which] is the risk that
9	measure"	9	the Republic will expropriate all or part of its
10	E	10	business, which is the essence of the Claimant's claim
11		11	in these proceedings.
12	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	12	The above analysis is borne out by the approach in
13		13	Mobil v Venezuela, Exhibit RLA-92, a case I am aware
14	1	14	Madam President is familiar with. It concerned
15		15	a corporate restructure, designed to gain treaty
16	•	16	protection, at a time where there were existing disputes
17	, 1	17	with the host state.
18	•	18	The Dutch claimant, Mobil BV, was inserted into the
19		19	ownership chain of the Venezuelan investments,
20		20	Mobil Venezuela, in 2006. At the time of the
21	*	21	restructuring, it was acknowledged that there were
22	*	22	disputes between the parties concerning enactment of
23	**	23	higher royalty and income taxes; see paragraphs 19 and
24		24	202. It was also accepted that the sole purpose of the
25	a test which must be grounded squarely and exclusively	25	restructuring was to obtain treaty protection; see
	Page 105		Page 107
14.20 1		14.40	1 100 1204
14:39 1	on the one and sole dispute which is said to have given	14:42 1	paragraphs 190 and 204.
2	rise to the investment arbitration in question.	2	In January 2007, Venezuela announced measures to
2 3	rise to the investment arbitration in question. It cannot be relied on by a state as an amorphous,	2 3	In January 2007, Venezuela announced measures to nationalise certain oil projects, including those of
2 3 4	rise to the investment arbitration in question. It cannot be relied on by a state as an amorphous, catch-all argument. Leading different alleged disputes	2 3 4	In January 2007, Venezuela announced measures to nationalise certain oil projects, including those of Mobil Venezuela. By June 2007, Mobil's investment had
2 3 4 5	rise to the investment arbitration in question. It cannot be relied on by a state as an amorphous, catch-all argument. Leading different alleged disputes to adopt that approach would be to ride roughshod over	2 3 4 5	In January 2007, Venezuela announced measures to nationalise certain oil projects, including those of Mobil Venezuela. By June 2007, Mobil's investment had been fully expropriated. Mobil BV brought a claim under
2 3 4 5 6	rise to the investment arbitration in question. It cannot be relied on by a state as an amorphous, catch-all argument. Leading different alleged disputes to adopt that approach would be to ride roughshod over rational for proper abuse of process objections and the	2 3 4 5 6	In January 2007, Venezuela announced measures to nationalise certain oil projects, including those of Mobil Venezuela. By June 2007, Mobil's investment had been fully expropriated. Mobil BV brought a claim under the Netherlands-Venezuela BIT in respect of the
2 3 4 5 6 7	rise to the investment arbitration in question. It cannot be relied on by a state as an amorphous, catch-all argument. Leading different alleged disputes to adopt that approach would be to ride roughshod over rational for proper abuse of process objections and the need to apply a high, restrictive threshold to such	2 3 4 5 6 7	In January 2007, Venezuela announced measures to nationalise certain oil projects, including those of Mobil Venezuela. By June 2007, Mobil's investment had been fully expropriated. Mobil BV brought a claim under the Netherlands-Venezuela BIT in respect of the expropriation of its investment. Venezuela argued that
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	rise to the investment arbitration in question. It cannot be relied on by a state as an amorphous, catch-all argument. Leading different alleged disputes to adopt that approach would be to ride roughshod over rational for proper abuse of process objections and the need to apply a high, restrictive threshold to such objections. The specific dispute must be considered by reference to the claim advanced. Therefore, [if] it was	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	In January 2007, Venezuela announced measures to nationalise certain oil projects, including those of Mobil Venezuela. By June 2007, Mobil's investment had been fully expropriated. Mobil BV brought a claim under the Netherlands-Venezuela BIT in respect of the expropriation of its investment. Venezuela argued that the claim constituted an abuse of right because the restructuring was effected at a time when this dispute
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31 (Pages 105 to 108)

14:43 1	Similarly, the tribunal in Tidewater v Venezuela,	14:46 1	chose substantive business operations as the criteria
2	which is Exhibit RLA-93, found that one of the two	2	which would permit companies owned by a national of the
3	purposes for restructuring of the claimant was to	3	host state of the investment to benefit from the
4	protect Tidewater from the risk of expropriation [by]	4	protections offered by AANZFTA to nationals of their
5	incorporation of an investment vehicle in a state having	5	claimed home state.
6	investment treaty arrangements with Venezuela. See	6	The treaty sets out the prerequisites for such
7	paragraph 183, which says that a restructure was carried	7	coverage. It cannot be an abuse to fulfil the express
8	out in light of pre-existing, and therefore foreseeable,	8	criteria on which states have agreed. Otherwise, for
9	disputes with Venezuela's national oil company, which	9	example, for a treaty which only required simple
10	predated the incorporation of Tidewater Barbados in 2009	10	incorporation to be an investor, incorporation with
11	and the transfer to it of Tidewater's Venezuelan	11	motivation of treaty coverage would be an abuse. That
12	business, in paragraph 184.	12	cannot be correct.
13	However, as in Mobil, the fact that the	13	Moreover, there are further sound reasons for the
14	restructuring was carried out in light of an existing	14	Claimant's stance, and I will summarise these now.
15	foreseeable dispute did not deprive the claimant of the	15	The denial of benefits provision operates by
16	right to invoke the treaty for future disputes which	16	reference to the treaty wording. It's not another form
17	were unforeseeable at the time of the restructuring.	17	of abuse. Denial of benefits does not import the more
18	Accordingly, the tribunal held that it was not an abuse	18	general concepts of good faith which one finds in the
19	for Tidewater to bring a claim under the treaty in	19	abuse objection.
20	respect of an unforeseeable expropriation law passed by	20	Denial of benefits provisions operate on
21	Venezuela after the date of restructuring; see	21	a case-by-case basis under the relevant treaty, whereas
22	paragraphs 196 and 197.	22	abuse of process imports general principles as a form of
23	In terms of the language in the question, it is the	23	customary international law, which floats above the
24	Claimant's position that anything less than specific	24	express provisions of a treaty.
25	dispute does not engage the abusive provisions, if that	25	The threshold to establish substantive or, where
	Page 109		Page 111
	Tage 107		1 ago 111
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14:45 1	is what is meant by the final part of the question. The	14:48 1	applicable, substantial business operations is not
14:45 1 2	Claimant considers it's right to adopt the language used	14:48 1 2	applicable, substantial business operations is not especially high, consistent with the fact that tribunals
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2	Claimant considers it's right to adopt the language used	2	especially high, consistent with the fact that tribunals
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14:49 1	has taken.	14:52 1	treaty: the treaty that's before us, the treaty that's
14.49 1	THE PRESIDENT: Can I just ask you a question in this	14.32 1	there in black and white, the treaty that the parties to
3	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	3	the treaty have thought about and decided to put
4	respect. MR PALMER: Certainly.	4	a specific test on. And certainly I don't see how that
5	THE PRESIDENT: You say that denial of benefit does not	5	can be overridden.
6	inform the general concept of good faith, if I have	6	That's my personal view on it, and the Claimant's,
7	understood you correctly, unlike abuse of process.	7	I suppose.
8	You recognise that when we interpret a treaty	8	THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
9	provision under the Vienna Convention, we have to do	9	MR PALMER: Is that alright? Does that answer
10	•	10	THE PRESIDENT: That answers my question, yes.
11	somehow? Or what would you say?	11	MR PALMER: Where did I finish?
12	• • • •	12	The Claimant would also like to note that if some
13		13	form of value judgment is being exercised by a tribunal
14		14	on a broad-brush basis, which of course is not
15		15	correct I think I've gone through that section.
16		16	I now deal with the question that you asked,
17		17	question 5. And the Claimant's position is that on this
18		18	issue, it remains as its previous stance, reserving its
19		19	right to change its position at any later point in time
20		20	during this arbitration.
21		21	THE PRESIDENT: When you say I'm not sure have you
22		22	concluded your answer on question 5, or?
23		23	MR PALMER: At question 5, we're dealing with Article 27(2),
24	*	24	and we're saying that our position remains unchanged at
25		25	this point in time.
	Page 113		Page 115
14:51 1	between the parties to the treaty, who have thought	14:53 1	THE PRESIDENT: But you make a reservation for later stages.
14:51 1 2	between the parties to the treaty, who have thought about this question, who have decided what they want to	14:53 1 2	THE PRESIDENT: But you make a reservation for later stages. Are you meaning that refers to if this arbitration
2	about this question, who have decided what they want to	2	Are you meaning that refers to if this arbitration
2 3	about this question, who have decided what they want to do. They could have put all sorts of tests which you're very familiar with from other treaties there, but they chose a specific test.	2 3	Are you meaning that refers to if this arbitration proceeds to the merits? MR PALMER: Exactly, yes. THE PRESIDENT: Not during this preliminary stage?
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14:55 1	paragraphs 252 to 347 of the Claimant's Response.	14:58 1	notification or approval process."
2	After I explain two of the Claimant's alternative	2	The Claimant participated in the share swap on
3	arguments, Dr Anna Kirk will further assist the Tribunal	3	29 January 2019, as set out in Exhibit C-562, and
4	in understanding the Claimant's primary position.	4	formally advised the Respondent's ASIC, by
5	I will first go to two alternative arguments that	5	Exhibit C-484, of the share swap on 8 February 2019.
6	the Claimant wishes to make, based on the AANZFTA treaty	6	The Claimant, immediately following the share swap,
7	itself. We have a slide there, I think. (Pause)	7	started preparing its application pursuant to
8	The Respondent's first admission that we've referred	8	Section 601CD of the Corporations Act 2001, which is
9	to earlier is at paragraph 64 of its Reply, that:	9	Exhibit [CLA-]161. Section 601CD states as follows:
10	" Australia does not dispute that the share swap	10	"(1) A foreign company must not carry on business in
11	was both lawful and effective in transferring ownership	11	the jurisdiction unless:
12	of the shares in Mineralogy to Zeph."	12	(a) it is registered under this Division; or
13	AANZFTA, in Chapter 11, Article 2(c), states,	13	(b) it has applied to be so registered and the
14	inter alia, that:	14	application has not been dealt with."
15	" investment means every kind of asset owned or	15	"Carrying on business in Australia" is defined in
16	controlled by an investor, including but not limited to	16	Section 21 of the Corporations Act as follows:
17	the following:"	17	"(1) A body corporate that has a place of business
18	And it lists "shares".	18	in Australia, or in a State or Territory, carries on
19	In the circumstances, it's curious, to say the	19	business in Australia, or in that State or Territory, as
20	least, for the Respondent to dispute that the Claimant	20	the case may be.
21	has made an investment. The Respondent has conceded	21	(2) A reference to a body corporate carrying on
22	that the Claimant became the owner of the shares	22	business includes a reference the body:
23	following the lawful and effective share swap. The	23	(b) administering, managing, or otherwise dealing
24	admission that the share swap was legal and effective in	24	with, property situated in Australia, or in the State or
25	transferring ownership of the shares in Mineralogy to	25	Territory, as the case may be, as an agent, legal
	Page 117		Page 119
	Tage 117		Tage 117
14:56 1	the Claimant is necessarily an admission of ownership by	14:59 1	personal representative or trustee or otherwise."
2	the Claimant of the asset, namely the Mineralogy shares.	2	Importantly, also in Exhibit CLA-161 is
3	This is therefore an admission by the Respondent of the	3	Section 601CE of the Corporations Act, which sets out
4	existence of the Claimant's investment within the	4	what matters must be addressed in an application for
5	meaning of Chapter 11, Article 2(c) of AANZFTA.	5	registration, which states as follows I think they're
6	Current evidence already filed with the Response and	6	listed on the slide in front of you:
7	the Rejoinder makes it clear that the Claimant is	7	"Subject to this Part, where a foreign company
8	an investor of Australia, has made investments in	8	lodges an application for registration under this
9	accordance with the requirements of AANZFTA, Chapter 11.	9	Division that is in the prescribed form and is
10	Article 2(d) states, when dealing with an "investor	10	accompanied by:
11	of a Party", it means:	11	(a) a certified copy of a current certificate of its
12	" a natural person of a Party or a juridical	12	incorporation or registration
13	person of a Party that seeks to make, is making, or has made an investment in the territory of another	13	(b) a certified copy of its constitution
14 15	•	14	(c) a list of its directors containing personal details of those directors that are equivalent to the
15 16	Party" Importantly, the relevant footnote 4 which is on	15 16	personal details of directors referred to in [another
16	the third line of the slide, I think provides	17	section of the Corporations Act] 205B(3)
18	certainty, and states as follows:	17	(d) if that list includes directors who are:
19	"For greater certainty, the Parties understand that	18	(i) resident in Australia
20	an investor that 'seeks to make' an investment refers to	20	(i) resident in Austrana (ii) members of a local board of directors;
20	an investor that seeks to make an investment refers to an investor of another Party that has taken active steps	20 21	A memorandum that is duly executed by or on behalf
21 22	to make an investment. Where a notification or approval	21 22	of the foreign company and states the powers of those
23	process is required for making an investment,	22 23	directors
23	an investor that 'seeks to make' an investment refers to	23	(f) notice of the address of:
25	an investor that seeks to make an investment refers to an investor of another Party that has initiated such	25	(i) if it has in its place of origin a registered
23	an investor of another rary that has initiated such	2.5	(1) It it has in its place of origin a registered
	Page 118		Page 120
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15:00 1	office	15:03 1	it is a certainty that it is an "investor of a Party" as
2	(ii) otherwise its principal place of	2	provided by Article 2(d), in accordance with the
3	business	3	certainty given by footnote 4: that it initiated its
4	(g) notice of the address of its registered office	4	notification and approval process required by
5	under section 601CT"	5	Section 601CE of the Corporations Act to allow it to be
6	It goes on to say, as you can see, that ASIC, if	6	a foreign company operating in Australia.
7	that material is provided, must grant it permission.	7	So just summarising there, we are saying: on one
8	THE PRESIDENT: Can I ask you: if I understand you	8	hand, it has ownership, it's required to have ownership,
9	correctly, you refer to this Act in relation to	9	it's a section of the treaty that says if it's got
10	footnote 4, 2(d).	10	ownership, it's an investment. On the other hand, we
11	MR PALMER: That's correct.	11	say it is an investor because it has pursued seeking
12	THE PRESIDENT: That's right.	12	an investment to the stage where it has made its
13	MR PALMER: I've got one	13	notification, and footnote 4 and the treaty itself deems
14	THE PRESIDENT: I must say and I will be interested in	14	it to be an investor.
15	what you say about it to me, footnote 4 deals with	15	So it has complied with "investment", it has
16	the status of an investor pre-investment, when the	16	complied with "investor". That's my submission.
17	investment is not yet made but the investor has only	17	THE PRESIDENT: I understand. And what is your answer to
18	taken steps, and what steps are sufficient or what steps	18	the objections that are made in respect of the verb
19	are not sufficient to qualify as an investor.	19	"make" in 2(d)?
20	Now, Zeph had made the investment, had made the	20	MR PALMER: So if we go back and look at the
			-
21	share swap	21	construction
22	MR PALMER: Can I just respond to that, before we go too far	22	DR KIRK: Perhaps I can help, because that's exactly what
23	in the argument?	23	I'll address now.
24	THE PRESIDENT: Yes, please.	24	MR PALMER: Yes, so what we're doing is I'll now ask
25	MR PALMER: I mean, during the opening for the Respondent,	25	Dr Kirk.
	Page 121		Page 123
15:02 1	they said that the fact that the ownership transfer was	15:04 1	THE PRESIDENT: If you have organised yourself differently,
15:02 1 2	they said that the fact that the ownership transfer was legally effective did not necessarily mean that it had	15:04 1 2	THE PRESIDENT: If you have organised yourself differently, I don't want to interfere.
			I don't want to interfere. MR PALMER: Okay.
2	legally effective did not necessarily mean that it had	2	I don't want to interfere.
2 3	legally effective did not necessarily mean that it had made an investment under the treaty. That's what they said. That was their THE PRESIDENT: Why did they say that?	2 3	I don't want to interfere. MR PALMER: Okay.
2 3 4	legally effective did not necessarily mean that it had made an investment under the treaty. That's what they said. That was their	2 3 4	I don't want to interfere. MR PALMER: Okay. THE PRESIDENT: I just thought that
2 3 4 5	legally effective did not necessarily mean that it had made an investment under the treaty. That's what they said. That was their THE PRESIDENT: Why did they say that?	2 3 4	I don't want to interfere. MR PALMER: Okay. THE PRESIDENT: I just thought that MR PALMER: Dr Kirk was going to address that point.
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	legally effective did not necessarily mean that it had made an investment under the treaty. That's what they said. That was their THE PRESIDENT: Why did they say that? MR PALMER: I don't know. I don't know. THE PRESIDENT: I put it to you that the Respondent said so because they consider that the share swap was not a contribution because it contributed no value to the investment. MR PALMER: Okay. So let's just assume for the argument that they're correct, right? In that circumstance, it hasn't made an investment but it's seeking to make one, in this two-step process. THE PRESIDENT: That's why you're addressing this? MR PALMER: That's correct. THE PRESIDENT: Okay, thank you. That's clear. MR PALMER: The Claimant completed its application for registration and notification with ASIC, as set out in Exhibit C-97, on 8 March 2019. So because of the volume of material since its acquisition, it lodged that on 8 March. And the Claimant was registered as a foreign company in Australia, which is required by the ASIC Act, as set out in Exhibit C-482, on 29 March 2019.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	I don't want to interfere. MR PALMER: Okay. THE PRESIDENT: I just thought that MR PALMER: Dr Kirk was going to address that point. THE PRESIDENT: Fine. Then address it when you have planned to do so. MR PALMER: I will now ask Dr Kirk to address the Tribunal on behalf of the Claimant to further deal with matters set out as the Claimant's primary position, because I was dealing first with two alternative positions. Okay, thank you. Dr Kirk. THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. DR KIRK: Thank you very much. So I will briefly address the Tribunal on the Claimant's position on the investment and investor objections: in particular, whether an active contribution is required for an investor to have made an investment. The Claimant's position on these issues is set out in the response at paragraphs 271 to 364 and the Rejoinder at paragraphs 147 to 157. As the tribunal in RENERGY v Spain (CLA-179) observed, the majority of the investment cases support the conclusion that an active contribution from the new

,			
15:06 1	tribunal says at [paragraph] 571:	15:09 1	obtained ownership of the shares, and in this case by
2	"In a larger number of cases, tribunals have	2	a share swap, it has made an investment in accordance
3	rejected the suggestion that the current owner of assets	3	with the plain meaning of the treaty.
4	must have made an active contribution to qualify as	4	A similar finding was made by the tribunal in
5	an investor. In several cases tribunals have held that	5	AMF Aircraftleasing v Czech Republic (RLA-49), another
6	the acquisition of the assets was sufficient."	6	case that the Respondent suggests supports its position.
7	In other words, the majority of tribunals have	7	The tribunal in that case said that the treaty provides
8	rejected the submission now made to you by the	8	that investors must be authorised to make an investment.
9	Respondent.	9	The ordinary meaning of these terms indeed indicates
10	To this end, the Tribunal should not accept at face	10	that the investor has to act and effectively engage in
11	value the Respondent's table at slides 42 and 43 of	11	the action of making an investment. In other words, all
12	their opening slides. Please read the cases carefully.	12	that is required is that the claimant acted to make
13	Of course, we know you will.	13	an investment; in the present case, by engaging in the
14	In reality, the position on active contribution by	14	share swap.
15	an investor is markedly different on a proper analysis	15	The position in Addiko was adopted in the recent
16	of the cases, and I will seek to draw out some of the	16	case of Sea Search-Armada v Colombia (CLA-242). Again,
17	key points now.	17	the treaty at issue contains substantially the same
18	In Addiko Bank v Montenegro (RLA-52), a case that	18	definition of "investor" as the AANZFTA. In that case,
19	the Respondent says supports its position that an active	19	the rights at issue were assigned to the investor by
20	contribution by an investor is required to make	20	a related company. There is no indication in the award
21	an investment, the tribunal interpreted the same treaty	21	that any consideration whatsoever was paid for the
22	wording that is at issue here. The case involved	22	assignment of the rights.
23	a transfer of shares for no consideration. The tribunal	23	The tribunal upheld the investment. It said that
24	did not find that the requirement to make an investment	24	there was no requirement for an active or personal
25	necessitated any active contribution. The tribunal said	25	contribution from the claimant, as the original
	Page 125		Page 127
15:07 1	at narragraph 252, and that's up there on the sarrage	15:11 1	investment estisfied any requirement for a contribution
13.07 1	at paragraph 352, and that's up there on the screen: "The Tribunal is of the view that the ordinary	15:11 1	investment satisfied any requirement for a contribution. The tribunal relied on the Addiko case and on
3	meaning of the verb 'making' includes an act of	3	Kim v Uzbekistan in rejecting any requirement for
4	acquiring an investment which can be defined as gaining	4	an active or personal investment by the investor.
5	possession or control of, or getting or obtaining	5	As I have mentioned, in both Addiko and
6	something. The emphasis is not on the exchange of	6	Sea Search-Armada, no consideration at all was paid for
7	monetary value for title or possession, but on the act	7	the assets acquired. These cases involved a straight
8	of obtaining title or possession. Thus, 'making'	8	transfer of assets. This was also the case in Levy
9	an investment includes instances in which title or	9	v Peru (CLA-188, paragraph 148), where the tribunal
10	possession is obtained over an asset that qualifies as	10	said:
11	an investment."	11	"It is clear that the Claimant acquired her rights
12	It is submitted that this is the sensible and	12	and shares free of charge. However, this does not mean
13	natural meaning of the phrase "make an investment", and	13	that the persons from whom she acquired these shares and
14	is the meaning that should be adopted here. It is not	14	rights did not previously make very considerable
15	a case of "making a meal", to pick up on Mr Wordsworth's	15	investments of which ownership was transmitted to the
16	language. To "invest" does not require in and of itself	16	Claimant by perfectly legitimate legal instruments."
17	further active steps, unlike perhaps making a meal, not	17	In all of these cases, if any requirement for
18	least because there are a number of forms that	18	contribution exists, it is satisfied by the original
19	an investment can take. And you picked up on this this	19	investment or contribution. There is no requirement for
20	morning, Madam President. They include active or	20	any active additional contribution from the person
21	passive or otherwise.	21	acquiring the investment.
22	Now, in emphasising this point, this most certainly	22	Additional cases which confirm this position are set
23	is not a change by the Claimant in its position. The	23	out in the Response at [paragraphs] 322 through to 329.
24	Claimant has always said that ownership of the	24	These cases are all consistent with the position taken
25	investment is key. Provided that the Claimant has	25	by the Swiss Federal Tribunal in Clorox v Venezuela.
	Page 126		Page 128

36 (Pages 125 to 128)

15:12 1	And this is the first Swiss Federal Tribunal decision on	15:16 1	DR KIRK: I am simply reflecting the Respondent's
2	this (RLA-144), rather than the one we have been looking	2	submission. They are the ones who are saying that "made
3	at on abuse of right.	3	an investment" means an active contribution.
4	In this decision, the Federal Tribunal overturned	4	THE PRESIDENT: But what the Respondent says is: to have
5	the arbitral decision, finding that the verb in that	5	an investment, you must make contribution, meaning you
6	case "invested" or "to invest" required an active	6	have to provide something of value. And I hope I am not
7	contribution. In that case, the shares in the	7	distorting the Respondent's submission.
8	investment had been transferred to the claimant without	8	But my question is: what has to be active? What
9	any payment or consideration. The arbitral tribunal	9	does this "active" stand for? The cases often say
10	found that there had been no transfer of value, and	10	"active", but have people really thought about what
11	therefore that no investment had been made.	11	needs to be active? For what does it stand? I'm not
12	The Swiss Federal Tribunal in Clorox rejected the	12	sure all the cases use "active" with the same
13	very arguments now being made by the Respondent, and	13	connotation.
14	said at paragraph 3.4.2.7 that the term "invested" did	14	DR KIRK: They may not. In my submission, "active" or at
15	not require an active investment be made by the investor	15	least, from the Claimant's side, all that is required as
16	in exchange for the assets. The holding of assets was	16	far as an active contribution is concerned is engaging
17	sufficient to show that the Claimant had invested in	17	in the act of obtaining the title to the investment.
18	those assets.	18	And I will come to that
19	The Swiss court went on to say that the arbitral	19	THE PRESIDENT: That's why you spoke of the participation?
20	tribunal was wrong to impose additional conditions on	20	DR KIRK: Exactly.
21	the investor, being the condition of active contribution	21	THE PRESIDENT: Yes, good. Thank you.
22	that was not expressly stated in the words of the	22	DR KIRK: And I will speak a little more about
23	treaty.	23	restructurings in a minute, which may fill that out.
24	The Swiss Federal Tribunal also confirmed that	24	THE PRESIDENT: You have answered my question.
25	an arbitral tribunal was not permitted to deny	25	DR KIRK: The Respondent also relies in its written
	Page 129		Page 131
	1450 129		Tuge 131
15:14 1	jurisdiction on the basis that the original investment	15:17 1	submissions on Standard Chartered v Tanzania, one of the
2	was carried out by another entity and then transferred	2	cases that most clearly imposes a requirement for
3	to the claimant through a corporate restructuring.	3	an active investment, whatever that might mean. That
4	There are many other cases in the Claimant's	4	case has generally not been followed by subsequent
5	Response and Rejoinder that come to a similar	5	tribunals.
6	conclusion, and the Claimant continues to rely on all of	6	Indeed, the tribunal in Koza v Turkmenistan
7	these.	7	(CLA-180, paragraph 231) said that the finding in
8	In its Reply, the Respondent relies on Montauk	8	Standard Chartered that investments must be made by
9	Metals v Colombia (RLA-147), which is a June 2024	9	an investor in some active way, rather than simply
10	decision, to support its position. The tribunal in	10	passive ownership, resulted from and these are the
11	Montauk only briefly considered the meaning of "make	11	words on the slide "a somewhat strained reading of
12	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	12	the words 'of', 'by' and 'made'" in the relevant BIT.
13		13	And it is precisely this "strained reading" that the
14		14	Respondent advocates for here. It should be rejected,
15	•	15	just as it was in the Koza case.
16	<u> </u>	16	Similarly, in Nachingwea v Tanzania (RLA-47,
17	**	17	paragraph 153), the tribunal considered the case of
18	* *	18	Standard Chartered, and concluded that:
19		19	" this Tribunal is unable to agree [with the
20	* * *	20	Standard Chartered case] that such a requirement of
21		21	active contribution can be said to arise by virtue of
22	•	22	the use of the word 'made' in Article 1(a) of the BIT.
23		23	That an investment has to be 'made' does not necessarily
24	Do I have to actively manage the corporation? What is	24	imply that an investment has to be 'actively made'.
25		-	
23	the "active" about?	25	There is a distinction between the two and this Tribunal
23	the "active" about? Page 130	25	There is a distinction between the two and this Tribunal Page 132
23		25	

37 (Pages 129 to 132)

15:19	1	would be very reluctant to conclude, without more, that	15:22 1	in his idiosyncratic approach.
	2	'made' equates with 'actively made'."	2	Funnily enough, on the share swap, he was entirely
	3	I have only referred to a few of the cases in the	3	conventional. And share swaps or transfers have been
	4	submissions. But you can see, even from this high-level	4	recognised by investment tribunals time and again as
	5	review, that the position accords with the conclusion of	5	being a legitimate way of making an investment in the
	6	the esteemed authors Dolzer, Kriebaum and Schreuer in	6	context of corporate restructurings. This is
	7	their 2022 text Principles of International Investment	7	an established principle and it should be the end of the
	8	Law (CLA-191, page 81), which is on the slide now.	8	matter.
	9	It says:	9	It follows from this that issues of nominal or face
	10	"It follows from these authorities that the	10	value are also irrelevant in the context of corporate
	11	preponderant view is that mere ownership or control of	11	restructuring. And this was confirmed in RENERGY
	12	the investment will suffice to bestow the status of	12	v Spain (CLA-179), which distinguished the case of
	13	an investor. In other words, according to the majority	13	KT Asia on the basis that KT Asia where a nominal value
	14	view, it seems that an active contribution by the	14	in the exchange was at issue did not involve a corporate
	15	current owner of the assets is not required."	15	restructuring.
	16	Before moving on, I also wish to recall some of the	16	The nominal value issue simply does not arise in
	17	additional matters that appear actually largely agreed	17	context of a corporate restructuring. It is important
	18	between the parties, or at least not contested. And	18	to note that after the share swap, just as an aside,
	19	I say this by reference to paragraph 61 of the ROPO.	19	MIL, the parent, retained very, very valuable assets, in
	20	First, a share swap, including a cashless share	20	the form of both Zeph and Mineralogy. And that was the
	21	swap, in and of itself is a legitimate way of obtaining	21	purpose of the share swap.
	22	an investment. This was clearly established in Mobil	22	Given the case authorities on this issue, and the
	23	v Venezuela and a number of other cases discussed at	23	continual recognition that corporate restructuring using
	24	paragraphs 284 to 286 of the Claimant's Response, and	24	share swaps creates legitimate investments, it would be
	25	the Respondent quite rightly does not contest this.	25	incongruous of this Tribunal to then say that the shares
		Page 133		Page 135
		1 ugc 155		1 age 133
15:20	1	Second, an investment can be acquired through	15:24 1	transferred in a restructuring are not an investment as
	2	a corporate restructuring. There is absolutely nothing	2	they do not satisfy any risk or contribution element
	3	wrong with acquiring an investment in this manner,	3	that may exist because they were part of a standard
	4	whether by share swap, transfer or otherwise, as	4	corporate restructuring. In none of the cases I have
	5	confirmed in cases such as Levy v Peru, Tidewater	5	mentioned have elements of risk or contribution been
	6	v Venezuela and Aguas del Tunari v Bolivia, amongst many	6	deemed unsatisfied simply because the transaction was
	7	others.	7	a face-value share swap or share transfer as part of
	8	There is nothing unusual about the restructure in	8	a regular corporate restructuring.
	9	the present case or the share swap that went on. It	9	As I have also stated earlier, it is
	10	reflects standard corporate practice and is similar to	10	a well-established principle that any requirement for
	11	many of these other cases where investments have been	11	contribution inherent in the term "investment", as it
	12	found.	12	may be, is satisfied by the original investment and does
	13	These two points are important also in regard to the	13	not require a brand new investment from every investor
	14	President's questions to Mr Palmer yesterday on the	14	that subsequently acquires the asset. Both the original
	15	nominal value of the shares swapped versus the economic	15	contribution and the inherent risks involved in the
	16	reality that you were discussing, and also on the risk	16	investment are transferred with that asset to the new
	17	point that was raised.	17	investor.
	18	As I said, the share swap in the present cases is	18	I do emphasise here that obviously this is not
	19	an entirely standard commercial practice, commonly used	19	an ICSID Convention arbitration. It is far from clear
	20	when restructuring a corporate group. We've actually	20	that the inherent characteristics that one implies into
	21	heard a lot in this hearing about Mr Palmer's	21	the definition of "investment" in the ICSID Convention
	22	unconventional way of approaching business. He	22	can be implied into a treaty such as the AANZFTA, where
			22	4 4 4 4 1 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
	23	certainly does not do business or manage his affairs in	23	the state parties have provided a very clear definition
	23 24	a way that we all might be used to seeing in cases like	24	of "investment" that already includes carve-outs for
	23			
	23 24	a way that we all might be used to seeing in cases like this, and for the most part he has been very successful	24	of "investment" that already includes carve-outs for commercial contracts for sale of goods and services, and
	23 24	a way that we all might be used to seeing in cases like	24	of "investment" that already includes carve-outs for

38 (Pages 133 to 136)

15:25	similar types of transactions.	15:29 1	an investment.
2	The state parties to the AANZFTA have been very	2	Consistent also with the adoption of the US Model
3	clear about what an "investment" means, and this should	3	BIT provisions, the AANZFTA definitions of "investment"
4	be respected. You have our submissions on this point in	4	and "covered investment", as well as the definition of
:	the Response and I just want to make sure it's clear	5	"investor" itself, are very broad. The definition of
(that we continue to rely on those.	6	"investor" should be interpreted in this context.
,	So returning to the points that I was making before	7	The need to consider the definitions of "investment"
:	8 I went off on that little tangent. The third point that	8	and "covered investment" is even more acute because the
	I wanted to make and it's related to what I've just	9	verb "make", simply as a matter of English grammar, is
1	0 been discussing is that the adequacy of the	10	a transitive or delexical verb, taking its meaning from
1		11	the noun that it is paired with; in this case,
1		12	"investment".
1		13	This is not a matter of the effet utile principle.
1-		14	The words must be given their plain meaning. And to
1	• •	15	"make an investment" must take account of the meaning of
1		16	"investment": to own shares.
1	•	17	As the Addiko tribunal said (RLA-52, paragraph 352),
1		18	making an investment is simply "the act of obtaining
1		19	title or possession" over that investment. This is the
2	• •	20	plain and ordinary meaning of the treaty provision, when
2		21	interpreted in context and in good faith.
2		22	When taken together, all of these points are made
2		23	clear in the case authorities that I have referenced,
2		24	and they lead to only one conclusion: there is no
2		25	requirement for an active contribution to make
2	(CLIT 177), where it distinguished the IXI Tisia case that	23	requirement for all detrive contribution to make
	Page 137		Page 139
15:27	1 was about nominal value on the basis that KT Asia did	15:30 1	an investment. The Claimant simply has to show that
15:27		15:30 1	an investment. The Claimant simply has to show that it legitimately acquired the shares to have made
2	2 not pertain to a corporate restructuring.	2	it legitimately acquired the shares to have made
	not pertain to a corporate restructuring. One could only imagine the uncertainty that would be		it legitimately acquired the shares to have made an investment, and it has done so.
2	not pertain to a corporate restructuring. One could only imagine the uncertainty that would be introduced into the investment regime if adequate	2 3	it legitimately acquired the shares to have made an investment, and it has done so. I wish to just briefly touch on the returns point
; ;	not pertain to a corporate restructuring. One could only imagine the uncertainty that would be introduced into the investment regime if adequate consideration were a requirement of an investment.	2 3 4	it legitimately acquired the shares to have made an investment, and it has done so. I wish to just briefly touch on the returns point before I hand it back to Mr Palmer. This point we say
2	not pertain to a corporate restructuring. One could only imagine the uncertainty that would be introduced into the investment regime if adequate consideration were a requirement of an investment. Fifth, the origin of the funds from which the	2 3 4 5 6	it legitimately acquired the shares to have made an investment, and it has done so. I wish to just briefly touch on the returns point before I hand it back to Mr Palmer. This point we say is fatal to the Respondent
2	not pertain to a corporate restructuring. One could only imagine the uncertainty that would be introduced into the investment regime if adequate consideration were a requirement of an investment. Fifth, the origin of the funds from which the original investment was made is irrelevant. This was	2 3 4 5 6 7	it legitimately acquired the shares to have made an investment, and it has done so. I wish to just briefly touch on the returns point before I hand it back to Mr Palmer. This point we say is fatal to the Respondent THE PRESIDENT: Maybe before we go there, let us just check
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2 2 3 3 4 3 4 3 4 4 1 1	not pertain to a corporate restructuring. One could only imagine the uncertainty that would be introduced into the investment regime if adequate consideration were a requirement of an investment. Fifth, the origin of the funds from which the original investment was made is irrelevant. This was confirmed in RENERGY v Spain, Tokios Tokelés and a number of other cases cited in the Claimant's response. In particular, it does not matter if the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	it legitimately acquired the shares to have made an investment, and it has done so. I wish to just briefly touch on the returns point before I hand it back to Mr Palmer. This point we say is fatal to the Respondent THE PRESIDENT: Maybe before we go there, let us just check with the court reporter whether we should not have a break, because this morning he was ready to go on, but the day gets longer. (Pause)
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39 (Pages 137 to 140)

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15:35 1	(3.32 pm)	15:48 1	to reserves."
2	(A short break)	2	Now I note that, just like in this case, in
3	(3.46 pm)	3	OI European Group, the dividends were declared or not
4	THE PRESIDENT: Dr Kirk, you were about to go to another	4	declared, as the case may be, by the directors of the
5	topic.	5	subsidiary company, not by the shareholder, and the
6	DR KIRK: Yes. Thank you, Professor Kaufmann-Kohler. I was	6	reference for that is paragraph 597.
7	about to talk very briefly about the returns issue,	7	That is, of course, standard corporate practice.
8	which the Claimant says is fatal to the Respondent's	8	It's very usual that the directors of the company itself
9	investor objection.	9	declare the dividends, not the shareholder. But this
10	It's quite noticeable that Mr Wordsworth's	10	did not prevent a finding that the retained profits were
11	submissions on this point focused almost exclusively on	11	investments. The economic reality is that the directors
12	the term "dividend". But the definition of "returns" is	12	act in accordance with the wishes or consensus of the
13	far wider, and includes profits yielded.	13	shareholders.
14	It is clear that Mineralogy yielded profits	14	This is especially the economic reality of a closely
15	regardless of whether a dividend was paid, and that	15	held, single-shareholder company. The shareholder can
16	these profits can constitute investments in and of	16	take out the profits of the investment if it wishes to
17	themselves under the treaty.	17	do so, and it would be naive to suggest otherwise.
18	It is also undisputed that the Claimant, Zeph,	18	Finally, I briefly want to touch on a point raised
19	approved those profits remaining in Mineralogy when it	19	by the President yesterday with Mr Birkett about needing
20	signed off on the accounts which specifically retained	20	to retain some cash in the company in this case,
21	those profits within Mineralogy. The Claimant,	21	Mineralogy in order to allow Mineralogy to operate.
22 23	Mineralogy's parent, has reinvested the profits returned by Mineralogy in that business by approving those	22	Now, of course, normally that would be true. But
23	profits being left in the business for Mineralogy's use.	23 24	Mineralogy is rather unique: it requires virtually no working capital to maintain its source of income. It is
25	I just want to take you to the case of OI European	25	likely the largest privately owned royalty stream in the
23	I just want to take you to the case of OI European	23	likely the largest privately owned royalty stream in the
	Page 141		Page 143
15:47 1	Group v Venezuela, which is CLA-189, which we say is	15:50 1	world.
2	very apposite.	2	If Mineralogy or its shareholder, Zeph, chose to
3	The tribunal held in that case (paragraph 241) that:	3	reinvest zero dollars in its operations, Mineralogy
4	"When a shareholder decides not to collect profits	4	would still maintain the vast majority of its income.
5	in full, but to leave them in whole or in part	5	It is only because it chooses to reinvest that it did
6	with the company, it is waiving a right and making	6	•
7	a contribution of cash to the company, which is enriched		not pay out virtually all of the earnings as dividends.
		7	not pay out virtually all of the earnings as dividends. And that reinvestment is the will of the shareholder.
8	- · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		And that reinvestment is the will of the shareholder.
8	to the extent of the amount that the shareholder relinquished."	7	
	to the extent of the amount that the shareholder relinquished."	7 8	And that reinvestment is the will of the shareholder. The retention of profits in 2019 and 2020 are returns,
9	to the extent of the amount that the shareholder relinquished."	7 8 9	And that reinvestment is the will of the shareholder. The retention of profits in 2019 and 2020 are returns, and are "investments" under the treaty.
9 10	to the extent of the amount that the shareholder relinquished." The tribunal goes on to say (paragraph 242): "It is true that the funds provided by the foreign	7 8 9 10	And that reinvestment is the will of the shareholder. The retention of profits in 2019 and 2020 are returns, and are "investments" under the treaty. So to conclude on the overall
9 10 11	to the extent of the amount that the shareholder relinquished." The tribunal goes on to say (paragraph 242): "It is true that the funds provided by the foreign investor [in that case] to Venezuelan Companies would	7 8 9 10 11	And that reinvestment is the will of the shareholder. The retention of profits in 2019 and 2020 are returns, and are "investments" under the treaty. So to conclude on the overall "investor"/"investment" objection, it's the Claimant's
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40 (Pages 141 to 144)

15:52 1 That's at paragraph 558. And we would say that that 2 is applicable not just to the definition of "investor" 3 but also to Article 11 on substantive investment. It is 4 clearly the role of the Tribunal to interpret that 5 provision and apply it. 6 Just on that point, I think it's important to 6 More and I reached the conclusion, after considering 7 emphasise that it's the Claimant's position that the 8 Claimant was acting in good faith when it invested in 9 these Singapore businesses. And just to remind the 10 Tribunal that it is of course legitimate to restructure, 11 as we all agree, in order to obtain treaty protection. 12 So it must also be legitimate to bring oneself within 13 the provisions of the treaty in order to ensure that 14 treaty protection exists, and that would include 15 ensuring you have a substantive business, if that's 16 a requirement under the treaty. 17 So as long as the restructuring and the treaty 18 protection itself is legitimate, there could be no basis 20 business" section is illegitimate or an abuse, 21 separately from that general abuse of right point. 22 Thank you. 23 MR PALMER: Thanks, Madam President. 25 In my evidence before the Tribunal bank inversed in the decided not to fund any new coal projects. 26 decided not to fund any new coal projects. 3 So in early June 2018, as the evidence shows paragraphs 119, 122 and 123 of my first witness statement, these three documents were in my po decided not to fund any new coal projects. 3 So in early June 2018, as the evidence shows paragraphs 119, 122 and 123 of my first witness statement, these three documents were in my po decided not to fund any new coal projects. 4 decided not to fund any new coal projects. 5 provisions of and apply it. 5 statement, these three documents were in my po documents in June 2018, that the coal project's of obtaining the billions of dollars needed for its development in Australia were non-existent. 10 The Claimant would submit that that decision was then, as a director of Mineralogy and Warat and	ssession. the thances I faced than Coal thand or was the ray of the conference of
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Thank you. 22 I explained the purpose of seeking to raise debt	apore.
23 MR PALMER: Thanks, Madam President. 23 in Singapore, with the assistance of international	unding
	banks
24 I'd like to summarise for the Tribunal the decision 24 whose regional headquarters were based in Sing	apore, and
25 I made to offshore in June 2018 and the subsequent 25 [that] that was how the system worked; and how	such
Page 145 Page 147	
15:53 1 events that are demonstrated by the evidence, and bring 15:56 1 arrangements were available in Singapore and	were not
2 all that together; in so doing, answering some of the 2 available in Australia.	
3 obvious questions that the Tribunal and the Respondent 3 I also explained in my evidence given in	
4 raised during my cross-examination yesterday. 4 cross-examination to the Tribunal that I had b	
5 This matter is addressed in the evidence in my first 5 involved in and was familiar with fundraising	
6 witness statement at paragraphs 113 to 139 and evidence 6 Singapore. I explained and I'll go to the sec	
7 given by me yesterday. 7 on the transcript in a second I explained that	
8 I'd like to start at the beginning. Firstly, I'd 8 my companies had previously borrowed \$100	
9 refer to Exhibit [C-]166, which I did in my opening, 9 fund three ships in Singapore. Construction f	~
10 which is a letter dated 12 December 2017 from the 10 been raised by each ship transaction incorpora	-
Premier of Queensland to the Prime Minister of Australia 11 a separate company that had been established	o fund
12 vetoing funding of \$1 billion for the Adani Coal 12 each ship's constructions.	
13 Project. 13 We see the transcript at Day 2, page 29, fro	
14 In paragraph 123 of my first witness statement, 14 lines 2 to 6; and page 272, from lines 21 to 23	
15 I explained that the Adani Coal Project is located 15 The Claimant submits that it's logical, cons	-
16 alongside the Claimant's project in Queensland. And as 16 the previous success my company had experie	
17 I stated in the Claimant's opening, I note that the 17 borrowing funds in Singapore, that the structu	
18 Adani Coal Project was eventually funded through 18 doing so could be adopted in raising loan fund 19 Singapore	S III
19 Singapore. 19 Singapore. 20 Saccordly I refer to Eyhibit P. 484 which is a draft. 20 Paragraphy 126 to 120 of my first witness of	otomt
20 Secondly, I refer to Exhibit R-484, which is a draft 20 Paragraphs 126 to 130 of my first witness s	
21 bill entitled "Coal-Fired Funding Prohibition Bill", 21 further expand on why Singapore was attractive which was legislation then currently before the 22 a fundraising perspective. The Claimant subm	
23 Australian Parliament, inter alia, banning the funding 24 of coal projects. 25 a simple commercial decision, being: should to the project be closed down and millions of dollars.	
24 of coal projects. 24 project be closed down and millions of donars 25 Thirdly, I refer to Exhibit C-165, which is 25 off, or should the project have a go and seek to	writton
25 on, or should the project have a go and seek to	
Page 146 Page 148	

41 (Pages 145 to 148)

15:57	restructure in Singapore? A simple, straightforward	16:00 1	having checked with my team: we do accept that the King
2		2	exhibits are in. But the Harris statement is not.
3		3	MR PALMER: That's correct, yes.
2	-	4	THE PRESIDENT: But clarified that the withdrawal did not
5		5	extend to the exhibits, absolutely. Right.
6		6	So the reference to the Harris statement can be
7		7	made you can refer to your statement, of course, that
8		8	says you asked Mr Harris to do this. You cannot refer
ç		9	to his statement.
10		10	MR PALMER: I haven't.
1:		11	THE PRESIDENT: You can refer to the exhibits to his
12		12	statements.
13		13	MR PALMER: That's correct.
14		14	THE PRESIDENT: Is that a clear direction?
1:		15	MR PALMER: That's how I look at it.
10		16	So in my statement, I confirmed that I instructed
1'		17	Mr Harris on or about July 2018 to engage London
18		18	economist Mr James King to prepare a comprehensive
19		19	report in respect of the coal project which could be
20		20	used to provide for potential lenders. These reports
2:		21	can be found at Exhibit C-472 and Exhibit C-474, and
22		22	each of the members of the Tribunal should read them.
23		23	Mr King provided his independent report in late
24	-	24	September 2018, and the two Singapore companies
2:		25	which is on the record were incorporated on
2.	question about the exhibits, and it was ruled at that	23	which is on the record were incorporated on
	Page 149		Page 151
15:59	5	16:01 1	30 November 2018.
2	and that was stressed to the other side. I realise	2	In my evidence yesterday I will give the
2	and that was stressed to the other side. I realise Mr Donaghue wasn't there at that time, but that was what	2 3	In my evidence yesterday I will give the transcript and lines in a minute I confirmed that it
3	and that was stressed to the other side. I realise Mr Donaghue wasn't there at that time, but that was what was discussed.	2 3 4	In my evidence yesterday I will give the transcript and lines in a minute I confirmed that it was proposed that a Singapore company be used to raise
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2 3 4 5	and that was stressed to the other side. I realise Mr Donaghue wasn't there at that time, but that was what was discussed. And I referred to paragraph 51 of my statement, which was made on 29 January 2024, and I have not	2 3 4 5 6	In my evidence yesterday I will give the transcript and lines in a minute I confirmed that it was proposed that a Singapore company be used to raise loan funds. And the Claimant submits that this was in accordance with the structure that my companies had
5	and that was stressed to the other side. I realise Mr Donaghue wasn't there at that time, but that was what was discussed. And I referred to paragraph 51 of my statement, which was made on 29 January 2024, and I have not withdrawn my statement from any evidence.	2 3 4 5 6 7	In my evidence yesterday I will give the transcript and lines in a minute I confirmed that it was proposed that a Singapore company be used to raise loan funds. And the Claimant submits that this was in accordance with the structure that my companies had previously used when raising loan capital in Singapore.
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16:03 1	in and expand. That's our evidence."	16:05 1	paragraph 86, the engineering companies provided
2	That was the quote.	2	contract maintenance to major shipyards operating in
3	Continuing on page 176 of the transcript for Day 2,	3	Singapore. During the Covid-19 pandemic, there was
4	in answer to a question from the Respondent, I stated:	4	an unexpected slowdown in demand and they went into
5	" it was pretty hard to get government licences	5	voluntary liquidation.
6	and concessions. So when it became available,	6	As the Amendment Act was enacted on 13 August 2020,
7	Michael Mashayanyika thought we should move quickly, and	7	if the Claimant had been incorporated for the purpose of
8	I accepted his recommendation and did it."	8	treaty protection purposes, it would not have placed the
9	As set out in Exhibit C-70, the Claimant was	9	engineering companies into liquidation in October 2020.
10	incorporated on 21 January 2019, and Exhibit C-507	10	The engineering companies would have been maintained for
11	confirms that the engineering companies	11	the purposes of that protection. The facts are that the
12	[GCS] Engineering Service Pte Ltd, Visco Engineering	12	engineering companies were not maintained. This is
13	[and] Visco [Offshore] were acquired by the Claimant on	13	a telling fact which destroys the unsubstantiated and
14	31 January 2019.	14	scandalous allegations of the Respondent in this regard.
15	During my cross-examination yesterday, commencing at	15	I will now deal with the abuse of process objection,
16	line 9 of page 176 of the transcript, I stated:	16	before calling on Dr Kirk to continue.
17	" the first thing we did was to look at the	17	The evidence is clear that the Claimant has
18	conditions of the Indian workers that were brought in to	18	a substantive business in Singapore, and did at the time
19	be contract labourers on ships, and we thought that they	19	the Amendment Act became law on 13 August 2020. As the
20	weren't up to a proper human rights standard. And then	20	Tribunal noted in Procedural Order No. 4, the Respondent
21	we increased those facilities and tried to make sure	21	has confirmed the Amendment Act was not foreseeable.
22	there was additional concessions. In Singapore, the	22	All claims before the Tribunal in the dispute that
23	human the health and safety regulations for immigrant	23	the Tribunal is considering are as a consequence of the
24	workers are less than they should be, and not the same	24	Amendment Act. If there was no Amendment Act, there
25	as Singaporean workers. So that was our first concern."	25	would be no dispute and there would be no arbitration.
	Page 153		Page 155
16:04 1	The Claimant submits that once the Claimant had	16:07 1	The Claimant has complied with the terms of the treaty
2	acquired the engineering companies, it found that they	2	and has a substantive business in Singapore, which
3	were, in effect, labour hiring companies keeping Indian	3	it has established in good faith, perfectly properly,
4	immigrant workers in subhuman conditions that were	4	inter alia, on 24 January 2020. Consequently, the
5	a disaster. The Claimant submits that by the end of	5	[Claimant] meets the test set out in the treaty.
6	[2019], worker condition matters had been remedied.	6	Before I turn to a few closing observations of the
7	As stated at page 179, line 6 to page 190, line 20 of the transcript from Day 2, the Claimant entered into	7	facts, can I seek to emphasise the following in relation
8 9	the Kleenmatic joint venture on 24 January 2020 and	8 9	to the rationale for incorporation of the Claimant,
10	•	10	while it is only relevant if the Tribunal rejects our case on foreseeability.
11	acquired the engineering companies. The remaining 10%	11	I would like to make it clear that there is no
12		12	proper basis to reject the Claimant's evidence on
13	from line 2.	13	rationale. As I hope the Tribunal will have gathered
14		14	from my evidence yesterday, I am an honest person who
15		15	deals with matters swiftly and fairly. I was prepared
16		16	to make concessions yesterday even when the point
17			
	I stated:	1/	arguably cut across the Claimant's case. And
18		17 18	arguably cut across the Claimant's case. And I explained to the President how I manage my business.
18 19	" we were getting, I think about 2% or 3% for the	18	I explained to the President how I manage my business.
19	" we were getting, I think about 2% or 3% for the funds we had on term deposit, or on deposit generally	18 19	I explained to the President how I manage my business. I'm an honest man and gave my evidence honestly.
	" we were getting, I think about 2% or 3% for the funds we had on term deposit, or on deposit generally	18 19 20	I explained to the President how I manage my business. I'm an honest man and gave my evidence honestly. I am dismayed that the Respondent persists in using
19 20	" we were getting, I think about 2% or 3% for the funds we had on term deposit, or on deposit generally with banks, and this is showing a yield close to 10%." The Claimant submits that it is normal business	18 19 20 21	I explained to the President how I manage my business. I'm an honest man and gave my evidence honestly. I am dismayed that the Respondent persists in using words like "bad faith", "sham", "lack of credibility",
19 20 21	" we were getting, I think about 2% or 3% for the funds we had on term deposit, or on deposit generally with banks, and this is showing a yield close to 10%."	18 19 20	I explained to the President how I manage my business. I'm an honest man and gave my evidence honestly. I am dismayed that the Respondent persists in using
19 20 21 22	" we were getting, I think about 2% or 3% for the funds we had on term deposit, or on deposit generally with banks, and this is showing a yield close to 10%." The Claimant submits that it is normal business decisions to seek high returns on investment when it is	18 19 20 21 22	I explained to the President how I manage my business. I'm an honest man and gave my evidence honestly. I am dismayed that the Respondent persists in using words like "bad faith", "sham", "lack of credibility", in circumstances where I have made clear my position.
19 20 21 22 23	" we were getting, I think about 2% or 3% for the funds we had on term deposit, or on deposit generally with banks, and this is showing a yield close to 10%." The Claimant submits that it is normal business decisions to seek high returns on investment when it is available. The Claimant accepts the proposition of the	18 19 20 21 22 23	I explained to the President how I manage my business. I'm an honest man and gave my evidence honestly. I am dismayed that the Respondent persists in using words like "bad faith", "sham", "lack of credibility", in circumstances where I have made clear my position. They have sought to adduce expert evidence about
19 20 21 22 23 24	" we were getting, I think about 2% or 3% for the funds we had on term deposit, or on deposit generally with banks, and this is showing a yield close to 10%." The Claimant submits that it is normal business decisions to seek high returns on investment when it is available. The Claimant accepts the proposition of the Respondent that the engineering companies were not profitable. As stated in my fifth witness statement at	18 19 20 21 22 23 24	I explained to the President how I manage my business. I'm an honest man and gave my evidence honestly. I am dismayed that the Respondent persists in using words like "bad faith", "sham", "lack of credibility", in circumstances where I have made clear my position. They have sought to adduce expert evidence about questions and rationale, but it does not mean that the Tribunal should reject my evidence on the facts. That
19 20 21 22 23 24	" we were getting, I think about 2% or 3% for the funds we had on term deposit, or on deposit generally with banks, and this is showing a yield close to 10%." The Claimant submits that it is normal business decisions to seek high returns on investment when it is available. The Claimant accepts the proposition of the Respondent that the engineering companies were not	18 19 20 21 22 23 24	I explained to the President how I manage my business. I'm an honest man and gave my evidence honestly. I am dismayed that the Respondent persists in using words like "bad faith", "sham", "lack of credibility", in circumstances where I have made clear my position. They have sought to adduce expert evidence about questions and rationale, but it does not mean that the

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16:08 1	is the reality of the position. It's why speculation	16:11 1	statute, it challenged the second award in the courts,
2	from third parties, none of whom are witnesses of fact,	2	and it lost. It then participated in the third
3	about what might or might not have been done should be	3	arbitration. It signed the arbitration agreement. It
4	rejected.	4	attended directions hearings. It agreed a timetable for
5	I will now turn to some of the facts. I will now	5	submissions. It agreed a hearing date and a date on
6	hand over to Dr Kirk to complete this section of the	6	which the award for damages in the third arbitration
7	Claimant's case.	7	would be issued. It signed the mediation agreement.
8	DR KIRK: Thank you very much.	8	Now, if it's the Respondent's position, as it said
9	I just want to start by addressing the	9	this morning, that abuse of right is a fact-specific
10	15 October 2019 letter (R-145) that Dr Donaghue spoke	10	enquiry, then these are the facts that are very, very
11	about this morning.	11	important. All the indicators were that Western
12	The Claimant submits that there is no connection to	12	Australia would go through the normal dispute resolution
13	be drawn between the Amendment Act and the threats made	13	process required by the State Agreement and the
14	by Mr McGowan over the CITIC dispute by virtue of this	14	Western Australian Arbitration Act. In these
15	October 2019 letter. The cases are clear: to be	15	circumstances, it is just not plausible to say that the
16	reasonably foreseeable, the dispute has to be a real or	16	Amendment Act was a real prospect at any time in 2019,
17	reasonable prospect; not just something you can imagine,	17	or indeed before it was passed.
18	not just a mere possibility.	18	To this end, it is agreed by the parties, and
19	In January 2019, the Claimant did not even know for	19	established or recorded in Procedural Order 4, that the
20	certain that it had the right to claim damages in the	20	Amendment Act was not even conceived of until May 2020.
21	BSIOP dispute. That was not confirmed until the	21	I have popped up on the screen again that text from
22	October 2019 award in the second BSIOP arbitration.	22	Mr Quigley. There is no mention here in this text of
23	One could hardly say that removal of that right was	23	the CITIC dispute or of any earlier threats. To all
24	a real prospect in January 2019, ten months before the	24	intents and purposes, this is a sudden idea that has
25	right had even been confirmed. Surely, for a measure	25	occurred to Mr Quigley in the middle of the night,
	Page 157		P 150
	1 age 137		Page 159
16:10 1	removing a right to be a real prospect, the right itself	16:13 1	thanks, apparently, to the fact that he no longer had
2	must first exist.	2	a girlfriend. This sudden idea dreamed up in the wee
3	When Mineralogy did learn that it had the right to	3	hours of 23 May 2020 cannot possibly have been
4	damages, it sent off what might be described and in	4	reasonably foreseeable or a real prospect in
5	fact, the Solicitor-General also described it this	5	January 2019 or in October 2019.
6	morning as "a shot across the bows", warning the	6	The Tribunal will know that the facts in this case
7	Government not to interfere with its newly confirmed	7	are markedly different from many of the cases where the
8	right.	8	abuse of rights argument has succeeded. In these cases,
9	Again, as the Solicitor-General said, there had been	9	like in Philip Morris, discussed this morning, they
10	•	10	involved detailed announcements by governments of
11		11	well-thought-through policies.
12	•	12	Even in Clorox v Venezuela, a case we have discussed
13		13	a lot, where the government announced that it was going
14		14	to implement price control measures to regulate products
15		15	that exceeded a certain profit margin and create a new
16		16	entity charged with implementing those measures the
17		17	announcement that prompted Clorox to undertake
18	*	18	a corporate restructure and obtain treaty protection
19	1 1	19	even this announcement was not enough to make the law
20	•	20	enacted six months later foreseeable.
21	Quite frankly, it appears the letter had no effect	21	The tribunal held, and the Swiss court agreed, that
			•
22	at all, and went largely unnoticed.	22	the President's speech was so general that a reasonable
23	at all, and went largely unnoticed. The Western Australian Government continued,	23	observer could not objectively have foreseen the
23 24	at all, and went largely unnoticed. The Western Australian Government continued, quite properly, the process that had been started back	23 24	observer could not objectively have foreseen the specific dispute that eventuated. Clorox could not
23	at all, and went largely unnoticed. The Western Australian Government continued, quite properly, the process that had been started back	23	observer could not objectively have foreseen the
23 24	at all, and went largely unnoticed. The Western Australian Government continued, quite properly, the process that had been started back	23 24	observer could not objectively have foreseen the specific dispute that eventuated. Clorox could not

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16:15	1	announcing the measure what range of products would be	16:19 1	treaty jurisdiction for a dispute that was already in
	2	impacted by the new price law, nor the manner in which	2	existence.
	3	the law would be applied.	3	The Tidewater tribunal dismissed that argument,
	4	Applying this reasoning to the present case, there	4	saying that the subject of the treaty claim was the law
	5	is no possibility that the vague statements made by	5	expropriating assets, and that this was clearly distinct
	6	Mr McGowan in November 2018 about Western Australia	6	from the commercial dispute between the subsidiary and
	7	considering its options in the best interests of the	7	the state entity. The existence of that commercial
	8	people, which might even include perhaps amending the	8	dispute did not mean that Venezuela's later
	9	State Agreement, could ever foreshadow the present	9	expropriatory actions should have been expected.
	10	dispute or even, quite frankly, any dispute that might	10	Importantly, it was relevant to the tribunal's
	11	have eventuated, but didn't, on the CITIC matter. His	11	assessment of foreseeability that at the time of the
	12	statements were simply too vague.	12	restructure, the subsidiary and the state entity were
	13	It is not conceivable when one considers the terms	13	acting in a manner consistent with continuing the will
	14	of the Amendment Act that it could have been foreseeable	14	to trade, and in the usual way that would be expected to
	15	in a western democracy. Of course, as we know, it was	15	resolve the dispute between them. The conduct pointed
	16	developed in secret. And it went further than even just	16	against a reasonably foreseeable expropriation of the
	17	considering options; indeed, it went so far as to	17	claimant's investment.
	18	curtail judicial power and to exempt politicians and	18	Similarly in this case, the Western Australian
	19	government officials from the criminal law. How that	19	Government at all times acted in a manner that would
	20	could be foreshadowed from the statements of Mr McGowan	20	objectively appear as though they were anticipating
	21	in November 2018 is hard to know.	21	their participation in the domestic arbitration process.
	22	There are a number of cases in the record where	22	From May 2020 onwards, this was clearly a deliberate
	23	disputes or disagreements between the parties existed	23	ploy to ensure that Mineralogy did not anticipate the
	24	prior to the restructure for treaty protection, and	24	Amendment Act.
	25	these disputes were often the reason for the	25	Similarly in Mobil v Venezuela (RLA-92), that case
		Page 161		Page 163
16:17	1	restructure: simply to gain treaty protection. However,	16:21 1	concerned a corporate restructure designed specifically
	2	the tribunals in those cases have confirmed that it does	2	and expressly to gain treaty protection at a time where
	3	not constitute abuse of right or process where that	3	there were already existing disputes with the host
	4	dispute is separate or only tangentially connected to	4	state. The state had already started to impose
	5	the dispute to be decided by the tribunal.	5	increased royalties and income tax rates on the claimant
	6	A heightened state of tension, hostility or dispute	6	when the claimant restructured to obtain treaty
	7	between an investor and the host state simply does not	7	protection. And Mr Palmer referred to this earlier.
	8	mean any particular adverse measure or specific dispute	8	Mobil was quite candid that its motivation for the
	9	is reasonably foreseeable. I have already referred to	9	restructure was to gain treaty protection, due to its
	10	the Clorox decision (CLA-182), which is apposite.	10	concerns about the possibility of more adverse treatment
	11	In Tidewater v Venezuela (RLA-93), the claimant's	11	in the future. After the restructure, the government
	12	subsidiary had been engaged in an ongoing commercial	12	implemented various measures to nationalise certain oil
	13	dispute with a state entity over arrears payable under	13	projects, including the claimant's.
	14	various invoices and whether the subsidiary's contract	14	The Mobil tribunal held that the existence of the
	15	with the state entity should be renewed. It was	15	pre-existing disputes, which were not the subject of the
	16	a significant dispute at that time between the Tidewater	16	arbitration before that tribunal, did not disqualify the
	17	subsidiary and the Venezuelan state entity.	17	tribunal's jurisdiction in respect of the
	18	After this dispute arose, the Tidewater Group	18	Nationalisation Law, which was enacted after the
	19	restructured to gain treaty protection. And the claim	19	restructuring.
	20	before the tribunal related to a law that was then	20	Finally, in Aguas del Tunari v Bolivia (CLA-185),
	21	enacted by the state after the restructure which	21	it was a case that involved an investment that had faced
	22	expropriated the assets of the subsidiary. Venezuela	22	strong popular opposition for a considerable time. At
	23	alleged that the treaty claim was merely an extension of	23	the time of the restructure, citizen groups and civil
	24	the pre-existing commercial dispute and that the	24	society organisations had expressed strong concern about
	25	claimant had been incorporated to access investment	25	the concession, and had, in some cases, called for its
		Page 162		Page 164

45 (Pages 161 to 164)

2	annulment. The protests eventually turned violent and	16:25 1	thank all of those people, Madam Chair. Thank you.
2	the Bolivian President declared a state of siege. The Bolivian authorities then terminated the concession.		THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
3		3	So we have now concluded your closing remarks and
4	Bolivia objected that the restructure had occurred	4	your answers to the Tribunal questions. Let me just see
5	at a time when the level of protests meant that the	5	whether my colleagues have any additional questions.
6	events that followed, including termination, were	6	No. I don't either. And you don't either. Fine.
7	foreseeable. The tribunal disagreed. The general	7	Thank you very much for addressing our questions in
8	public unpopularity and calls from interest groups for	8	a detailed fashion. That will be very helpful in our
9	the concession to be annulled made it imaginable that	9	deliberations.
10	the concession would be cancelled, but did not raise	10	I would like now to summarise what the Tribunal has
11	a foreseeable prospect that the government would in fact	11	this mind with respect to procedural aspects that we
12	act to terminate the concession. That measure was	12	need to cover. If needed, we can have a break
13	imaginable, but not foreseeable in the relevant sense	13	thereafter and you can consult within teams to see how
14	until the riots broke out on a larger scale in the	14	you want to react; or if it is obvious and a break is
15	following year after the restructuring had occurred.	15	not needed, we can just carry on.
16	I think I'll leave those there, given the time.	16	The first point is that we will need transcript
17	MR PALMER: I think our time has run out.	17	corrections to have a final transcript available. That
18	THE PRESIDENT: No, I have seen that you are now	18	is pre-redaction process. And we are in your hands
19	five minutes over time. But I thought that with the	19	about the time limit. That time limit, once we have the
20	permission of the Respondent, to whom you offered time	20	final transcript, then the redaction process as it is
21	yesterday, I would not interrupt you.	21	specified in PO3 starts; and once that is concluded, the
22	MR PALMER: Thank you.	22	transcript will be uploaded on the PCA website.
23	THE PRESIDENT: But I don't know how much more time you	23	We had said at the pre-hearing conference, and also
24	have.	24	in PO5, that in principle there would be no post-hearing
25	MR PALMER: I think we can conclude there, if we could just	25	briefs unless the Tribunal has specific questions. We
	Page 165		Page 167
16:24 1	have perhaps one minute of extra time.	16:27 1	have asked our questions, and for now I think we feel
2	THE PRESIDENT: Sure. No, no, I didn't want to cut you off.	2	that we have what we need to deliberate and reach
3	So if you have a few more things to say, you may do so.	3	a decision.
4	MR PALMER: I think we're happy to conclude there.	4	That being said, there's always a slight reservation
5	We just wanted to spend a minute to thank	5	to be made that in case in the course of the
6	Mr McGowan, our court reporter here, for the excellent	6	deliberation a specific issues comes up, then we would
7	job that he's done. I thought that was important, to		
	thank Mr McGowan for that. And certainly to thank the	7	ask for the parties' input. But that would be quite
8		8	ask for the parties' input. But that would be quite a limited, specific question.
9	Tribunal for coming here. And also to thank the	8 9	ask for the parties' input. But that would be quite a limited, specific question. We would like to have statements of costs for this
9 10	Tribunal for coming here. And also to thank the Respondent, and every member of the Respondent's team,	8 9 10	ask for the parties' input. But that would be quite a limited, specific question. We would like to have statements of costs for this phase of the proceedings. When I say "statements of
9 10 11	Tribunal for coming here. And also to thank the Respondent, and every member of the Respondent's team, who acted very professionally. It's very important that	8 9 10 11	ask for the parties' input. But that would be quite a limited, specific question. We would like to have statements of costs for this phase of the proceedings. When I say "statements of costs", I don't think we need submissions on costs,
9 10 11 12	Tribunal for coming here. And also to thank the Respondent, and every member of the Respondent's team, who acted very professionally. It's very important that we recognise that they're doing a professional job, and	8 9 10 11 12	ask for the parties' input. But that would be quite a limited, specific question. We would like to have statements of costs for this phase of the proceedings. When I say "statements of costs", I don't think we need submissions on costs, because we know that we are under the UNCITRAL Rules;
9 10 11 12 13	Tribunal for coming here. And also to thank the Respondent, and every member of the Respondent's team, who acted very professionally. It's very important that we recognise that they're doing a professional job, and they've certainly done that, and we want to thank them	8 9 10 11 12 13	ask for the parties' input. But that would be quite a limited, specific question. We would like to have statements of costs for this phase of the proceedings. When I say "statements of costs", I don't think we need submissions on costs, because we know that we are under the UNCITRAL Rules; we know that the UNCITRAL Rules have provisions on
9 10 11 12 13 14	Tribunal for coming here. And also to thank the Respondent, and every member of the Respondent's team, who acted very professionally. It's very important that we recognise that they're doing a professional job, and they've certainly done that, and we want to thank them very much.	8 9 10 11 12 13 14	ask for the parties' input. But that would be quite a limited, specific question. We would like to have statements of costs for this phase of the proceedings. When I say "statements of costs", I don't think we need submissions on costs, because we know that we are under the UNCITRAL Rules; we know that the UNCITRAL Rules have provisions on allocation of costs. And unless the parties wish to
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15	Tribunal for coming here. And also to thank the Respondent, and every member of the Respondent's team, who acted very professionally. It's very important that we recognise that they're doing a professional job, and they've certainly done that, and we want to thank them very much. Also the Claimant would like to thank the [PCA] team for all the hard work that they've put in, and having	8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	ask for the parties' input. But that would be quite a limited, specific question. We would like to have statements of costs for this phase of the proceedings. When I say "statements of costs", I don't think we need submissions on costs, because we know that we are under the UNCITRAL Rules; we know that the UNCITRAL Rules have provisions on allocation of costs. And unless the parties wish to provide more, I don't think we need it. What we need is, of course, an itemisation of the
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	Tribunal for coming here. And also to thank the Respondent, and every member of the Respondent's team, who acted very professionally. It's very important that we recognise that they're doing a professional job, and they've certainly done that, and we want to thank them very much. Also the Claimant would like to thank the [PCA] team for all the hard work that they've put in, and having these facilities; and also all of the employees of the	8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	ask for the parties' input. But that would be quite a limited, specific question. We would like to have statements of costs for this phase of the proceedings. When I say "statements of costs", I don't think we need submissions on costs, because we know that we are under the UNCITRAL Rules; we know that the UNCITRAL Rules have provisions on allocation of costs. And unless the parties wish to provide more, I don't think we need it. What we need is, of course, an itemisation of the costs by category. We do not need supporting
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	Tribunal for coming here. And also to thank the Respondent, and every member of the Respondent's team, who acted very professionally. It's very important that we recognise that they're doing a professional job, and they've certainly done that, and we want to thank them very much. Also the Claimant would like to thank the [PCA] team for all the hard work that they've put in, and having these facilities; and also all of the employees of the Peace Palace that we can't forget. We couldn't be here	8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	ask for the parties' input. But that would be quite a limited, specific question. We would like to have statements of costs for this phase of the proceedings. When I say "statements of costs", I don't think we need submissions on costs, because we know that we are under the UNCITRAL Rules; we know that the UNCITRAL Rules have provisions on allocation of costs. And unless the parties wish to provide more, I don't think we need it. What we need is, of course, an itemisation of the costs by category. We do not need supporting documentation, unless a party were to raise it after,
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	Tribunal for coming here. And also to thank the Respondent, and every member of the Respondent's team, who acted very professionally. It's very important that we recognise that they're doing a professional job, and they've certainly done that, and we want to thank them very much. Also the Claimant would like to thank the [PCA] team for all the hard work that they've put in, and having these facilities; and also all of the employees of the Peace Palace that we can't forget. We couldn't be here without them. So I think it doesn't hurt to pause to remember those people and to think what they've done to make this possible, because it really is important; not just for this dispute, for other disputes, and for the rest of the world. That's what the Peace Palace was established for.	8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	ask for the parties' input. But that would be quite a limited, specific question. We would like to have statements of costs for this phase of the proceedings. When I say "statements of costs", I don't think we need submissions on costs, because we know that we are under the UNCITRAL Rules; we know that the UNCITRAL Rules have provisions on allocation of costs. And unless the parties wish to provide more, I don't think we need it. What we need is, of course, an itemisation of the costs by category. We do not need supporting documentation, unless a party were to raise it after, once the cost statement is filed or the Tribunal ex officio would ask questions. For that, we will also need a time limit. That has to come when the different publication issues are resolved, because that will still involve some time on both teams' accounts.
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46 (Pages 165 to 168)

16:29 1	have already mentioned the transcript. There is also	16:33 1	THE PRESIDENT: Fine. I see that the Claimant agrees. So
2	a provision in the annex to PO3 for publication of all	2	we can go for three weeks from today.
3	the submissions following the hearing to which the	3	MR WORDSWORTH: Thank you very much.
4	submissions relate, and it is specified that this	4	Then on issue 2, in principle, no PHBs, and you've
5	implies the Notice of Arbitration, that was deemed	5	indicated no need for them. And the Respondent
6	a statement of claim, and of course the four specific	6	understands and is content with that.
7	preliminary objection submissions.	7	There is just one exception, where, as to
8	They cannot yet be published because the redaction	8	question 5, the Tribunal earlier today was emphasising
9	process with respect to the Rejoinder is not completed,	9	the issue on interpretation of 27(2), and suggesting
10	and the Tribunal would propose that we wait to have all	10	that the Tribunal may not have in fact any discretion so
11	the submissions publishable to upload them on the	11	far as concerns approaching the treaty parties.
12	website. I think that was the idea of doing it after	12	Australia has not understood 27(2) in that way.
13	the hearing.	13	There are various textual reasons why that is. And we
14	We have asked ourselves what happens with the	14	are wondering whether the Tribunal would be assisted
15	PowerPoint presentations that were used during the	15	because obviously it's quite an important point on
16	hearing. There is no provision in the annex to PO3.	16	hearing more from the parties on that specific issue;
17	However, there is a provision on supporting	17	just that issue. And those would be, obviously, limited
18		18	submissions, directed at assisting you, which would be,
19		19	I would have thought, up to five pages; but you could,
20		20	if you wished to, set a shorter limit.
21		21	But we hope that would be of assistance to the
22	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	22	Tribunal. And of course we are saying that in
23	•	23	circumstances where the Claimant has never stated
24		24	a specific position as to the interpretation of these
25		25	wordings; it has just maintained the position that no
	•		
	Page 169		Page 171
16:31 1	the publication: that the redaction process is also in	16:35 1	issues on interpretation arise.
16:31 1	the publication: that the redaction process is also in	16:35 1 2	issues on interpretation arise. MR PALMER: I think we're content to limit submissions to
2	course. The Respondent has said that it has nothing to	2	MR PALMER: I think we're content to limit submissions to,
2 3	course. The Respondent has said that it has nothing to redact, and the Claimant has not yet said. But the	2 3	MR PALMER: I think we're content to limit submissions to, say, three pages, in a limited period, at a time where
2 3 4	course. The Respondent has said that it has nothing to redact, and the Claimant has not yet said. But the deadline has not expired, so you will do it whenever	2 3 4	MR PALMER: I think we're content to limit submissions to, say, three pages, in a limited period, at a time where the Respondent could put its submissions in and we'd
2 3 4 5	course. The Respondent has said that it has nothing to redact, and the Claimant has not yet said. But the deadline has not expired, so you will do it whenever unless you have an answer now; then that simplifies.	2 3 4 5	MR PALMER: I think we're content to limit submissions to, say, three pages, in a limited period, at a time where the Respondent could put its submissions in and we'd have a seven-day period to respond, something like that.
2 3 4 5 6	course. The Respondent has said that it has nothing to redact, and the Claimant has not yet said. But the deadline has not expired, so you will do it whenever unless you have an answer now; then that simplifies. But the deadline is around 25 or 26 September.	2 3 4 5 6	MR PALMER: I think we're content to limit submissions to, say, three pages, in a limited period, at a time where the Respondent could put its submissions in and we'd have a seven-day period to respond, something like that. I don't think it's a big issue.
2 3 4 5 6 7	course. The Respondent has said that it has nothing to redact, and the Claimant has not yet said. But the deadline has not expired, so you will do it whenever unless you have an answer now; then that simplifies. But the deadline is around 25 or 26 September. Let me see whether my co-arbitrators have anything	2 3 4 5 6 7	MR PALMER: I think we're content to limit submissions to, say, three pages, in a limited period, at a time where the Respondent could put its submissions in and we'd have a seven-day period to respond, something like that. I don't think it's a big issue. THE PRESIDENT: I would have thought simultaneous
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	course. The Respondent has said that it has nothing to redact, and the Claimant has not yet said. But the deadline has not expired, so you will do it whenever unless you have an answer now; then that simplifies. But the deadline is around 25 or 26 September. Let me see whether my co-arbitrators have anything to add to what I tried to summarise from our discussions. No? No? So a question to you: do you wish to have a moment to confer before you react? Then we can have a break. Or you can react immediately.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	MR PALMER: I think we're content to limit submissions to, say, three pages, in a limited period, at a time where the Respondent could put its submissions in and we'd have a seven-day period to respond, something like that. I don't think it's a big issue. THE PRESIDENT: I would have thought simultaneous submissions, because you're both starting from the same basis, which is what 27(2) means, essentially, for this Tribunal. DR KIRK: I was thinking there's probably a lot of common ground between the parties on this, and I just wondered
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	course. The Respondent has said that it has nothing to redact, and the Claimant has not yet said. But the deadline has not expired, so you will do it whenever unless you have an answer now; then that simplifies. But the deadline is around 25 or 26 September. Let me see whether my co-arbitrators have anything to add to what I tried to summarise from our discussions. No? No? So a question to you: do you wish to have a moment to confer before you react? Then we can have a break. Or you can react immediately. How is it on the Respondent's side?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	MR PALMER: I think we're content to limit submissions to, say, three pages, in a limited period, at a time where the Respondent could put its submissions in and we'd have a seven-day period to respond, something like that. I don't think it's a big issue. THE PRESIDENT: I would have thought simultaneous submissions, because you're both starting from the same basis, which is what 27(2) means, essentially, for this Tribunal. DR KIRK: I was thinking there's probably a lot of common ground between the parties on this, and I just wondered if the Respondent wanted to put in a submission
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	course. The Respondent has said that it has nothing to redact, and the Claimant has not yet said. But the deadline has not expired, so you will do it whenever unless you have an answer now; then that simplifies. But the deadline is around 25 or 26 September. Let me see whether my co-arbitrators have anything to add to what I tried to summarise from our discussions. No? No? So a question to you: do you wish to have a moment to confer before you react? Then we can have a break. Or you can react immediately. How is it on the Respondent's side? MR WORDSWORTH: I think we can react immediately,	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	MR PALMER: I think we're content to limit submissions to, say, three pages, in a limited period, at a time where the Respondent could put its submissions in and we'd have a seven-day period to respond, something like that. I don't think it's a big issue. THE PRESIDENT: I would have thought simultaneous submissions, because you're both starting from the same basis, which is what 27(2) means, essentially, for this Tribunal. DR KIRK: I was thinking there's probably a lot of common ground between the parties on this, and I just wondered
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	course. The Respondent has said that it has nothing to redact, and the Claimant has not yet said. But the deadline has not expired, so you will do it whenever unless you have an answer now; then that simplifies. But the deadline is around 25 or 26 September. Let me see whether my co-arbitrators have anything to add to what I tried to summarise from our discussions. No? No? So a question to you: do you wish to have a moment to confer before you react? Then we can have a break. Or you can react immediately. How is it on the Respondent's side? MR WORDSWORTH: I think we can react immediately, Madam President. THE PRESIDENT: And that is also the case of the Claimant, yes? MR PALMER: (Inaudible: no microphone) THE PRESIDENT: Good. So let me turn to the Respondent. Mr Wordsworth. MR WORDSWORTH: Thank you. On transcript corrections, I think the only real issue is the first date for completing corrections. We'd suggest three weeks for that, just to enable the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	MR PALMER: I think we're content to limit submissions to, say, three pages, in a limited period, at a time where the Respondent could put its submissions in and we'd have a seven-day period to respond, something like that. I don't think it's a big issue. THE PRESIDENT: I would have thought simultaneous submissions, because you're both starting from the same basis, which is what 27(2) means, essentially, for this Tribunal. DR KIRK: I was thinking there's probably a lot of common ground between the parties on this, and I just wondered if the Respondent wanted to put in a submission THE PRESIDENT: There is a lot of common ground, and we understand that. And we want to specifically note on the record that both parties have told us that they do not consider that a joint interpretation should be requested. We note that, and that is certainly helpful for our purposes. Maybe we take the proposal on board, and then I have a short discussion when we have all the points with my co-arbitrators and get back to you. But it is noted. MR WORDSWORTH: Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. Statement of costs: we understand the point that

47 (Pages 169 to 172) Trevor McGowan Amended by the parties

16:37 1	interested in information and itemisation. That does	16:40 1	final transcript that is the transcript established
2	call into question the issue of obviously there are	10.40 1	on the basis of the parties' corrections. If there are
3	the costs of this hearing, there are costs of the	3	disagreements on corrections, the Tribunal will deal
4	proceeding overall, but also separate cost elements with		with them, and then there will be a final transcript.
	respect to, for example, the interim measures	4	And that transcript will be subject to a redaction
5		5	
6	application and the like.	6	process, like any submission.
7	We are approaching this on the basis that the	7	MR PALMER: Okay.
8	Tribunal will be assisted by an itemisation that sets	8	THE PRESIDENT: So these matters should not be in the
9	out those individual cost limbs. And although the	9	publishable version for which the feed was cut, but
10	1 0	10	there might be others.
11	there is a rule or a potential rule as to costs	11	MR PALMER: Sure.
12		12	THE PRESIDENT: Yes. And then only will we publish the
13	useful for those matters to be itemised, and very	13	transcript.
14	•	14	But the point was on the statement of costs.
15	•	15	MR WORDSWORTH: On the statement of costs sorry,
16	•	16	I thought perhaps you wanted me to complete first, the
17	category", and thereby I wanted to say: legal fees,	17	Claimant having just addressed the issue of
18		18	publications.
19		19	I don't think we've got anything particular to add
20	•	20	so far as concerns the procedure you have outlined on
21	Is that the proposal, that you identify according to	21	publication. The issue you raised was as to the
22	topic?	22	treatment of PowerPoints, and Australia is content with
23	MR WORDSWORTH: That would be, Madam President.	23	the suggestion of the Tribunal thereto.
24	THE PRESIDENT: Yes.	24	Then issue 5 I think is for the Claimant anyway
25	MR WORDSWORTH: Or at least identify what, if any, different	25	only.
	Page 173		Page 175
	1 100 110		- 10
16:39 1	rule, or how the rule would apply so far as concerns	16:42 1	MR PALMER: The Claimant is content with that too,
16:39 1 2	those individual parts of the proceeding.	16:42 1 2	Madam President, yes.
	those individual parts of the proceeding. THE PRESIDENT: It's also a point that I am noting now, and		Madam President, yes. THE PRESIDENT: There was the suggestion with respect to the
2	those individual parts of the proceeding. THE PRESIDENT: It's also a point that I am noting now, and we can discuss it among the Tribunal members and revert	2	Madam President, yes. THE PRESIDENT: There was the suggestion with respect to the statement of costs that this would be itemised by topics
2 3	those individual parts of the proceeding. THE PRESIDENT: It's also a point that I am noting now, and we can discuss it among the Tribunal members and revert when we have all the different points.	2 3	Madam President, yes. THE PRESIDENT: There was the suggestion with respect to the statement of costs that this would be itemised by topics and there would be some submission.
2 3 4	those individual parts of the proceeding. THE PRESIDENT: It's also a point that I am noting now, and we can discuss it among the Tribunal members and revert when we have all the different points. MR WORDSWORTH: Then just as to procedure for that,	2 3 4	Madam President, yes. THE PRESIDENT: There was the suggestion with respect to the statement of costs that this would be itemised by topics and there would be some submission. MR PALMER: Well, we tend to agree with you that just by
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48 (Pages 173 to 176)

16:43	1 THE PRESIDENT: Yes. So there is no need to spend time on	17:08 1 are useful/appropriate from your point of view, you may
	2 doing this.	2 provide them, but the idea is that these are concise
	3 DR KIRK: Thank you.	3 comments.
	4 THE PRESIDENT: Anything that you wish to add, or any	4 We could provide application for reply if necessary.
	question, before we discuss the very few points that	5 That would really be if one of the parties thinks that
	6 remain among the Tribunal members?	6 one specific aspect needs to be commented on. And the
	7 MR PALMER: No.	7 application would have to be filed seven days after
	8 THE PRESIDENT: No?	8 submission. So if we keep to 31 January, it would be
	9 MR WORDSWORTH: No, thank you.	9 application by 7 February.
1	0 (4.44 pm)	As I mentioned just before, in the meantime, of
	1 (The members of the Tribunal withdraw)	course the Tribunal will proceed to deliberate. It is
1	2 (5.04 pm)	12 difficult for us to give you now an indication of when
	3 THE PRESIDENT: So we looked at the different steps, and	an award on preliminary objection will be ready. We
	4 I am summarising them. And where there were open	will certainly want to be diligent and render an award
	5 issues, I will make the proposals that the Tribunal has	15 as soon as possible. At the same time, this hearing has
	6 about those.	shown that there are a number of rather complex issues,
	7 So the first thing would be the transcript	both factual and legal; there are certain aspects of
	8 corrections; if possible, agreed. And because I am	18 legal principle as well. And we understand the high
	9 adding the "if possible, agreed", I add also a week. So	19 stakes involved in this case, which means that we want
	we would have four weeks from now, which is 16 October.	20 to be careful in the way we handle this and issue
	We confirm: no post-hearing briefs. However, it is	21 a good-quality decision.
	true that it would be helpful for us to have short	<u> </u>
		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
		reactions on this summary, if there is anything that
	five pages. I mean, we are not in kindergarten; you	24 requires comment or clarification.
4	5 will know what needs to be provided. It seemed to us	25 Mr Wordsworth.
	Page 177	Page 179
17:06	1 that 16 October might be a good deadline for that.	17:10 1 MR WORDSWORTH: Only, Madam President, as you might have
17:06	Then the statement of costs. And to get to the time	2 anticipated, Australia would be very grateful, on the
17:06	Then the statement of costs. And to get to the time limit, I need to explain how we arrived at it. It is	
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Day 3 -- Hearing on Preliminary Objections

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17:12 1	PCA and of course the members of the Tribunal. We are	17:15	1	(5.15 pm)	
2	in full agreement on that, Madam President.		2	(- · - I /	(The hearing concluded)
3	Australia greatly appreciates the professionalism		3		(1 1 8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
4	and dedication of, indeed, the court reporter, the		4		
5	technicians, particularly those responsible for the		5		
6	public live stream, our Opus 2 colleagues, the PCA and		6		
7	their staff, of course the Secretary to the Tribunal and		7		
8	the members of the Tribunal themselves.		8		
9	We of course extend our thanks to the Claimant and		9		
10	its legal team for its professionalism and commitment to		10		
11	a smooth and efficient hearing. And if you'll indulge		11		
12	me, may I extend my thanks to the members of the		12		
13	Respondent's team, particularly and perhaps especially		13		
14	those who couldn't join us here in The Hague. And		14		
15	I wish everyone safe travels home.		15		
16	Thank you, Madam President.		16		
17	THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.		17		
18	Anything on your side?				
19	MR PALMER: Well, the only thing I can add is "Happy		18 19		
20	Christmas and Happy New Year", because we probably won't				
20	meet again until after Christmas and New Year! So all		20 21		
22	the best for the season. And that goes to everybody.				
23	Thanks very much.		22		
	THE PRESIDENT: Thank you!		23		
24	-		24		
25	So it remains for the Tribunal to thank all of those		25		
	Page 181				Page 183
17:13 1	who contributed to this hearing and to these				
2	proceedings: the PCA team and the PCA for its				
3	hospitality in the Peace Palace; the court reporter; the				
4	technicians, the Opus technicians and those who handle				
5	the live stream. It was logistically a relatively				
6	complex hearing and it worked absolutely impeccably, so				
7	that needs to be emphasised.				
8	I would also like to thank the party representatives				
9	who attended here and remotely. There are people who				
10	are watching and participating, whom we are not seeing				
11	but who have been part of this hearing, and we should				
12	acknowledge that.				
13	Then of course I would like to thank counsel for				
14	very professional conduct of this arbitration, not only				
15	during the hearing but also during the entire written				
16	phase. It was remarkable in terms of the quality of the				
17	submissions; but also, even though this is a difficult				
18	dispute for both parties we understand that it has				
19	been a very friendly, collegial atmosphere among				
20	counsel. And that is very much appreciated because it				
21	helps the Tribunal focus on the real issues, rather than				
22	being distracted by all kinds of procedural incidents				
23	and skirmishes.				
24	So I wish now everyone a very safe trip back and				
25	I close this hearing. Thank you very much to everyone.				
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49:25 50:12,18,22	101:19 102:14	119:8,16 120:3,17	153:22 167:5	47:21 58:17 72:4	75:24 141:11
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